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When students entered the chambers of Judge Joseph Meade Bailey in 1888 for the educational adventure that was later to become known as Chicago-Kent College of Law, the entire English and 
American legal opus fit in 600 volumes. Chatter inside the chambers might 
have centered on the infamous “Great Boodle Trial,” one of the first public 
corruption trials in Chicago, or the new Rookery Building being built just 
a block north on LaSalle Street. More serious discussion might have turned 
to basic questions about the Constitution and the highest court of the land. 
Should the Bill of Rights be applied to the States? Should everyone have the 
right to have their cases heard by the U.S. Supreme Court?
Outside the judge’s chambers, students were faced with a world of new 
technologies (the telegram, the portable camera, skyscraping architecture) 
and fast-evolving legal questions. Rapid industrialization and the monopo-
listic tendencies of major enterprises, particularly the railroads centered in 
the Midwest, were pushing Congress towards the passage of a path breaking 
“anti-trust” law. Women were permitted to enroll in the early law classes held 
in Judge Bailey’s chambers and they were increasingly involved in providing 
legal aid to the poor through the Protective Agency for Women and Chil-
dren, but were denied the right to sit on juries. And while Albert Goodwill 
Spalding, owner of the Chicago White Stockings, and John Montgomery 
Ward, the nation’s most famous shortstop, were battling over player labor 
issues, post–Civil War tensions were still simmering in a scandalous case that 
pitted California against the President.
 Since those early classes in the late nineteenth century, IIT Chicago-Kent 
graduates have mastered the law and served their clients in all 50 states and 
around the world. They have joined big firms, formed their own firms, cre-
ated businesses, been appointed to the bench, served as legislators, argued 
in the Supreme Court, joined the media, and won awards for their ideas and 
their representation. They have changed the law and changed the world. And 
now, 125 years after the law school was founded, we celebrate the tenacity 
and success of this great Chicago institution and its alumni with tales span-
ning 125 years of law and change.
Lori Andrews and Sarah Harding
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In late-August 1887, as some of Chicago-Kent College of Law’s first students were beginning 
their studies in the chambers of 
Judge Joseph Bailey, a bottle carrying 
a handwritten note bobbed across 
Lake Michigan. Found on the shores 
of Grand Haven, Michigan, the bot-
tle and its contents were rushed to 
a reporter for the then-fledgling 
Chicago Daily Tribune newspaper. 
Thrilled to have scooped the com-
petition, the Tribune published the 
note the next day as an exclusive:
To my friends in Chicago: A 
few more hours and I will be safe 
through the straits and in Canada.
Sheriff Matson, please accept my 
thanks for the bath, but I have 
concluded it in British waters. Oh 
Ed, I wish you were here with me! 
Goodbye till we meet!
The note’s author was William 
J. McGarigle, and he had reason to 
gloat. A former Cook County Com-
missioner and warden of the Cook 
County Hospital, McGarigle had 
successfully fled police custody af-
ter being convicted on corruption 
charges and sentenced to three years 
in prison. McGarigle escaped by 
duping the Sheriff of Cook Coun-
ty, Canute Matson, into allowing 
him a visit with his wife and kids at 
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“The Boodle Aldermen: Each sat in his particular oven,” cartoon by Art Young, 1892.
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their Lakeview home. After asking 
to take a bath to “freshen up,” Mc-
Garigle slipped out a window, made 
his way to a schooner docked along 
the south branch of the Chicago Riv-
er, and sailed out into the lake and 
through the Straits of Mackinaw to 
Canadian waters.
Slipping past the patrol boats, 
knowing he was about to be a free 
man (Canada had no extradition 
treaty with the U.S. at the time), Mc-
Garigle must have chuckled as he 
threw the bottle overboard. When 
found, the note would not only put 
a thorn in the backside of Matson 
and the entire sheriff ’s office, but it 
would surely put a smile on the face 
of his friend, Edward McDonald. 
The “Ed” from the note, McDonald 
was McGarigle’s co-defendant, fel-
low county commissioner, and now 
former cellmate. Keeping McDonald 
in good spirits hadn’t been easy as 
the summer humidity in their cells 
climbed and a transfer to the Joliet 
Penitentiary loomed, but McGari-
gle did his best. The truth was, Ed 
McDonald’s happiness mattered. As 
a long-time board member and the 
Cook County Hospital’s engineer, 
he knew every detail of the swin-
dles that landed them and the other 
county commissioners in jail. But 
more importantly, he was brother to 
Michael “Big Mike” or “King Mike” 
McDonald, boss of the Chicago 
Democratic Machine and the city’s 
first politician gangster.
McGarigle, Ed McDonald, and 
Big Mike McDonald form the nu-
cleus of a fantastic story of proudly 
corrupt politicians, seemingly-righ-
teous reformers, bag men, kidnap-
pers, and suckered citizens, revealed 
through the testimony of the “Great 
Boodle Trial” of 1887. The “most 
sensational corruption scandal of 
the late nineteenth century,” the 
Boodle Trial offers a glimpse into the 
crooked machine politics of early 
Chicago and the equally underhand-
ed tactics of overzealous reformers. 
Called by some a “corrective anti-
dote” to “[a]n epidemic of fraud,” 
the trial helped galvanize the reform 
movement in Chicago, proving that 
even well-connected Chicago politi-
cians could be brought to justice. At 
the same time, it demonstrated the 
lengths—some say necessary; oth-
ers say illegal—reformers would go 
in the pursuit of their goals. Finally, 
the trial reminds us of just how en-
trenched corruption is in Chicago 
politics.  As dramatic as it was at the 
time, the trial may have been the 
beginning, not the end, of Chicago’s 
legacy of corruption.
Chicago’s Great Boodle Trial, which began on June 4, 1887, was 
actually two “prolonged and tedious 
trials.” The first trial pitted State’s 
Attorney Julius Grinnell against 
McGarigle and Ed McDonald; the 
second was against over a dozen 
other commissioners and private 
contractors in an “omnibus” pro-
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ceeding. Both cases centered around 
the same allegations of public cor-
ruption. According to prosecutors, 
a ring of crooked commissioners 
took control of the Cook County 
Board sometime in the early 1880s. 
If a company wanted to do business 
with the county, it had to pay the 
ring a “commission” for the priv-
ilege. What we today call a “pay to 
play” scheme, this arrangement al-
lowed dishonest commissioners and 
business owners to get rich off coun-
ty contracts secured through bribes 
and inflated by padded invoices. Ed 
McDonald helped organize the ring 
and set up the schemes, while Mc-
Garigle, acting as the bag man, col-
lected the bribes and kickbacks—the 
“boodle.” Everything led back to Big 
Mike McDonald, the man who con-
trolled Chicago’s Democratic Party, 
all county patronage, and the county 
board.   
A sampling of the boodlers and 
their schemes, recounted in vivid 
detail through the two trials, shows 
the power of early Chicago machine 
politics and the depth of the com-
missioners’ individual greed. There 
was Harry “Prince Hal” Varnell, a 
gambler and saloon owner appoint-
ed warden of the Cook County In-
sane Asylum. Varnell promptly set 
up a private office and home on the 
grounds of the asylum and outfit-
ted them with “Persian rugs, Brus-
sels carpets, and lace curtains.” He 
ordered expensive foods and paid 
for the living expenses of his neph-
ews, cousins, and friends, all using 
taxpayer money. The asylum’s drug 
store and infirmary served as the 
“clubhouse” for the ring of com-
missioners.
James “Buck” McCarthy joined 
the county board in 1884. A high 
school dropout, former boxer, and 
meat packer in the Chicago stock-
yards, McCarthy’s main qualification 
for being a commissioner was his 
friendship with Big Mike McDon-
ald. McCarthy’s protégé was Charles 
Lynn, who served as a deputy sheriff 
and commissioner. Lynn admitted 
to joining the board “solely for the 
money he could extort,” recounting 
his “scorn” for Chicago industrialists 
who refused to pay the ring its ex-
pected commissions. Charles Frey, 
another McDonald-controlled com-
missioner, was warden of the coun-
ty poor house. He bought silk un-
derwear costing eighty-five dollars, 
charging it to the county as a bale of 
muslin.    
And then there was McGarigle. 
Warden of the county’s 600-bed hos-
pital for the poor, McGarigle’s office 
was adorned in the finest import-
ed damask drapes. China spittoons 
flanked his office door. He even had 
a private horse stable built on hospi-
tal grounds for his personal use. In 
one of the more farcical accounts, it 
was reported that McGarigle had 24 
lightning rods mounted on a hospi-
tal tool shed—one “on every chim-
ney, every alcove, every corner, and 
every crevice.” The lightning rods 
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were installed by Varnell, a business 
agent of the manufacturer.
As the boodlers siphoned off tax 
dollars to fund their lavish offices 
and private dinners, county patients 
suffered. In the Cook County Hos-
pital’s contagious disease ward, “a 
cramped, fetid, 18- by 40-foot room,” 
patients fought for space on only 
six beds, often lying side by side on 
the floor. Unlike the $3.00-a-dozen 
strawberries and grapes Varnell or-
dered for his party guests at the club-
house, patients were served spoiled 
meat. The nurses and orderlies often 
showed up to work drunk. Similar 
conditions were found at the asylum 
and the poor house. Newspapers re-
ported that “the poor, the lunatics, 
and the sick have fared none too 
well, but those who have been hired 
to take care of them live in luxury.”
Not surprisingly, the boodlers’ largess eventually garnered 
notice. In 1886, the county budget 
faced a staggering one million dollar 
deficit (approximately 25 million in 
today’s dollars), which was directly 
tied to the reckless spending of the 
corrupt commissioners. This rallied 
the few reform-minded commis-
sioners on the county board, includ-
ing J. Frank Aldrich, who was also a 
member of the reform-based Union 
League Club of Chicago. The Union 
League Club joined causes with the 
Citizens’ Association, another re-
form group, whose membership in-
cluded George Pullman, one of the 
wealthiest and most powerful in-
dustrialists in the country. Pullman 
and the other reformers brought suit 
against the county board to enjoin 
it from entering into more dubious 
Several men sitting on benches along a hallway in the Cook County Hospital, 1911, DN-0008937, Chicago 
Daily News negatives collection, Chicago History Museum.
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contracts—the first was to drill an 
unnecessary artisan well at the poor 
house—thereby beginning the “re-
form movement in county affairs.”      
Despite the laudable goal of 
ending the “epidemic of fraud” in 
county politics, the reformers were 
not exactly above reproach in their 
tactics. In fact, some of the reform-
ers’ methods rivaled those of the 
boodlers. After filing their civil 
suit, the reformers funded a private 
prosecution of the ring of com-
missioners. Of the $150,000 raised 
(over three and a half million dol-
lars today), at least $30,000 went to 
the Mooney and Boland Detective 
Agency for the purpose of review-
ing county invoices and conducting 
non-stop surveillance of county con-
tractors suspected of paying bribes. 
When the invoices the detectives 
had access to didn’t show evidence of 
bribes, the reformers had ones that 
did stolen from a county safe. The 
“confiscated” documents helped lead 
to a raid on the commissioners’ club-
house, which uncovered additional in-
criminating evidence. 
Now all the reformers needed 
was a witness. A corrupt contrac-
tor, a plumber named Nic Schnei-
der, gave the reformers what they 
were after. Drinking one night at Big 
Mike McDonald’s four-story Clark 
Street gambling parlor and saloon, 
“The Store,” Schneider loudly toasted 
to “county contracts,” saying, “I am 
rich and by gracious in two years I 
shall be as rich as anybody.” Joining 
him in the toast was a county com-
missioner. Two Mooney and Boland 
detectives, who had been surveil-
ling Schneider, witnessed the toast. 
When Schneider left the tavern, the 
detectives followed. Schneider never 
made it home that night. Disappear-
ing with him were his business pa-
pers, including the false invoices he 
wrote to pad county contracts and 
evidence of the commissions he paid 
to secure county work.
The ring of commissioners 
learned through their own private 
detectives that Schneider was being 
held by the reformers. Based on a 
bogus warrant issued for Schnei-
der’s arrest, the commissioners sent 
nine policemen to recapture him, 
but they were turned away after a 
struggle. Schneider, possibly bound 
and gagged in a second floor room, 
could hear the “ruckus” below as the 
men fought over him. He turned 
witness for the prosecution soon 
after and fled out of state, escorted 
(some might say restrained) by two 
private detectives.
The reformers may have felt jus-
tified using such tactics to secure 
evidence against the boodlers given 
their control over the jury system. 
At the time, the grand jury—the 
only body that could issue an indict-
ment formally charging a defendant 
with a serious crime—was selected 
by the county commissioners. Each 
commissioner wrote two names of 
prospective jurors on blank cards, 
which were then drawn from a hat. 
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When a new grand jury was chosen, 
one of the corrupt commissioners 
simply picked cards that had been 
dog-eared by the others in the ring. 
This system, though rudimentary, 
had been used effectively to shield 
machine politicians from prosecu-
tion for over a decade. In fact, when 
asked about the possibility of indict-
ment, Buck McCarthy commented, 
“There are only two powers over the 
[county] board, one is the Almighty, 
the other the grand jury, and we get 
to draw the grand jury.”
McCarthy’s confidence was mis-
placed, however. After reformist 
commissioner Aldrich witnessed the 
loaded draw, the reformers were able 
to convince a judge to empanel a 
special grand jury. The special grand 
jurors, “honest and true men who 
refused to be bribed or intimidated,” 
promptly indicted the ring of com-
missioners and private contractors 
on 106 counts of public corruption. 
The reformers had thus broken the 
“power of puppet master [Big Mike] 
McDonald and his commissioners 
to control the selection of grand ju-
ries that had protected them from 
criminal indictments.”
After unsuccessfully moving for 
a change of venue on the grounds 
that the prosecution had been im-
properly funded by private citizens, 
the Boodle Trial was underway. The 
evidence against McGarigle and 
Ed McDonald was overwhelming. 
“Witness after witness was placed 
on the stand to prove that [they] had 
systematically robbed the taxpay-
ers of this county for a long time.” 
Plumber Nic Schneider became the 
prosecution’s star. Notwithstanding 
accusations of perjury by the defen-
dants, Schneider’s testimony, sup-
ported by his false invoices, showed 
that Ed McDonald was connected 
with four firms that overcharged the 
county for goods and labor and that 
McGarigle collected and disbursed 
the bribes and stolen money. Both 
defendants testified in their own de-
fense, but offered contradictory tes-
timony “of the flimsiest character.”
On June 18, 1887, the jury found 
both men guilty. Later that summer, 
the “other dominoes fell” during the 
omnibus trial. When the verdicts 
were read, “the ball game at White 
Stocking Park was interrupted while 
the people cheered.” The penalties 
for most defendants were substan-
tial, ranging from thousands of 
dollars in fines to three years in the 
penitentiary for McGarigle and Ed 
McDonald. However, a few received 
smaller fines after agreeing to help 
the prosecution and paying restitu-
tion. Buck McCarthy, who was fined 
just $1,000 amid allegations that he 
had influence over one of the jurors, 
told reporters that he was “disap-
pointed and disgusted” with the ver-
dict. (McCarthy went on to be elect-
ed to the Chicago City Council.)
Of course, McGarigle’s flight to 
Canada meant he was never ful-
ly brought to justice. After living 
in Banff, British Columbia for two 
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years where he bought into a livery 
business and invested in a hotel, he 
cut a deal and returned to Chicago. 
He eventually ran a tavern in the 
Clark Street vice district controlled 
by Big Mike McDonald. Ed McDon-
ald didn’t fare as well. While awaiting 
transfer to the penitentiary, his nine-
year-old son died after falling from a 
fire escape at the Cook County Hos-
pital while playing with friends. The 
fall was caused by loose boards that 
hospital workers had failed to secure 
or seal off. Afterward, Ed McDonald 
“lapsed into a deep depression.” He 
served his time in Joliet but was ef-
fectively finished in Chicago politics.
And what of Big Mike McDon-
ald, the boss of the boodlers and the 
architect of their schemes?  He was 
never charged or tried as part of the 
Boodle Trial; the grand jury didn’t 
even vote on whether to indict him. 
Assistant States Attorney John Bens-
ley explained it this way: “In Mike 
McDonald’s case, an indictment 
could not be framed to hold. When 
a man lays all his plans coolly and de-
liberately with the express purpose, 
apparently, of preventing any tracing 
of crookedness to his door it is an ex-
tremely difficult thing to get him with 
legal evidence.” Big Mike explained it 
a little differently, though the senti-
ment was the same. Joking to report-
ers, he said, “[A]fter it’s all over I show 
’em a pretty clean pair of heels and I’ll 
do it this time or I’m very much mis-
taken.” He added, “Most everybody’s 
a boodler nowadays, you know.”
Big Mike McDonald remained on 
top of the Democratic Party for more 
than a decade longer, controlling an 
empire of gambling parlors, saloons, 
and prostitution houses, while di-
recting city and county patronage. 
The Boodle Trial did not slow his op-
erations. The same year of the trial, 
he was reported to have ordered city 
aldermen under his control to ap-
“The Boodlers Convicted,” New York Times head-
line, June 19, 1887. Facing: Photo of Michael “Big 
Mike” McDonald and another man, 1907, DN-
0005146, Chicago Daily News negatives collection, 
Chicago History Museum.
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prove a $200,000 contract for apply-
ing “preserving fluid” to City Hall. 
The fluid, which 
was “guaranteed 
to keep the state-
ly building intact 
for a hundred 
years,” washed 
away in the rain 
two days later. 
The World’s Fair 
that took place in 
Chicago in 1893 
put more millions into Big Mike Mc-
Donald’s pockets as city contracts 
swelled and armies of tourists gam-
bled and drank at The Store. It was at 
this time that McDonald supposedly 
coined the phrase, “There’s a sucker 
born every minute.” Big Mike retired 
to his Ashland Boulevard mansion in 
the early 1900s, content to let the next 
generation of boodlers and gangsters 
try its hand in Chicago.
The legacy of the Great Boodle Trial and the reform efforts it 
epitomized is decidedly mixed. In 
some ways, it was a significant vic-
tory for early Chicago reformers. 
The Boodle Trial was a very public 
demonstration that the city’s ma-
chine politicians—at least most of 
them—were not above the law. All 
told, nine commissioners and coun-
ty contractors who faced trial were 
convicted and sentenced to two 
years or more in jail; four others were 
convicted and fined the maximum 
allowed under statute. Up to that 
time, no politician had received such 
harsh punishment for “boodling.” 
The commission-
ers’ convictions, 
even for those 
receiving only 
fines, also meant 
they would be 
automatically re-
moved from the 
county board. 
By “turn[ing] the 
rascals out of 
the County Board and brand[ing] 
them forever as convicted public 
swindlers,” the trial ended most of 
the commissioners’ political careers, 
and more importantly, Big Mike Mc-
Donald’s control over county con-
tracts. The Tribune called the trial 
“the most successful assault on pub-
lic crooks to that date.”
More broadly, the trial and the 
scandal leading up to it galvanized 
Chicago’s reform-minded citizens, 
kick-starting the city’s reform move-
ment. To successfully investigate 
and prosecute the ring of commis-
sioners, two reformist groups—the 
Union League Club and the Citizens’ 
Association—joined forces. The alli-
ance brought activist industrialists, 
politicians, and judges together, and 
allowed for great sums of money to 
be raised to combat corruption. The 
Boodle Trial was just the first success 
of the reformers. After the trial end-
ed, reformers pressured the state 
legislature to review how jurors were 
selected in Cook County, leading to 
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a revamped jury system in which 
county commissioners no longer 
selected grand juries. This allowed 
prosecutors to bring public corrup-
tion cases under a fair system. With 
the help of a press corps intent on 
publishing more exposés like those 
leading up to the Boodle Trial, re-
formers went on to successfully in-
vestigate and prosecute bail-bond 
fraud and ghost payrolling. Some of 
these reform movements continue 
today.
Yet, to achieve their goals, the 
reformers became separated from 
the corrupt commissioners by only 
a matter of degree. While calling for 
the prosecution of Big Mike McDon-
ald—“the managing and directing 
thief whose influence has cast such a 
blighting shadow over public affairs in 
this county”—reformers kidnapped 
witnesses, stole documents from a 
county safe, and privately funded the 
criminal indictments of their adver-
saries. The reformers’ “ends justifies 
the means” rationalization, which 
they undoubtedly employed, rings 
as hollow as McGarigle’s defense that 
the prevailing system was at fault for 
his crimes—that he just went along 
with the boodling because everyone 
else did. While there are safeguards 
in place today to guard against the 
use of such “impure methods,” many 
contend the prosecutions of recent 
Chicago politicians have been mo-
tivated less by enacting genuine re-
form and more by furthering polit-
ical gain. One current Cook County 
Commissioner, William Beavers, 
awaiting trial for allegedly failing to 
pay taxes on money he took from 
his campaign fund (and used to 
pay gambling losses, among other 
things), has accused prosecutors of 
indicting him as retribution for re-
fusing to wear a wire against John 
Daley, a former commissioner who 
is brother to Richard Daley, Chica-
go’s longest-running mayor.
The best measure of the Boodle 
Trial’s impact is, of course, whether 
it changed the culture of corruption 
in Chicago politics. On that score, 
the trial has had little lasting impact. 
The headlines of today’s Tribune 
read much as they did 125 years ago. 
Month after month, colorful Chica-
go politicians fight indictment (some 
from their county board seats) for 
schemes that would get an approving 
nod from Big Mike McDonald. Bea-
vers is the most recent, and possibly 
the most odd (after being indicted, 
he called the United States Attorney 
prosecuting him a “rooster with no 
nuts”), but he is by no means alone. 
On its way to earning the distinc-
tion of being the most corrupt city 
in the country, Chicago has seen five 
of its governors imprisoned, over 30 
aldermen indicted and convicted, 
and countless other public officials 
investigated. At the top of that list is 
former Governor Rod Blagojevich, 
who is currently serving a 14-year 
prison term for attempting to auc-
tion off President Barack Obama’s 
vacant United States Senate seat for 
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personal gain. Wiretaps of Blagoje-
vich recorded him saying, “I’ve got 
this thing and it’s f—ing golden, and 
. . . I’m just not giving it up for f—in’ 
nothing.”
It could be argued that these 
prosecutions even taking place, 
some against officials at the highest 
levels of government, proves that the 
Boodle Trial has had a lasting im-
pact—the trial showed generations 
of reformers that political corruption 
could be combated in Chicago in a 
meaningful way. Others will more 
cynically say that for every crooked 
politician prosecuted, another will 
take his place, and that the most 
well-connected crooks—the crafty 
bosses like Big Mike McDonald—al-
ways find a way to operate above the 
law. While the truth is likely some-
where in between, the Great Boodle 
Trial reminds us most of all that as 
long as there is boodle, there will be 
men trying to take it. As McGarigle 
remarked a few months before his 
conviction, “I don’t care if the same 
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system prevailed in heaven, there 
would be boodlers. The tempta-
tion is too great. . . .  Men are but 
human[.]” ◆
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Chicago-Kent traces its ori-gin to the incorporation of the Chicago College of Law in 
1888. Chicago-Kent’s founding coin-
cided with the opening of the Rook-
ery Building designed by the preem-
inent architectural firm of Burnham 
and Root. There is a direct connec-
tion between the now iconic Rook-
ery Building, located at Adams and 
LaSalle, and the law school building 
further west on Adams. There is also 
a more indirect but interesting con-
nection between the first and second 
schools of Chicago architecture and 
Daniel Burnham’s vision of the mod-
ern city. Architects, but especially 
Daniel Burnham, helped make and 
sustain Chicago as a world city, thus 
making it an attractive and exciting 
place to practice law to the benefit 
of  all law schools in Chicago in-
cluding Chicago-Kent.
The Rookery is now a classic ex-
ample of the first school of Chica-
go architecture which helped shape 
modern Chicago and continues to 
make Chicago a special place, de-
spite decades of desecration of this 
rich architectural heritage. The Great 
Fire of 1871 destroyed the Loop and 
the newly developed residential ar-
eas to the north. It did, however, nar-
rowly miss the lumber yard which 
occupied the site of the current law 




Rookery Building, Historic American Buildings Survey, Library of Congress.
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attracted to Chicago because of the 
opportunities to rebuild the city. 
The skyscraper was perfected here, 
and this technological innovation, 
along with the telephone and Otis 
Elevator, created the modern office 
city by separating industrial pro-
duction from its administration. By 
1888, Chicago, along with Buenos 
Aires and Sao Paulo, was emerging 
as a major example of a modern city 
unconstrained by any significant ur-
ban past. The city had grown from 
about 100,000 persons when Lin-
coln was nominated for President, 
a few blocks from the current law 
school, to one million inhabitants 
and counting.
Chicago had surpassed Philadel-
phia and became America’s second 
city. Chicago’s location as a rail and 
water hub enabled it to become the 
processing center for the agricultural 
bounty of the Midwest and Great 
Plains as well as the distribution cen-
ter for this region. For a brief period 
of time, wealthy Chicagoans used 
their new wealth and power to pa-
tronize a progressive group of archi-
tects to build modern, forward-look-
ing cathedrals of commerce.
A group of Chicago architects, 
led by Dankmar Adler, Louis Sul-
livan, John Root, Daniel Burnham 
and later Frank Lloyd Wright, de-
veloped a distinctive style of archi-
tecture geared to the technological 
innovations that were changing the 
nature of business. The Rookery is 
a perfect example. The walls were 
partially load-bearing, but the inte-
rior used the state-of-the-art steel 
frame, developed by William Jenny, 
to permit it to become the tallest 
building in Chicago. The building 
is a mix of early modernist and ret-
rospective styles. The walls of large 
windows allowed maximum use of 
light because of the dimness of the 
20 watt bulbs powered by Common-
wealth Edison’s first loop generating 
station across the street. The exterior 
building is also an example of Chi-
cago Romanesque. This style, whose 
distinctive feature was the arch, was 
based on pre-Gothic Romanesque 
architecture in southern France. Ini-
tially adopted by Frank Richardson 
in Boston, the great Louis Sullivan 
brought it to Chicago. The Auditorium 
Theater, which opened in 1889, is 
the best surviving example.
After the elite lost interest in 
“modern architecture,” innovation 
languished in Chicago until the 
post–World War II modernist school 
emerged. Until the 1980s, Post-War 
Chicago architecture was a monu-
ment to Mies van der Rohe. Fleeing 
Nazi Germany, he ultimately settled 
in Chicago, headed IIT’s then De-
partment of Architecture, designed 
its landmark campus, and more 
generally helped make the German 
Bauhaus the dominant form of post– 
World War II Chicago architecture.
The law school’s current building, 
which opened in 1992, is a synthesis 
of the two great schools of  Chica-
go architecture. Its scale and facade 
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recall the post-fire Prairie School, 
especially the Rookery Building. 
However, the incorporation of an 
arch into early designs was rejected 
as disproportionate to the building. 
Not only is it about the same height, 
it was designed by Holabird and 
Root, the successor firm to Burnham 
and Root. The relatively austere stone 
facade, rather than a pure steel and 
glass frame characteristic of Mies’s 
main campus buildings, echoes the 
Rookery in both style and underly-
ing philosophy. And, like the law, it 
both respects the past and looks to 
the future. Burnham rejected the ar-
gument of Louis Sullivan and Frank 
Lloyd Wright that America needed 
a distinctive style of architecture. 
Rather, “Burnham and his allies,” as 
the Encyclopedia of Chicago explains, 
“believed that the sometimes frantic 
quest for ‘American-ness’—the ob-
session with New World originality 
and horror of all things Europe-
an—was itself a kind of insecurity, 
and that maturity would consist in 
an acknowledgment that America 
was not culturally isolated from the 
rest of the world. Burnham and his 
associates saw the United States as 
a rightful heir to the traditions of 
Western culture.”
Daniel Burnham’s larger legacy 
for Chicago and its vibrant legal 
community is twofold. First, Prairie 
School architecture both symbolized 
Chicago’s emergence as a world city 
in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century by allowing it to drain 
“Rookery Building, exterior,” photo from 1891, Images of America Collection, Frances Loeb Library.
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the surrounding region of both re-
sources and talent, legal and other-
wise. This legacy along with Burn-
ham’s partially realized 1909 plan 
also helped Chicago to evolve into a 
major financial center, after its origi-
nal industrial base of Chicago eroded 
after World War II. The concentra-
tion of law firms to serve Chicago’s 
economy provided  employment for 
thousands of lawyers.
The second legacy of Burnham’s 
plan is much darker but also benefit-
ted Chicago lawyers. The much hailed 
plan envisioned Chicago as a great 
city in the mold of Paris or Imperial 
Vienna. But the plan primarily con-
centrated on a magnificent core and 
lakefront for the wealthy. The un-
ruly, poor, polluted, and dangerous 
rest of the city, home to the waves of 
immigrants from around the world 
and migrants from other parts of the 
country, was depicted only by end-
less low rise, uniform blocks. In other 
words, the city that actually existed 
was largely ignored. It was left to 
others to deal with what was in fact 
happening on the streets of Chica-
go. In the twentieth century, Chi-
cago’s continuing attempts to deal 
with urban problems such as racial 
segregation, urban poverty, substan-
dard housing, rampant corruption, 
and juvenile and gang violence have 
provided endless opportunities for 
lawyers and future lawyers trying to 
obtain justice for individuals caught 
in the net of poverty, corruption, 
brutality, and discrimination equally 
characteristic of Chicago, including 
a young Columbia University grad-
uate (and Chicago-Kent commence-
ment speaker), Barack Obama. ◆
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When we think of extraor-dinary nineteenth cen-tury legal institutions 
and innovations, we generally do 
not think of women. In fact, in 1875, 
the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that Illinois’ refusal to admit 
women to the bar did not violate the 
newly passed Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution. Yet 
remarkably, in 1885, women in Chi-
cago created the Protective Agency 
for Women and Children (PAWC), 
which was one of the very first orga-
nizations in the country to provide 
free legal aid to the poor.
The PAWC began inauspiciously 
and indirectly. In 1876, Caroline 
M. Brown, a wealthy woman and 
mother of two children, founded 
the Chicago Women’s Club (CWC) 
by inviting 21 women to meet in 
her living room to learn about and 
discuss the day’s pressing social, po-
litical, and cultural issues. Brown 
was acutely aware of the limited 
sphere in which elite women could 
maneuver respectably and worried 
that some might take a dim view of 
the club. Yet, in the aftermath of the 
disastrous 1871 fire, Chicago was 
a particularly hospitable place for 
such a group, as women had creat-
ed organizations to provide charity 
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The Legal Aid Society, established in 1905 from a merger of PAWC and the Legal Aid Bureau, photo by 
Charles J. Bernauer, 1919, ICHi-36161, Chicago History Museum.
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and relief to victims of the fire. Thus 
a tradition of middle-class and elite 
women’s organizing already was be-
ginning to develop in Chicago.
One of the first projects of the 
CWC was to place a woman night 
matron in each police station and 
the club hired and raised funds for 
the matron’s salary. The issue of hav-
ing women police matrons was one 
embraced by numerous women’s 
organizations across the country. It 
was an appropriate women’s issue be-
cause it involved the supervision of 
working-class and poor women un-
der the rationale of protecting such 
women’s virtue from male prisoners 
and from policemen (often immi-
grant men). Responsibility for the 
matron gave CWC members cause 
to visit the jails as well as to follow 
jailed women’s cases through court 
proceedings. They observed first-
hand the treatment of poor women 
and girls in Chicago courts as defen-
dants, witnesses, and victims.
These experiences underlay the 
CWC’s decision to create the Pro-
tective Agency for Women and Chil-
dren in 1885. The PAWC announced 
as its objective: “To secure justice for 
women and children, to give legal 
counsel free of charge, and to ex-
tend moral support to the wronged 
and helpless.” Significant to notice 
here is that the PAWC limited its 
clientele to women. In fact, gender 
was fundamental to how members 
of the PAWC viewed themselves, 
constructed their roles and du-
ties, and defined the problems that 
they sought to solve. According to 
the PAWC, elite and middle-class 
women had a unique responsibility 
to protect poor and working-class 
women from a host of dangers and 
injustices. Central to the PAWC’s 
ideology was the argument that men 
as a whole had failed to create a mor-
al and just society. Instead, men had 
constructed a world that was rife 
with injustices to women and gov-
erned by a corrupt political system 
in which men put self-interest before 
the public good.
Charlotte Holt was hired by the 
PAWC as the organization’s superin-
tendent. She ran the office and inter-
viewed women who sought aid. She 
and her assistants, board members, 
and volunteers then would investi-
gate cases and attempt to settle them. 
A male attorney would become in-
volved only if a lawsuit was filed, 
which was a rare event. Each year, 
the number of clients to whom the 
PAWC ministered grew exponentially. 
In its first year, the PAWC handled 
156 cases, in its third year 1,145, and 
by 1905 over four thousand. There 
were few rules regarding the types 
of cases that the PAWC would take. 
Rather it functioned flexibly and 
often improvised, meeting needs as 
they arose. Thus unlike the practice 
of most later legal aid societies, the 
PAWC did not have eligibility re-
quirements, did not require that a 
client be worthy, and was entirely 
unconcerned that it might take cases 
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away from attorneys. As the PAWC’s 
superintendent stated, “We do not 
make any rules, but judge of each 
case as it comes to us.”
The two largest categories of cases 
were wage claims involving women 
whose employers had failed to pay 
them and domestic relations claims. 
In wage cases, Holt and other board 
members, using their influence and 
persuasion through letters and per-
sonal visits, pressured employers to 
pay such wages. This form of con-
ciliation was used so often that the 
PAWC dubbed it “White Mailing.” 
The “white” was intended to imply 
that it was done in the name of jus-
tice, morality, and the public good, 
as opposed to blackmail which was 
done for self-interest.
The bulk of the PAWC’s domestic 
relations cases raised issues of aban-
donment and/or non-support of 
wives by husbands. These cases went 
to the heart of the PAWC’s belief in 
the absolute obligation of a husband 
to support his wife and children. In 
a typical case, a woman would ap-
pear at the PAWC’s office claiming 
that her husband disappeared weeks 
ago, leaving her penniless. Now the 
landlord was demanding rent, and 
the furniture was being repossessed. 
At times, the husband was close by 
living with relatives and at other 
times he had traveled far away. Of-
ten the wife would have some sense 
of where the husband was staying 
and where he worked. The PAWC 
would take the case, search for the 
husband, threaten him with a law-
suit for failure to support, and col-
lect support payments for the wife. 
If the husband did not agree to pay, 
the PAWC often would convince 
his employer to pay wages directly 
to the PAWC for the benefit of the 
wife. Actions such as these com-
bined the threat of litigation with 
public humiliation by making visi-
ble a man’s failure as a breadwinner. 
In the small number of cases where 
these methods failed, the PAWC 
might file a lawsuit against the hus-
band for non-support. Meanwhile 
the PAWC also would negotiate with 
the landlord and furniture dealer for 
lower or postponed payments. The 
PAWC rarely initiated lawsuits and 
this was for good reason. A lawsuit 
would require that the PAWC’s male 
lawyer become involved. Even more 
important, the PAWC had  little faith 
in the courts and did not believe that 
courts could actually deliver justice.
The PAWC’s vision of legal aid went well beyond representing 
plaintiffs in claims for monetary 
damages. Rather the PAWC de-
vised for itself the mission of over-
seeing the court system’s treatment 
of poor and working-class women’s 
cases involving sexual assault. The 
PAWC declared that they intended 
to protect such women from a legal 
system that too often failed to take 
seriously cases in which women 
made claims of rape or sexual abuse. 
Rather, courts and the state dis-
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missed charges, charged defendants 
with minor offenses, or even found 
defendants innocent in cases where 
significant proof of abuse existed. 
The PAWC argued that defendants’ 
lawyers endlessly delayed cases and 
inappropriately influenced judges. 
If a trial occurred, the defendant’s 
lawyer humiliated the victim by at-
tacking her character and chastity. 
Likewise the state’s attorney, who 
was at best overworked and apathet-
ic, could not be relied upon to pros-
ecute cases fully.
Leaders of the Agency also be-
lieved that the court system was 
filled with justices of the peace and 
police magistrates who had obtained 
their appointment through political 
connections and were often corrupt. 
By contrast with corrupt non-elite 
justices of the peace, police magis-
trates, and lawyers, PAWC members 
considered themselves more compe-
tent and certainly more virtuous. In 
1887, the PAWC confidently wrote 
a letter to state appellate judges re-
garding the deplorable state of the 
lower courts. The letter declared, 
“We have had cases in which we 
believe political influences have 
governed the Justices. We have had 
cases in which sympathy with vice 
seemingly decided the question. We 
have had cases in which the attor-
ney for the accused controlled the 
Justice, and it was deemed impos-
sible to secure a fair hearing.” They 
further complained of intentional 
delays, mind-numbing technicali-
ties, discourteous treatment by court 
personnel, crowded courtrooms, 
and magistrates’ and court officers’ 
lack of sympathy with or concern 
for poor women. The letter urged 
the appellate justices to appoint only 
the most qualified attorneys to judi-
cial positions. Regarding the issue 
of qualifications, the PAWC’s com-
plaints were laden with contradic-
tions. Even its most powerful and 
active members did not have formal 
legal training, and the PAWC’s mis-
sion was to exert their own influence 
over judges.
Part of what the PAWC found so 
objectionable was that police magis-
trates and other lower court judges 
were not only deeply ensconced in 
politics but were also non-elite, often 
immigrant men. The PAWC’s attack 
on court officials reflected their larg-
er fear of the power that immigrants 
and non-elite men, through political 
connections and the system of Chi-
cago’s ward bosses, had obtained. By 
contrast with the supposedly illegit-
imate power exercised by court offi-
cials, the members of the PAWC saw 
themselves and the power that they 
exercised to be earned, natural, and 
above reproach.
When the PAWC learned about 
a case of sexual violence, it became 
involved in multiple ways, including 
conducting its own investigation, 
gathering evidence, and speaking 
with judges and attorneys. At times, 
PAWC members would pressure 
the state’s attorney into allowing the 
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PAWC’s own attorney to prosecute 
cases. In their own words, they would 
act “the sister’s part.” One of the 
PAWC’s best-publicized and most 
visible tactics was to appear en masse 
in courtroom proceedings involving 
cases of sexual assault. In doing so, 
they functioned as judicial watch-
dogs whose presence was intended 
to shame court officials and lawyers 
into proper behavior. PAWC mem-
bers walked a fine line in assuming 
this role, as truly respectable wom-
en rarely appeared in court, which 
all recognized as a masculine space. 
Chicago’s police courts were rough-
and-tumble places—crowded, noisy, 
filled with smoke, and teeming with 
defendants of all sorts. These were 
hardly places where ladies appeared. 
Responding to the PAWC’s actions, 
some court officials declared that the 
courts, especially police courts, were 
not an appropriate place for respect-
able women. Such judicial opprobri-
um only increased the PAWC’s te-
nacity and paradoxically augmented 
the impact had by the public nature 
of their protests. As the PAWC ex-
plained, “The presence of a delega-
tion of reputable women, women of 
social position and influence, chang-
es the moral tone of Police court, 
and imparts courage to a timid girl, 
whose very innocence confuses her, 
in the presence of so many strange 
men.”
As PAWC members invaded the 
courtroom, they also began to ques-
tion substantive and evidentiary laws 
regarding sex crimes. Particularly 
infuriating was how defense law-
yers raised issues of a victim’s con-
sent and used past sexual conduct 
to demonstrate consent, even when 
crimes involved girls. The PAWC 
strongly condemned as hypocritical 
the double standard that permitted 
men to have sex outside marriage 
while condemning women who did 
so. Connecting this understanding 
to the legal arena, they sought to 
make a woman’s chastity and morali-
ty irrelevant to the question whether 
she was the victim of a sex crime. As 
members continued to attend court, 
they began to assert that the courts’ 
unfair treatment of women in cases 
regarding sexual violence was not 
caused only by individual men’s be-
havior. Rather, the PAWC insisted, 
this unfair treatment was engrained 
into law and required the enactment 
of new laws that would exclude evi-
dence of a women’s chastity or previ-
ous conduct. It explained, “[I]mmo-
rality should be no hindrance to 
legal rights in one sex more than the 
other.” It also campaigned to raise 
the legal age of consent, which in 
Illinois was ten for a girl. Laws rais-
ing the age of consent went hand-
in-hand with reforming evidentiary 
rules and burden of proof standards, 
as statutory rape made questions of 
consent and a girl’s character and past 
sexual conduct moot. As the PAWC 
understood, such reformed laws re-
moved a judge’s discretion and further 
controlled defense attorneys’ behavior.
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Significantly, the PAWC did not 
conceptualize its legal work as dis-
tinct from its other work, which in-
cluded providing non-legal advice, 
giving financial aid, locating lodg-
ings, finding employment, and seek-
ing medical services for its clients. It 
would have made little sense to the 
women of the PAWC to believe that 
the purpose of legal aid was simply 
to provide their clients the ability to 
go to court separated from a concern 
with substantive justice or material 
well-being. Moreover, they claimed, 
the PAWC provided its clients with 
“self-respect” and “self-dependence.”
The women of the PAWC also 
tended to accept the stories told by 
those women seeking their help. In 
other words, they presumptively be-
lieved their clients rather than find-
ing their stories suspect. Moreover, 
they appreciated the importance of 
allowing clients to tell their stories 
slowly, which they asserted “busy 
lawyers would not bear.” As they rec-
ognized, many women who sought 
help did not have legally cognizable 
claims. But they believed that client 
narratives had value in and of them-
selves. “Many a tale of woe is told 
in our office, the mere listening to 
which by sympathetic and intelli-
gent women is all the help possible. 
It is astonishing how grateful some 
of these women are for the opportu-
nity of telling their trials to such lis-
teners.” For a poor woman to tell her 
story to a middle-class or wealthy 
woman and to have her listen to and 
acknowledge her story must have 
given the poor women a sense of 
empowerment and agency.
Like attorneys, volunteers and 
employees of the PAWC treated all 
conversations with clients as con-
fidential, often refusing to write or 
speak about individual cases. As 
Holt wrote, “Much of our work is of 
a confidential nature, and as our aim 
has always been to encourage women 
to come to us for advice and coun-
sel, it has been one of the essential 
stimulants to them to be assured of 
the strictly private nature of all work 
that could be kept private.” Thus the 
Agency never publicly discussed its 
cases in any detail, even in its fund-
Photo of Lucy Louisa Flower, long-time officer of the 
PAWC, Chicago Markers of Distinction, http://chi-
cagotribute.org/Markers/Flower.htm.
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raising materials. By contrast with 
a variety of reform organization, 
especially those related to women, 
the PAWC eschewed melodramatic 
narratives of seduction and betrayal 
of young women. In their view, such 
stories and issues were so serious 
that they needed to stand outside 
popular discourse. They were not to 
be traded upon and instead were to 
be treated as precious.
Early in its history, the PAWC’s members correctly understood 
their power as coming from their 
class and social position. As time 
passed, they began to base their 
claims to expertise and authority 
on their growing legal knowledge 
and experience. They proudly pro-
claimed that the bench and the bar 
recognized and appreciated their 
expertise. The PAWCs relationship 
to judges and attorneys was compli-
cated, because they simultaneously 
looked down on many lawyers and 
judges while still longing for their 
acceptance and basking in their 
compliments. When long-time offi-
cer and board member Mary Potter 
Crane died, the PAWC boasted that 
“she had a judicial mind, and was 
always welcome at the State’s At-
torney’s office, and her advice and 
counsel in difficult cases . . . were 
frequently sought by attorneys.” 
Likewise, one board member wrote 
that Charlotte Holt “has so won the 
respect and confidence of the courts 
that whatever case she presents 
is sure of respectful hearing.” The 
PAWC was also particularly proud 
when, in the late 1890s, they re-
ceived requests from judges to have 
the PAWC station a representative 
in every police court to handle cases 
involving women, an affirmation 
of the PAWC’s importance and its 
members’ legal and practical ex-
pertise.
The work of the PAWC had last-
ing influence not only in shaping the 
idea and practice of providing orga-
nized legal aid to the poor, but also 
in building Chicago’s specialized 
courts, including its juvenile and 
domestic relations courts. A num-
ber of women who were officers of 
the PAWC played significant roles 
in the creation of these courts and 
the PAWC may have functioned as a 
model for such courts. Both of these 
courts were intended to move away 
from an adversary model of law and 
sought to minimize the role of law-
yers. Likewise, tremendous discre-
tion was vested in social workers, 
often women, whose job was to un-
derstand holistically those who ap-
peared before the court. They were 
to use such knowledge to fashion 
individual solutions and such courts 
were intended to be flexible insti-
tutions not bound by strict under-
standings of the rule of law.
The PAWC was an extraordinary 
institution. At a time when only a 
miniscule number of women were 
lawyers, it created a space in which 
women provided legal advice to 
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other women. Situated within a 
thick network of women’s clubs, the 
PAWC expanded its activities to pro-
vide a wide range of legal services to 
women, and it refused to make hard 
distinctions either between the types 
of cases that it would handle or be-
tween legal versus non-legal cases. 
In 1905, the PAWC became the Chi-
cago Legal Aid Society and its vision 
of legal aid as part of a continuum of 
care became the hallmark of a Chi-
cago-style of legal aid which is still 
with us today. ◆
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When Chicago-Kent’s pre-decessors were founded in 1888 there were no 
e-commerce, wireless access to media, 
e-mail, Facebook friends, or airline 
delays. That does not mean, however, 
that people did not shop remotely, en-
joy entertainment, communicate with 
friends, or travel. They just did them 
in other ways, all of which sometimes 
spawned disputes, some of which 
found their way into the courts. What 
follows is a story of the dreams of 125 
years ago. The characters are fiction-
al. What they talk about is not.
✳          ✳          ✳
Annie Morton, 22, had just finished 
playing “Now Where Did You Get 
That Hat?” on the piano in the parlor 
of the rooming house at 2210 South 
Prairie Street in Chicago. 
“I should like to have one just the 
same as that!
“Where’er I go, they shout ‘Hello! 
Where did you get that hat?’” she 
sang.
Patrick Boland, still dressed in his 
telegraph messenger’s blue uniform 
with red trim, sat on the couch by 
the piano and applauded. His cap 
with a prominent brass number “79” 
sat on the table beside him.
WHAT'S A TELEGRAM?
Henry H. Perritt, Jr.
“Telegraph operator printing telegram,” photo by Waldon Fawcett, c. 1908, National Photo Company Collection, 
Library of Congress.
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Annie giggled and then looked at 
Luther Wardell, who was sitting 
in a plush chair beside the couch. 
“What’s the matter, Luther?” she 
asked. “You don’t like it? It’s one of 
the most popular songs this year.”
“Oh, I’m sorry!” Luther said. He 
plucked at his blue denim trousers. 
“I enjoyed it. I was just thinking 
while I listened.”
“About the strike?” Patrick asked.
“Yeah. I think I’m just going to go 
home and help work the farm. I 
didn’t think they’d fire all of us. Who 
knew that they’d be able to get hun-
dreds of strike breakers to work as 
switchmen and brakemen within a 
week.”
“That’s the CB&Q Railroad for you,” 
Patrick said. “They’re even nastier to 
their passengers than to the brake-
men. They’re tough.”
“Everyone is tough,” Luther re-
sponded. “I’m sick of it. You come to 
Chicago to make your fortune, and 
everyone holds you down. There are 
no decent jobs.”
“Sure there are,” Patrick said. “I’ve 
got one, with American District 
Telegraph Company. When I was 
started, at age twelve, the pay was 
$17 per month. Now, I’m one of 
about one-hundred boys employed, 
most in the La Salle Street central of-
fice, but I’m up to $20.”
“Oh, we know, we know,” Luther 
said. “Seven long years you’ve been 
telling us your boring stories about 
it.”
“It’s not boring at all. It’s exciting,” 
Patrick said, glancing at his cap 
proudly and determined to gain the 
upper hand against Luther. “We’re al-
lowed to take on special errands for 
our customers. One guy who owns 
the livery stable up by the river paid 
me two dollars to follow his wife and 
report to him that she had spent a 
good part of her day with one of the 
stable boys.” He was disappointed by 
Annie’s lack of reaction.
“I’ve heard that Western Union pays 
better,” Annie said. “They have about 
140 boys, about half of them working 
out of the main office at La Salle and 
Washington Streets.” Annie liked to 
tease Patrick almost as much as she 
liked playing music.
“It’s not so bad,” Patrick said. He liked 
for Annie to think well of him. “We 
wait on benches at the office and get 
called in turn, according to when we 
went out last. Almost everyone rides 
a safety bicycle now. When a cus-
tomer rings his call box, we ride out 
and pick up a handwritten message 
and bring it back for transmission.”
“What’s a safety bicycle?” Luther 
asked.
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“You are a farm boy,” Patrick laughed. 
“You ought to get one. They’ve been 
out for three years. They’re much 
better than the old kind with a large 
front wheel and a smaller rear one. 
These new ones have pneumatic 
tires.”
“I can’t afford one now,” Luther said 
glumly.
“I don’t like it that we have to pay for 
our own uniforms,” Patrick admit-
ted. “They cost $12, and they take it 
out of our pay.”
“I bet you have to buy your own bi-
cycle, too,” Luther said. “That’s not 
for me.  I’ve got loans to pay back 
now.”
“You had to borrow money only be-
cause you lived so high during the 
strike. You should have saved up be-
forehand,” Annie said.
She shifted her attention back to Pat-
rick. “You’re a thing of the past,” An-
nie said. “What do people need with 
telegraph boys when they can just 
use the telephone?”
“Don’t be ridiculous,” Patrick said. 
“Telephones will never replace the 
telegraph. Everyone knows that. Did 
you see the article in the January 1, 
1888, Chicago Daily Tribune?”
“No.”
“It was headlined, ‘Telephones a Nui-
sance.’ It quoted the Reedy Elevator 
Manufacturing Company as saying, 
‘The service we receive is not at all 
satisfactory, and if all instruments 
could be removed we would have 
ours fired at once. Would much pre-
fer the old system of messengers, let-
ters, or dispatches, as frequent costly 
errors are made by telephone, which 
you cannot trace to any reliable party. 
We don’t think the telephone com-
pany has sufficient assistance in their 
offices to wait on calls promptly. Fre-
quently we ring three or four times 
before we hear the lazy “hello?” and 
more frequently they reply, “Busy 
now—call again,” or “Busy; will ring 
you up when through.” But they nev-
“Frank, the Telegraph Boy,” illustration (uncredited) 
from The Telegraph Boy by Horatio Alger, Jr., 1879.
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er ring. We consider it very poor ser-
vice. But as our neighbors and cus-
tomers have the phone we must keep 
up with the procession.’”
“That’s not fair,” Annie said. “I work 
very hard. So does everyone else.”
“We’re all getting screwed,” Luther 
said. “And now, that robber baron, 
Benjamin Harrison, stole the elec-
tion from Grover Cleveland.”
“He’s not a robber baron,” Annie said. 
“I wouldn’t think you would favor 
Cleveland. He vetoed pensions for 
veterans. He’s not for the common 
man. And he’s a sympathizer for the 
South. He would have never sup-
ported the women’s suffrage move-
ment. We’re poised to get something 
done, now, on the amendment. The 
two main organizations merged last 
year.”
“Women’s suffrage—pshaw!” Luther 
said. “Next thing they’ll want is to 
shut down the saloons.”
“It would help you save money for 
a bicycle, if they were shut down,” 
Annie said. “Anyway, I’m going to 
do my part. I’m going to become a 
lawyer.”
“A lawyer!” Patrick said. “You can’t 
be a lawyer.”
“Yes I can. Did you see the story in 
the September 7, 1888, edition of the 
Chicago Daily Tribune? Miss Emma 
Baumann and Miss Ada Dalter ap-
plied for admission to the Chicago 
Evening Law School. Several of the 
seventy young men already enrolled 
objected and went to Judge Moran, 
one of the founders, who rebuked 
them and said that the precedent 
was well established that women 
could be admitted to the bar. I’m go-
ing to apply.”
“Even if they let you in,” Patrick said, 
“and even if you get admitted to the 
bar, no one will give a girl lawyer any 
work.”
“I hope you won’t borrow any mon-
ey for that,” Luther said, laughing. 
“You’d be better off borrowing it to 
go to saloons.”
“I’ve already got a promise of some 
work,” Annie said. “One of the me-
chanics at the telephone company 
wants me to help him get a patent 
for his idea for a new switchboard 
apparatus. It’s a good idea. The days 
of making a telephone call by sig-
naling a switchboard operator and 
giving her the name of the person 
to be called are over. They have just 
introduced five-digit numbers to 
accommodate the rapid growth in 
subscribers. Now automatic dialing 
is being introduced in Chicago—”
“Because of the rude and lazy opera-
tors,” Luther said.
Then & Now: Stories of Law and Progress30
“What does this guy look like?” Pat-
rick asked.
“Jealous?” Annie teased.
“Well, you ought to think about it,” 
Patrick said. “You’re on the verge of 
becoming an old maid.”
“And all the inventiveness is already 
producing lots of lawsuits—more 
work for lawyers,” Annie argued. 
“Alexander Graham Bell and West-
ern Union are suing each other. 
Morse’s patent for the telegraph is 
always being challenged.”
“Keep your job, but organize,” Lu-
ther said. “Launch a strike against all 
this mechanical foolishness, taking 
away jobs. It was bad enough on the 
railroad.”
“Oh, right,” Annie said. “It’s a won-
der you still have all your fingers. 
They need to make the Janney auto-
matic coupler mandatory.”
“I guess I don’t have to worry about 
that anymore,” Luther said, flexing 
the fingers on both hands and look-
ing at them. “That’s another thing a 
union could do for us. The most ba-
sic goal, though, is to insist on what 
the Congress just did for mail carri-
ers: making eight hours a full day of 
work, with overtime pay for hours 
worked over eight.”
“That’ll never happen,” Patrick de-
clared. “And they shouldn’t have 
done it for the post office workers. 
They don’t work as hard as we do, 
and we damn sure don’t have a deal 
like that.”
“They deliver mail twice a day to res-
idential customers and four times a 
day to businesses,” Luther said.
“It would be quicker if they rode bi-
cycles, like we do,” Patrick said.
“Just wait,” Annie said. “Bicycles 
aren’t the future. Self-propelled car-
riages are. The Wisconsin legislature 
just awarded a prize for a steam-pro-
pelled carriage that completed a 
race from Green Bay to Madison, a 
distance of 201 miles at an average 
speed of six miles per hour.”
“That was nine years ago,” Luther 
said. “And nothing has come of it. 
There’ll be flying machines before 
horses and railroads need to be 
afraid.”
“Better try to get a union for the 
horses,” Annie said. “There will be 
flying machines. Four years ago, a 
man named John Joseph Montgom-
ery made a glider flight near San Di-
ego.”
“Yeah, but you can’t put a steam 
engine in a glider,” Patrick said. He 
laughed. “If they could, Luther, you 
can make sure they hook them to-
gether with automatic couplers. A 
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flying train!”
“I’m telling you,” Annie said. “Peo-
ple are inventing things all over the 
place. Pretty soon, I won’t have to 
learn the new songs to play them on 
the piano. Thomas Edison just got a 
patent for a machine that plays mu-
sic from grooves etched on a wax 
cylinder.”
“Well, I guess they can stop work 
on the Auditorium Theatre,” Patrick 
said, “even though it’s scheduled to 
open next year. President Harrison 
and Vice-President Levi Morton 
are supposed to come to the grand 
opening. They’ll be disappointed to 
hear that all the operas and plays 
are going to have to find somewhere 
else to perform in Chicago. Oh—I 
forgot—there won’t be any operas 
and plays. They’ll be a thing of the 
past. Everyone will stay at home, 
sit on the couch and listen to ‘pho-
nographs.’ They’ll all get fat, and no 
one will learn how to play the piano 
anymore.”
Annie ignored him. “And he just 
applied for another one: an ‘Opti-
cal Phonograph,’ capable of show-
ing pictures in full-motion. Already, 
people are excited about the Kodak, 
the first roll-film camera just pat-
ented. And a man named Herman 
Hollerith received a patent for an 
automatic tabulating machine. You 
punch numbers into paper cards and 
his machine sorts them.”
“You must have gotten into your 
mother’s laudanum,” Patrick said. 
“Next thing you’ll predict is send-
ing telegraph signals through the air, 
without wires.”
Photo of telephone operators sitting at a switchboard, 1903, DN-0001438, Chicago Daily News 
negatives collection, Chicago History Museum.
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“It’s possible,” Annie said. “An En-
glish scientist, James Clark Maxwell, 
has already proven mathematically 
that electricity can be transferred 
through free space, and a German, 
Heinrich Hertz, has demonstrated it 
in his laboratory.”
“Things are changing pretty fast,” 
Luther said, showing a spark of en-
thusiasm for the first time. “There 
sure is a lot of stuff being invented 
on the railroads,” Luther said. “The 
Janney automatic coupler is one; 
airbrakes before that. Now, people 
are working on automatic signaling 
systems and even on ways to replace 
the steam locomotive with some 
kind of engine that burns fuel inside 
the cylinders. I’ve been coming up 
with some ideas of my own before I 
got caught up in the strike.” A hint 
of sadness returned to his face. “One 
thing I’ll miss is all the machinery.”
He thought for a moment and then 
rushed on: “Think about what Old 
Man Sears and his partner Roe-
buck have already done. Their new 
‘Sears & Roebuck’ catalog was just 
published from their new office on 
Homan Street. It advertises watches 
and jewelry, which can be purchased 
by mail. ‘Book of Bargains: A Money 
Saver for Everyone,’ ‘Cheapest Sup-
ply House on Earth,’ and ‘Our trade 
reaches around the World,’ he brags. 
People are ordering them like crazy. 
There’s no reason they can’t include 
other stuff, like sewing machines, 
sporting goods, musical instru-
ments, saddles, firearms, buggies, 
bicycles, baby carriages, eyeglasses, 
clothing . . . ” He looked at Patrick. 
“Or safety bicycles,” he said.
“She must have given you some of 
the laudanum,” Patrick said. “Steam 
powered gliders linked with auto-
matic couplers, card sorting ma-
chines linked with vapor telegraph 
signals. Just imagine!” Patrick chuck-
led. “For that matter you could order 
from the catalog with a vapor tele-
gram. Old Man Sears would track 
the orders by sorting the cards, and 
deliver the stuff by steam powered 
gliders and steam carriages.”
“I tell you what, Luther,” Annie said. 
“Don’t go back to the farm. Stay 
here, with us. I’ll become a lawyer 
and help you get patents on all the 
stuff you’ll invent—if you keep all 
your fingers. Go talk to Reverend 
Frank Wakeley Gunsaulus, the min-
ister at Plymouth Congregational 
Church. He’s already trying to per-
suade Philip Armour to extend his 
grant for the Sunday School that Ju-
lia Beveridge is running to establish 
a new kind of school where students 
of all backgrounds can prepare for 
meaningful roles in a changing in-
dustrial society, to study mechanics, 
chemistry, architecture, and library 
science. They already have some-
thing like that in Boston. It’s named 
the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology—‘Boston Tech,’ most people 
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call it.”
Luther looked at her.
“We’d make a good team,” she urged, 
with a quick glance at Patrick.
“Who knows?” Luther added. “May-
be we’ll get married.” He leered at 
Patrick.
“Maybe,” Annie said, “Even though 
Patrick is cuter in that uniform. Put 
on the hat, handsome.”
“Ha!” Luther said. “I can just see it. 
He’ll still be riding his safety bicycle 
around the streets of Chicago asking 
people if they want to send a telegram, 
and they’ll say, ‘What’s a telegram?’”
Annie laughed. Patrick tried to 
smile, the hat halfway to his head.
“And then,” Luther said, looking at the 
hat and laughing harder. “They’ll say, 
‘now where did you get that hat.’” ◆
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The year the Chicago-Kent College of Law was found-ed, a new consumer product 
arrived on the scene: the portable 
camera. Before then, taking some-
one’s photo was a big deal. A person 
would get dressed up and go to a stu-
dio. Photos were not taken without a 
person’s permission.  But the porta-
ble camera changed all that—and in 
the process led to the development 
of legal rights of privacy that endure 
today.
An 1890 newspaper article 
warned:
Have you seen the Kodak fiend? 
Well, he has seen you. He caught 
your expression yesterday while 
you were innocently talking at the 
Post Office. He has taken you at a 
disadvantage and transfixed your 
uncouth position and passed it on 
to be laughed at by friend and foe 
alike. His click is heard on every 
hand. He is merciless and omni-
present and has as little conscience 
and respect for proprieties as the 
verist hoodlum. What with Kodak 
fiends and phonographs and elec-
tric search lights, modern inven-
tive genius is certainly doing its 
level best to lay us all out bare to 
the gaze of our fellow-men.




Advertisement for the Kodak camera, c. 1890.
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Snapchat and YouTube today, the 
portable camera fundamentally 
changed the way other people and 
institutions could peer into people’s 
lives. But the issues raised by today’s 
cutting-edge technologies are similar 
to those raised by the Kodak fiend.
In the late 1800s a lawyer, Samuel 
Warren, married the daughter of a 
Senator. He was unprepared for the 
incessant media attention to their 
union, fueled by the newly-devel-
oped portable camera. After his chil-
dren were born, paparazzi would 
snap photos of the babies when the 
family took walks down the street. 
Annoyed, he thought about what 
legal recourse he might have. Were 
there any legal precedents for a 
“right to be let alone”? He pondered 
the issue with a friend from law 
school, Louis Brandeis. They could 
have suggested that people no lon-
ger had a right to be left alone be-
cause technologies could now track 
and record what they did. Instead 
they noted that the intrusiveness of 
technologies like the portable cam-
era made it even more important 
for people to have control over in-
formation about themselves. “The 
intensity and complexity of life at-
tendant upon advancing civilization 
has rendered necessary some retreat 
from the world,” they wrote, “so that 
solitude and privacy have become 
more essential to the individual; but 
modern enterprise and invention 
have, through invasion upon his pri-
vacy, subjected him to mental pain 
and distress, far greater than could 
be inflicted by mere bodily injury.”
Their article, “The Right to Pri-
vacy,” was published in 1890 in the 
Harvard Law Review. They demon-
strated that a privacy right had a 
basis in fundamental Constitutional 
values, such as the right to refuse to 
testify against oneself, and common 
law principles, such as the “right of 
determining, ordinarily, to what ex-
tent his thoughts, sentiments, and 
emotions shall be communicated to 
others.”
“The protection afforded to 
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions 
. . . is merely an instance of the en-
forcement of the most general right 
of the individual to be let alone,” 
they said. “It is like the right not to 
be assaulted or beaten, the right not 
to be imprisoned, the right not to be 
maliciously prosecuted, the right not 
to be defamed.”
Their ideas were incorporated 
into law through the creation of four 
distinct legal actions for invasion of 
privacy: for intruding on someone’s 
seclusion, for publicly disclosing 
private information, for putting a 
person in a “false light” in the public 
eye, and for appropriating someone’s 
name or likeness for commercial use. 
They advocated that information 
about and photos of people could 
be disseminated if they had con-
sented or if the matter was of legit-
imate public interest. Since then, the 
fundamental Constitutional right 
to privacy has additionally been in-
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terpreted to include a right to make 
important personal decisions, such 
as whether to use contraception or 
whether to homeschool your child.
The mode of analysis of the two 
Boston lawyers from a century ago 
has been used to analyze each new 
technology that has reached the 
courts. How does it affect the indi-
vidual and society? How do funda-
mental legal values help to protect 
the individual when the technology 
is used? As each new technology has 
been adopted—including forensic 
technologies, medical technologies, 
and computer technologies—the ap-
plication of fundamental values has 
been used to protect, and often ex-
pand, people’s privacy rights. Some-
times courts, lacking the compre-
hensive analysis of technology like 
the one undertaken by Warren and 
Brandeis, took missteps when they 
first encountered a technology. But 
ultimately, privacy prevailed.
When Charles Katz entered a 
public phone booth in 1965, he never 
imagined that cops would tap the 
phone line. The cops charged him 
with placing illegal bets—and he 
protested that they had infringed the 
Fourth Amendment limits on gov-
ernmental intrusion into a person’s 
private life. The trial judge said that 
wiretapping didn’t violate the Fourth 
Amendment because the Founding 
Fathers drafted the Constitutional 
provision to honor people’s privacy 
in their homes. In this case, the po-
lice hadn’t trespassed into his home. 
In fact, there had even been a Su-
preme Court decision on the matter, 
back in 1928, when cops had used 
earlier wiretap technology to learn 
that someone was violating Prohibi-
tion.
In that earlier case, Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), 
the five-justice majority of the U.S. 
Supreme Court had held that a 
“The Kodak Fiend,” Hawaiian Gazette, December 9, 1890, 
Chronicling America Collection, Library of Congress.
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bootlegger’s privacy hadn’t been 
invaded and he hadn’t been forced 
to incriminate himself because, al-
though police had recorded the calls 
he was making from his home, the 
wiretap equipment had been placed 
on phone lines outside his home. 
Writing for the dissent was none 
other than Louis Brandeis, who was 
then a Supreme Court justice. He ar-
gued that fundamental values had to 
be applied to new technologies. He 
noted that when the Constitution 
was adopted, “force and violence”—
torture and breaking into people’s 
houses—were the only ways that the 
government had to obtain private 
information about people. The Con-
stitution protected against force and 
violence. But, said Brandeis, “discov-
ery and invention have made it pos-
sible for the government, by means 
far more effective than stretching 
upon the rack, to obtain disclosure 
in court of what is whispered in the 
closet. . . . The progress of science 
in furnishing the government with 
means of espionage is not likely to 
stop with wiretapping. Ways may 
some day be developed by which the 
government, without removing pa-
pers from secret drawers, can repro-
duce them in court, and by which it 
will be enabled to expose to a jury 
the most intimate occurrences of 
the home.” According to Brandeis, the 
Constitution’s fundamental value of 
privacy and the right not to incriminate 
yourself needed to be applied not only 
to “what has been, but of what may be.”
Forty years after the Olmstead decision, when Charles Katz’s 
case was appealed to the U.S. Su-
preme Court, the majority of the 
justices applied Brandeis’s logic. 
Even though Charles Katz was us-
ing a public phone booth, the Court 
said that the Constitutional right of 
privacy “protects people, not places.” 
What a person seeks to preserve as 
private, even in a public place, may 
be Constitutionally protected.
The Supreme Court protected 
Katz’s privacy by enunciating a legal 
test that is still used today: Did the 
person have an “expectation of pri-
vacy” and was that an expectation 
that society was willing to protect? 
As a result, police need to get a war-
rant, based on probable cause, before 
they tap someone’s phone.
The march of law enforcement 
technology continued, and in 2001, 
a new forensic technology reached 
the court. A federal agent suspected 
Danny Kyllo of growing marijuana. 
Since growing pot indoors requires 
high-intensity lamps, the agent sat in 
a car across from the home and used 
an Agema Thermovision 210 ther-
mal imager to scan Kyllo’s home. The 
scan showed that the roof over the 
garage and a side wall of the home 
were relatively hot compared to the 
rest of the home and substantially 
warmer than neighboring homes 
in the triplex. The agent concluded 
that Kyllo was growing pot and con-
vinced a judge to allow him to search 
Kyllo’s home. The agent found pot, 
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and Kyllo was convicted on a drug 
charge. Because the thermal scan-
ner did not physically intrude on the 
house and did not show any private 
human activities, the trial court said 
that it hadn’t infringed Kyllo’s Con-
stitutional rights.
The appellate court, too, held that 
Kyllo had shown no subjective ex-
pectation of privacy because he had 
made no attempt to conceal the heat 
escaping from his home, and “even 
if he had, there was no objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy 
because the imager ‘did not expose 
any intimate details of Kyllo’s life,’ 
only ‘amorphous “hot spots” on the 
roof and exterior wall.’”
When the U.S. Supreme Court 
took the case, it reversed Kyllo’s 
conviction. “It would be foolish to 
contend that the degree of privacy 
secured to citizens by the Fourth 
Amendment has been entirely un-
affected by the advance of technol-
ogy,” wrote Justice Antonin Scalia. 
“Where, as here, the Government 
uses a device that is not in general 
public use, to explore details of the 
home that would previously have 
been unknowable without physi-
cal intrusion, the surveillance is a 
‘search’ and is presumptively unrea-
sonable without a warrant.”
In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court 
in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945 (2012), assessed the use of a 
GPS tracking device installed on a 
car driven by Antoine Jones, a D.C. 
nightclub owner. Jones was the tar-
get of a narcotics investigation by 
police and the FBI. The Court held 
9 to 0 that the twenty-eight-day war-
rantless use of the GPS violated the 
Fourth Amendment. In her concur-
rence, Justice Sotomayor pointed 
out how the fundamental right to 
privacy was salient even in today’s 
world. “GPS monitoring generates 
a precise, comprehensive record of 
a person’s public movements that 
reflects a wealth of detail about her 
familial, political, professional, re-
ligious, and sexual associations,” 
wrote Sotomayor, adding, “People 
disclose the phone numbers they 
dial or text to their cellular provid-
ers; the URLs that they visit and the 
e-mail addresses with which they 
correspond to their Internet service 
providers; and the books, groceries 
and medication they purchase to 
online retailers. . . . I for one doubt 
that people would accept without 
complaint the warrantless disclosure 
to the Government of a list of ev-
ery Web site they had visited in the 
last week, or month, or year.” Justice 
Sotomayor also was concerned that 
“[a]wareness that the government 
may be watching chills associational 
and expressive freedoms.”
Contemporary medical technol-
ogies, such as genetic testing, have 
also raised disputes about the reach 
of privacy principles. When genet-
ic testing became possible, people 
were tested without their knowledge 
or consent. Doctors and researchers 
would use blood that people had 
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given to labs for routine cholesterol 
or pregnancy tests and perform ad-
ditional testing, without the person’s 
consent, for everything from breast 
cancer to Alzheimer’s disease. The 
argument was, what’s the harm? The 
person had already been pricked; the 
additional tests involved no addi-
tional intervention. And even if the 
blood was collected anew—as in a 
forensic DNA test—blood tests were 
safe and noninvasive.
But then employers and insurers 
started discriminating against healthy 
people based on their genetic predis-
position to future disease. With cer-
tain genetic mutations, for exam-
ple, some women had a higher risk 
of developing breast cancer than 
other women. Even with those mu-
tations, half the women would not 
develop breast cancer. Some women 
didn’t want to know whether they 
had the mutations or not. They said 
they would feel like they had a time 
bomb ticking away inside them. But 
employers and insurers wanted that 
information to make their decisions. 
There were no legal limits on what 
could be done with that information.
During routine physicals, an 
employer in California asked the 
company doctor to surreptitiously 
test the female employees to see if 
they were pregnant and the Afri-
can-American employees to see if 
they carried the sickle cell anemia 
gene mutation. The results were not 
disclosed to the employees, but they 
were put in to their personnel files.
When the existence of the files 
leaked, the employees sued. The trial 
court dismissed the case, saying that 
the test was a modest intrusion, no 
more than what people usually un-
dergo in a physical. But the appellate 
court held that genes contain per-
sonal information that is protected 
by the fundamental right to privacy. 
“One can think of few subject areas 
more personal and more likely to 
implicate privacy interests than that 
of one’s . . . genetic make-up,” wrote 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in Norman-Bloodsaw v. Law-
rence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 
1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998). Since 
then, Congress has passed a law, the 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimi-
nation Act, specifically prohibiting 
employers and insurers from dis-
criminating against people based on 
the results of genetic tests. People’s 
privacy rights include the right not to 
have genetic information generated 
about them or used against them.
Even computer technologies that 
collect data about people have been 
subject to a fundamental rights anal-
ysis. When Judge Robert Bork was 
nominated for the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1987, Michael Dolan, a 
Washington, D.C. newspaper re-
porter, attempted to discredit him by 
publishing his video store rental re-
cords. In today’s world, Judge Bork’s 
choices seem tame: British movies, 
Bond movies, costume dramas. The 
reporter was disappointed not to see 
legal movies such as 12 Angry Men 
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or To Kill a Mockingbird. Instead, 
Judge Bork had rented “only one 
truly court-related tape”: The Star 
Chamber.
Bork did not get the Supreme 
Court nomination. But the publi-
cation of his video rentals did get 
the attention of Congress. “It is no-
body’s business what Oliver North 
or Robert Bork or Griffin Bell or Pat 
Leahy watch on television or read or 
think about when they get home,” 
said Senator Pat Leahy. “In an era 
of interactive television cables, the 
growth of computer checking and 
check-out counters, of security sys-
tems and telephones, all lodged to-
gether in computers, it would be rel-
atively easy at some point to give a 
profile of a person and tell what they 
buy in a store, what kind of food 
they like, what sort of television pro-
grams they watch, who are some of 
the people they telephone. . . . I think 
that is wrong. I think that really is 
Big Brother, and I think it is some-
thing that we have to guard against.”
Senator Paul Simon agreed. 
“There is no denying that the com-
puter age has revolutionized our 
world.  Over the past twenty years 
we have seen remarkable chang-
es in the way each one of us goes 
about our lives. Our children learn 
through computers. We bank by ma-
chine. We watch movies in our living 
rooms. These technological innova-
tions are exciting and as a nation 
we should be proud of the accom-
plishments we have made. Yet, as we 
continue to move ahead, we must 
protect time honored values that are 
so central to this society, particularly 
our right to privacy. The advent of 
the computer means not only that 
we can be more efficient than ever 
before, but that we have the ability to 
be more intrusive than ever before. 
Every day Americans are forced to 
provide businesses and others per-
sonal information without having 
any control over where that infor-
mation goes. . . . These records are 
a window into our loves, likes, and 
dislikes.”
The legislators applied the funda-
mental Constitutional right to pri-
vacy and passed a law in 1988 for-
bidding disclosure of people’s video 
rental records (or, in this day and 
age, what they watch on Netflix). 
The bill prohibits video stores from 
disclosing “personally identifiable in-
formation”—information that links 
the customer or patron to particular 
materials or services. In the event of an 
unauthorized disclosure, an individual 
may bring a civil action for damages.
The concerns raised by the dis-closure of Bork’s video records 
are mild when compared to today’s 
digital invasion of privacy. A bil-
lion people have joined Facebook, 
a population only slightly smaller 
than either of the two largest coun-
tries, India and China. Marketing 
companies, political candidates, law 
enforcement agencies, employers, and 
other social institutions peer through 
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the keyholes of people’s lives by as-
sessing the information and photos 
that individuals post and that third 
parties post about them. Even more 
troubling, data aggregators use sur-
reptitious tracking mechanisms to 
follow people across the web and use 
that information to make judgments 
about them. If a woman does a Google 
search for old guitars and then seeks 
a credit card, she will be offered a 
credit card with less advantageous 
terms—not because her credit is 
bad, but because garage rock bands 
in general are less likely to pay off 
their credit cards. If she has a pho-
to of herself with a wineglass in her 
hand, she may be denied a job. Sev-
enty-five percent of employers look 
at people’s social network presence; 
one-third reject people who have al-
cohol in a Facebook photo. And, as 
with past technologies, courts and 
legislatures have been slow to pro-
tect privacy, initially holding that 
privacy rights are lost “on affirmative 
keystroke.”
In just the past two years, how-
ever, courts and lawmakers have 
begun to protect freedom of expres-
sion and privacy on social networks. 
In Layshock v. Hermitage School Dis-
trict, 650 F.3d 205 (3d. Cir. 2011), 
and J.S. v. Blue Mountain School Dis-
trict, 650 F.3d 915 (3d. Cir. 2011), the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that public high school students had 
a First Amendment right that cov-
ered their posts on social networks 
even if those posts were critical of 
school administrators. And a few 
state legislatures—including that of 
Illinois—passed laws prohibiting 
employers from asking for the social 
network passwords of an employee 
or a job applicant. That Illinois law 
went into effect 125 years after Chi-
cago-Kent College of Law opened its 
doors. The Illinois governor came to 
the campus to sign the bill into law 
Chicago-Kent College of Law Facebook page, retrieved Feb. 5, 2013, from https://www.facebook.com.
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and was introduced by a Chicago- 
Kent student who was working on 
internet privacy issues.
The Warren and Brandeis article 
not only created a legal framework 
that still applies today to safeguard 
people’s privacy, it also established 
a method for judging new technolo-
gies. The authors analyzed how fun-
damental values inherent in the U.S. 
Constitution and common law pro-
vide a basis to make judgments about 
new technologies. They also assessed 
how new technologies affected indi-
viduals, institutions, and the larger 
society. Warren and Brandeis did 
not suggest that individuals adapt to 
each new technology, but instead ad-
vocated that society assure that each 
technology was employed in a way 
that was consistent with fundamen-
tal societal values.
When Brandeis was appointed 
to the U.S. Supreme Court 26 years 
after his privacy article appeared, 
he continued to champion the ap-
plication of Constitutional values to 
modern technologies. He also wrote 
about the nature of a Constitution. 
“Time works changes, brings into 
existence new conditions and pur-
poses. Therefore a principle, to be 
vital, must be capable of wider appli-
cation than the mischief which gave 
it birth. This is peculiarly true of 
Constitutions. They are not ephem-
eral enactments, designed to meet 
passing occasions. They are, to use 
the words of Chief Justice Marshall, 
‘designed to approach immortality 
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as nearly as human institutions can 
approach it.’ The future is their care, 
and provision for events of good and 
bad tendencies of which no proph-
ecy can be made. In the application 
of a Constitution, therefore, our con-
templation cannot be only of what 
has been but of what may be.”
When the law school opened its 
doors 125 years ago, it would have 
been difficult to imagine the high-
tech world of today. But by learning 
about cutting edge technologies as 
well as fundamental legal principles, 
the students at IIT Chicago-Kent 
College of Law have been well edu-
cated, in every era, to face their gen-
eration’s legal challenges. ◆
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As 1888 drew to a close, John Montgomery Ward stood atop the world of profes-
sional baseball. The star shortstop 
had just led the New York Giants 
to the National League pennant, fol-
lowed by a triumph over the St. Louis 
Browns of the rival American Asso-
ciation in what even then went by 
the inflated title of baseball’s “World 
Series.” A dominating pitcher early 
in his career (he threw the second 
perfect game in major league his-
tory), an arm injury forced Ward 
to recreate himself as an infielder, 
where he became one of the best 
fielders and hitters of his era. He was 
lauded in the press as a ballplayer 
with “few equals and no superiors,” 
and “by long odds the most popu-
lar player in the profession.” These 
accomplishments would eventually 
earn Ward a place in the Baseball 
Hall of Fame.
Ward’s skills on the ball field were 
only a part of what made him such a 
remarkable figure. Contemporaries 
and historians alike have struggled to 
describe him. One adjective-happy 
biographer took the saturation ap-
proach: he was a “jug-eared, willowy, 
peach-fuzzed, overreaching punk” 
as well as “honorable, smart, and te-
nacious.” More admired than liked 
seems to have been the consensus 
view of Ward contemporaries. In a 
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JOHN MONTGOMERY WARD:
THE LAWYER WHO TOOK ON BASEBALL
Photo of John Montgomery Ward, 1922, Bain Collection, Library of Congress.
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profession not known for intellectu-
alism, he stood out. Although Ward 
left school at the age of thirteen in 
order to pursue his baseball career, 
he eventually earned, in his spare 
time, degrees in political science and 
law from Columbia. He was said to 
speak five languages. A regular con-
tributor to newspapers and periodi-
cals, in 1888 he published Baseball: 
How to Become a Player, which he 
described as a “handbook of the 
game, a picture of the play as seen by 
a player.”
Ward was also a pioneering labor 
leader. In 1885, he established Amer-
ica’s first sports union, the Broth-
erhood of Professional Base Ball 
Players. Initially designed to help 
sick, injured, or hard-up ballplayers 
and promote professional standards, 
the Brotherhood quickly evolved 
into something approaching a craft 
union for ballplayers. Ward had for-
ward-looking attitudes on race as 
well. At a time when the color line 
was hardening in American society, 
and organized baseball had become 
a whites-only affair, Ward urged the 
Giants to sign an African-American 
pitcher.
If all this wasn’t enough, Ward’s 
social life was also noteworthy. In 
1887 he married a New York actress 
and socialite, Helen Dauvray, who 
also happened to be a passionate 
baseball fan. “Her tiny hands beat 
each other rapturously at every vic-
tory of the Giants and her dark eyes 
were bedewed at every defeat,” re-
ported the New York Times. “But 
the thousands of spectators who ob-
served Miss Dauvray’s emotions lit-
tle suspected that one of the Giants 
had any precedence over the others 
so far as her affections were con-
cerned.” She had donated the Tiffany 
trophy that went to the World Series 
champion; it was the “Dauvray Cup” 
that her husband brought home at 
the end of the 1888 season. In How 
to Become a Player, the ever gallant 
Ward included a chapter explaining 
the basics of the game “for the ben-
efit of those ladies whose escorts ei-
ther cannot, or will not, answer their 
questions.” He also offered advice for 
his gentleman readers: “Whoever 
has not experienced the pleasure of 
taking a young lady to her first game 
of ball should seize the first opportu-
nity to do so.”
Life was not all three-hit games 
and celebrity life for the great Mon-
te Ward, however. His relationship 
with Helen Dauvray was strained 
almost from the start. He was carry-
ing on an affair, and she knew it; she 
wanted to return to the stage, and he 
didn’t want her to. They lived togeth-
er for only a year and soon divorced.
His baseball career too was about 
to veer off in some unexpected direc-
tions. Following his World Series tri-
umph, Ward captained a team of Na-
tional League all-stars that traveled 
around the globe between October 
1888 and April 1889 in an effort to 
promote the game overseas. It was a 
grand gesture, fitting for an emerg-
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ing era of American nationalism 
and confidence on the international 
scene. But the world tour also helped 
set in motion one of the most signif-
icant upheavals in baseball’s history. 
The man who organized and led the 
tour around the globe was Albert 
Goodwill Spalding. Soon after they 
returned home, he and Ward would 
face off in an epic struggle for the fu-
ture of the game.
Spalding, a star pitcher in his 
younger years, now owned the Chi-
cago White Stockings of the Na-
tional League in addition to a bur-
geoning sporting goods empire. The 
game never had a more effective and 
more passionate salesman. Baseball, 
he once wrote, captured the nation 
because “it is the exponent of Amer-
ican Courage, Confidence, Combat-
iveness; American Dash, Discipline, 
Determination; American Energy, 
Eagerness, Enthusiasm; American 
Pluck, Persistency, Performance; 
American Spirit, Sagacity, Success; 
American Vim, Vigor, Virility.” 
(Spalding also basically created base-
ball’s all-American birth myth, which 
conveniently featured a future Civil 
War hero, Abner Doubleday, in 1839 
dreaming up the game in bucolic 
Cooperstown, New York. In fact, 
baseball had largely evolved from 
various children’s games; if it ever 
had a proper birth moment, it was 
among young professionals in 1840s 
New York City.) Spalding envisioned 
the world tour as an opportunity to 
sell two things he loved above all: 
the game of baseball and the equip-
ment that bore his name. Despite his 
background as a player, and despite 
his overwrought romanticism about 
the national pastime, Spalding ap-
proached his role as a team owner 
from the perspective of the captain 
of industry that he had become: the 
players were employees, and com-
fortably paid ones at that; and it was 
the owner’s job to control costs and 
ensure a compliant workforce. Need-
less to say, he didn’t think much of 
Ward’s efforts with the Brotherhood.
John M. Ward, New York Giants baseball card por-
trait, 1887, Library of Congress. Facing: Photo of 
Albert Goodwill Spalding, 1910, Bain Collection, 
Library of Congress.
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The world tour had just reached Cairo, Egypt, in February 1889 
when the players received news that, 
at their winter meetings in New 
York, the National League owners 
had adopted a major reform de-
signed to reign in player salaries. 
They created a player classification 
system under which “Class A” play-
ers earned $2,500, “Class B” players 
$2,250, and so on, down to “Class E” 
players who earned $1,500. The clas-
sifications scheme took into account 
not only player ability, but also “con-
duct, both on and off the field.”
Ward, who had already estab-
lished himself as his generation’s 
most outspoken critic of baseball’s 
distinctive labor practices, saw the 
plan as an affront to the players. 
What made working as a profes-
sional ballplayer different from any 
other occupation was the “reserve 
clause,” a provision in player con-
tracts under which an owner could 
“reserve” a number of players when 
the term of their contracts ended. 
The clause prohibited the player 
from negotiating with another team 
unless his team released him. As 
professional baseball was controlled 
by an agreement between the teams 
under which each team agreed to 
respect the player contracts of oth-
er teams, the reserved player faced 
three options: sign a new contract 
at the terms dictated by the owner; 
hold out and hope for better terms; 
or stop playing baseball. Owners 
defended the reserve clause as es-
sential to ensuring the stability of 
the game. It did indeed further this 
goal. But there was another reason, 
one they didn’t trumpet so proud-
ly: it kept down player salaries. And 
here too it was effective. In the late 
1880s, as club profits tripled, player 
salaries grew by only 30 percent, a 
fact at least partly attributable to the 
reserve system.
In 1887, Ward had a scathing at-
tack on the reserve clause, titled “Is 
the Base-Ball Player a Chattel?” He 
compared the reserve clause to “a fu-
gitive-slave law”: it “denies [the play-
er] a harbor or a livelihood, and car-
ries him back, bound and shackled, 
to the club from which he attempted 
to escape.” The remedy, according to 
Ward, was simple: get rid of “base-
ball law” and allow “the business of 
base-ball to be made to rest on the 
ordinary business basis.”
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When he learned of the owners’ 
classification plan, Ward was so in-
censed he threatened to abandon the 
world tour to come home and con-
front the owners.  (The news that the 
Giants were trying to trade him only 
added to his frustration.) He sus-
pected that Spalding had planned the 
entire trip just to get him and some 
of his allies out of the country in or-
der to go forward with their plans. 
If this was indeed Spalding’s plan 
(and there is no evidence it was), it 
backfired, as the tour ended up giv-
ing some of the game’s top players 
long hours to share their grievances. 
The plan for the baseball revolution 
that would upend the game in 1890 
might very well have been hatched 
in quiet conversation among the 
players while on Spalding’s world 
tour. Nearly all the players on the 
tour would join Ward’s revolt against 
the National League.
During the 1889 season, Ward 
began preparations for the creation 
of a rival major league, the Players 
League. Working in secret (he was, 
after all, still on the enemy’s payroll), 
he found financial backing and con-
vinced many of his fellow players 
to commit to the new league. Some 
aspects of the Players League looked 
familiar. The players were famil-
iar—the new league lured many of 
the best National League players to 
its rosters. And the cities in which 
they played were familiar—the sev-
en cities in which their eight teams 
played were all cities that already 
had National League teams. But the 
business model behind the Players 
League was radically different from 
anything that had come before. 
Each club was run by an eight-man 
board, consisting of four players and 
four investors. The league was gov-
erned by a senate-like organization, 
with two representatives from each 
team (one elected by players, one by 
owners). Players had three-year con-
tracts, and no reserve clause. Inves-
tors were promised the first $10,000 
of each club’s net profit, with the rest 
to be divided among the players.
Spalding and the National League 
attacked the Players League. First, 
they turned to the courts: the Giants 
sued Ward for breach of contract. 
Ward had violated the terms of his 
reserve clause, they claimed, and 
they asked a New York state court 
to issue an injunction prohibiting 
Ward from playing for anyone else. 
The court denied the injunction. As 
the reserve clause failed to specify 
such essentials as Ward’s salary and 
the terms of the renewed contract, 
the judge concluded that it was too 
indefinite to be treated as a bind-
ing contract for the 1890 season. 
The court also raised the disturbing 
question of whether, assuming the 
reserve clause were read to consti-
tute a binding contract for the fol-
lowing season, the renewed contract 
would also include a reserve clause. 
If so, the player would be tied to his 
current team for as long as the team 
desired, while the team could release 
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a player with only 10 days’ notice.
This was rather absurd, according 
to the judge. “We have the spectacle 
presented of a contract which binds 
one party for a series of years and 
the other party for 10 days, and of 
the party who is itself bound for ten 
days coming into a court of equity to 
enforce its claims against the party 
bound for years.” The judge conclud-
ed that the reserve clause was unen-
forceable for “want of fairness and of 
mutuality.”
With the courts refusing to help, 
Spalding turned to public opinion. 
He pulled out all the rhetorical stops. 
What the players were doing was 
“secession,” a “revolt,” a “war”; the 
National League was confronting 
“hot headed anarchists” who were 
leading a “revolutionary movement.”
But the fall of the Players League 
after just one season came not from 
Spalding’s attacks in the press, nor 
from legal challenges. It came from 
the marketplace. The new league 
had the best players, but this was not 
enough. With three major leagues 
competing for a limited fan base, 
everyone suffered at the gate. At 
season’s end, when Spalding opened 
negotiations with Players League in-
vestors, he pointedly excluded Ward 
and any other players. “[T]he mon-
ied men met with the monied men,” 
as Spalding put it. The National League 
owners simply bought out their 
competition; several Players League 
clubs were integrated into a recon-
figured National League. Ward’s rev-
olution was over.
Ward returned to the National 
League, where he played four more 
seasons. He was still one of the best 
players in the league when he retired 
in 1894. He went on to be a success-
ful lawyer, a gentleman farmer, and 
a top amateur golfer. Although he 
mended fences with organized base-
ball, his passion for the cause he had 
led never left him. In 1925, shortly 
before his death, he gave a speech—
at an event to celebrate the National 
League, of all places—recounting 
the events of 1888–1890 in which he 
made clear that the war against the 
National League, while doomed, was 
justified.
For a brief moment, the Players League presented a radical al-
ternative business model for profes-
sional sports, one in which the play-
ers and owners shared control of the 
game as well as its profits. With the 
failure of Ward’s baseball revolution, 
the owner-dominated system lived 
on. In the following decades, various 
teams would go to court to have the 
reserve clause enforced against play-
ers who had jumped their contracts 
(a relatively common occurrence 
any time there was a rival league that 
refused to abide by the agreement 
that controlled the baseball monop-
oly). Judges, with only the rarest of 
exceptions, sided with the players, 
often citing Ward’s case as authori-
ty on the matter. The reserve clause 
lived on, however, and it did so be-
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cause the baseball monopoly, while 
periodically challenged, remained in 
place. As long as owners respected 
the contracts of their on-the-field 
competitors, they did not need the 
courts. For this reason, the most 
significant legal challenges to base-
ball’s unique labor practices came in 
the realm of antitrust, not contract 
law. But baseball law survived this 
challenge too, as the United States 
Supreme Court granted, and then 
twice reaffirmed, that federal anti-
trust law did not apply to profession-
al baseball.
When change eventually came in 
the 1970s, it was at the hands of an-
other organized players movement, 
but this time it was achieved not 
through a rival league but through 
labor negotiations (with a critical as-
sist from a sympathetic arbiter). To-
day, major league baseball operates 
in a way that has some similarities 
to the core premise of the alternative 
model Ward had offered. The game 
is governed, in large part, through 
collective bargaining agreements be-
tween players and owners. With the 
skyrocketing of player salaries after 
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the fall of the reserve clause, the game’s 
profits are far more evenly distrib-
uted between players and owners. 
It took almost a century, but John 
Montgomery Ward’s vision for ma-
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When the United States Congress enacted the first “antitrust” law in 
1890 it was taking a shot in the dark. 
At the time there was no concept of 
“antitrust law”—i.e., a general le-
gal regime intended to combat re-
straints on competition. Today more 
than 100 countries have such laws, 
including all significant participants 
in the global economy. Competition 
law has become a major factor in eco-
nomic life throughout much of the 
world. U.S. antitrust law has played 
a central role in this remarkable evo-
lution, and it is generally acknowl-
edged to be the most important of 
these laws. It is the touchstone and 
frame of reference for international 
discussions, and it is often used as 
a model or at least a major source 
of guidance by other countries in 
developing their own competition 
laws. The story is extraordinary, in-
terwoven with the roles of power 
and ideas and intertwined with the 
evolution of the U.S. and its role in 
the world. This brief essay sketches 
its trajectory. Chicago-Kent’s role as 
an educational institution tracks that 
trajectory.
David J. Gerber
U.S. ANTITRUST: FROM SHOT IN THE 
DARK TO GLOBAL LEADERSHIP
“The fog,” Puck cartoon by Will Crawford, 1911, Library of Congress.
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I. A Shot in the Dark
This new type of legislation was a “shot in the dark” in the sense 
that few, if any, of the legislators had 
any way of knowing what conse-
quences the legislation would have. 
They were “shooting” at something, 
but they didn’t know what they 
might actually hit. So what were they 
trying to do and why?
Antitrust law was, above all, a 
response to social turbulence and 
tensions. The United States in the 
1880s presented a complex mixture 
of hope, fear and resentments. The 
terrible Civil War was a memory, 
but not a distant one. Rapid indus-
trialization was creating great wealth 
for a few and jobs for many. Immi-
gration was bringing millions from 
Europe to take those jobs and to find 
land to farm in the Midwest and the 
West. Yet the rapid changes also gen-
erated sectional conflicts and social 
tensions, and political and legal  in-
stitutions strained to respond effec-
tively to them.
This mixture of pressures, con-
flicts and resentments led Congress 
to enact what came to be known as 
antitrust law. One key background 
factor was the resentment that many 
felt towards the new super rich and 
their lavish and ostentatious life-
styles. Located primarily in New 
York and other cities on the East 
Coast, these groups had achieved 
great wealth quickly, often through 
control of large manufacturing busi-
nesses. These firms often dominated 
specific industries, and this domi-
nance allowed them to exclude new 
entrants from those industries. It 
also allowed them to extract what 
many viewed as unfair prices and 
conditions on their suppliers as well 
as their employees. This led to an-
ger at the power of these so-called 
“trusts” and often combined with 
anger at the power of their owners 
to control the destinies and stifle 
the possibilities of others, especially 
those in other parts of the country. 
A specific catalyst for antitrust law 
was rising anger among Midwestern 
farming communities at what they 
saw as rapacious and monopolistic 
conduct by railroad companies and 
others whom they believed were 
manipulating prices paid to farm-
ers for their grain and livestock. 
Groups representing these interests 
pressured their representatives in 
Congress to do something about the 
“trusts” that were amassing fortunes 
for a few, but exploiting vast num-
bers of hard-working farmers and 
tradesmen.
Congress responded to this 
pressure by enacting the Sherman 
Antitrust Act in 1890. The name 
that soon attached to the legisla-
tion—“anti-trust”—reflected its goals. 
It was a tool to be used to combat the 
monopolistic abuses of very large 
enterprises. There was, however, no 
model for Congress to use in doing 
what it wanted to do—or wanted 
to appear to be doing. So Congress 
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“punted”—it simply federalized two 
barely used legal principles. It took 
two concepts from the common law 
that had been used for quite different 
purposes, first in England and then 
to a limited extent in the U.S., and it 
made them enforceable under fed-
eral law. The statute was very short, 
and its basics have not changed since 
1890. The first concept was “restraint 
of trade.” This concept had been 
used primarily in civil cases to com-
bat overly restrictive provisions in 
contracts. The second basic idea was 
“monopolization.” It had also been 
part of the English common law, but 
for centuries it had been little used 
in either England or the U.S. The leg-
islation contained virtually no guid-
ance as to the substantive content of 
the provisions, leaving issues of con-
tent to the federal courts.
The Sherman Act transformed 
the role of these private law concepts 
by providing that the federal govern-
ment could enforce them. Congress 
appears to have given little thought 
to how this was to take place. It did 
not create specific procedure for the 
enforcement of the antitrust provi-
sions. It merely authorized the U.S. 
Justice Department to file claims in 
the regular courts, using the normal 
rules for civil proceedings. Given that 
the federal government was still very 
small in 1890, the legislators could 
hardly have envisioned extensive 
federal administrative application of 
the provisions. Some assumed that 
private actions could be brought on 
the basis of the legislation, and this 
was confirmed a few years later.
This was the “shot in the dark!” 
The U.S. Congress was responding 
to specific domestic pressures. The 
legislators just took common law 
concepts and gave the federal gov-
ernment authority to use them in 
the federal courts. The legislators 
paid little, if any, attention to how 
others in the world had dealt with 
similar issues or what, if anything, 
they might think about the U.S. ex-
periment. They just experimented, 
basically relying on judges to sort 
out the issues and develop the law.
II. An Antitrust System Develops
Prior to the Second World War the system evolved slowly and 
fitfully according to a pragmatic, 
court-based process—typical of U.S. 
legal development generally. The 
judges were solving the conflicts be-
fore them, and there is little evidence 
that they thought about their deci-
sions as creating a “system” of an-
titrust law. They relied on accumu-
lated practical experience, domestic 
conceptions of the judicial role, and 
often on ideologies about the role 
of markets as they shaped the con-
tent and roles of antitrust in the U.S. 
There were relatively few cases, and 
other than in a few large companies 
there was relatively little interest in 
this area of the law.
After the war the roles and im-
portance of antitrust law expanded 
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greatly. One factor was transna-
tional. Antitrust came to be seen in 
the U.S. as a part of a global “mis-
sion” to provide an antidote to fas-
cism and to support freedom. Many 
believed that the concentrations of 
economic power in Germany and 
Japan were at least in part respon-
sible for the horrors of the Second 
World War, and they saw antitrust 
as a means of preventing such con-
centrations or at least curbing the 
resulting abuses. This led U.S. gov-
ernment officials and others actively 
to promote antitrust in Europe. A 
European version of antitrust law 
had begun to develop in the 1920s, 
but it had not gained much status in 
most European countries, and thus 
U.S. antitrust became a symbol of re-
structuring in Europe, both in indi-
vidual countries and in connection 
with the process of European inte-
gration. At the same time, the eco-
nomic and political dominance of 
the U.S. in the so-called “free world” 
allowed the U.S. to apply its antitrust 
law to conduct outside its own ter-
ritory and thus further support the 
antitrust mission.
This heightened political, sym-
bolic and economic importance of 
antitrust on the international plane 
combined with the de facto protec-
tion of the U.S. market encouraged 
rapid growth in the perceived impor-
tance of antitrust within the U.S. and 
the expansion of antitrust principles. 
By the early 1970s antitrust had be-
come a very important part of the 
legal environment of business and as 
such it attracted strong interest from 
lawyers. The growing importance of 
antitrust meant that law schools in-
creased their offerings in the area. 
According to Ralph Brill, antitrust was 
first taught at Chicago-Kent College 
of Law in 1973. This also meant, how-
ever, that antitrust represented a major 
cost for many U.S. businesses. These 
costs were tolerated as long as econom-
ic factors (especially currency and reg-
ulatory obstacles) buffered U.S. firms 
from international competition.
In the 1970s the international 
economic picture changed markedly, 
and these changes in global econom-
ic conditions generated a fundamen-
tal change in U.S. antitrust law. The 
“oil shocks” of the early 1970s and the 
concomitant international currency 
restructuring led to increased aware-
ness in the U.S. business communi-
ty of the need for U.S. businesses to 
compete internationally. Antitrust 
now began to appear as a burden on 
the U.S. economy, and this led schol-
ars to examine ever more carefully 
the intellectual justification for such 
burdens. Economists and law pro-
fessors increasingly argued that the 
courts had expanded antitrust law 
too far and that the entire edifice of 
antitrust law should be viewed from 
the perspective of its economic im-
pact. This perspective quickly won 
favor in the courts and law faculties, 
and  within a few years it led to a rad-
ical revision of standards for antitrust 
law in the U.S. The central substantive 
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law questions were now to be judged 
by economists according to economic 
criteria.
III. Global Competition Law Lead-
ership
The “shot in the dark” that was the U.S. antitrust law system is 
today no longer solely a domestic 
field of law. It is now also a critical-
ly important component of global 
economic policy! The system that 
U.S. judges had evolved to deal with 
purely domestic problems and that 
relied on little more than confidence 
in the capacity of courts to devel-
op reasonable responses to con-
flicts has been transformed into the 
central player in efforts to respond 
effectively to economic and other 
forms of globalization. It is now a 
U.S. export product, and the stakes 
are enormous. What directions and 
forms will the rules of competition 
take? Treatment of these issues will 
be a factor in the future of many 
countries, including the U.S., and 
for more than two decades Chica-
go-Kent has brought transnational 
competition law to our students, and 
Chicago-Kent faculty have contrib-
uted to the international discussion 
of these issues.
 
A. Foreign Interactions and Percep-
tions
 
U.S. antitrust now plays on a 
global stage, and much will depend 
on how foreign experts, lawyers, 
government officials and business 
leaders see U.S. antitrust. They will 
make decisions about what to do in 
their own countries and on the inter-
national level. This means that their 
perspectives on the U.S. system are 
critical to its roles both at home and 
abroad, and foreign images of U.S. 
antitrust have changed radically. Prior 
to the Second World War, those in 
Europe who knew anything about 
U.S. antitrust law (and they were 
few) generally considered it a mis-
take. They tended to see it as a fail-
ure that actually created more harm 
than good by forcing companies to 
merge rather than cooperate. This 
view predominated in large measure 
until after the Second World War. 
The Europeans were developing a 
different concept of competition law 
that emphasized administrative con-
trol of dominant firms. This concep-
tion of competition was spreading 
rapidly in Europe in the 1920s, but 
depression and war led to its virtual 
abandonment.
After that war ended, however, 
U.S. antitrust law became associated 
with U.S. economic dominance in 
the “free world.” The real and imag-
ined connections between economic 
concentration and military expan-
sion in both Germany and Japan 
convinced many that U.S.-style anti-
trust law should be used to combat 
such concentrations. U.S. occupa-
tion forces in Germany and Japan 
imposed U.S. antitrust ideas during 
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the occupation period, and the U.S. 
insisted that both countries either 
enact or maintain competition law 
after the occupation. This increased 
awareness of these ideas abroad. 
Perhaps more important, however, 
was the perception that antitrust 
was a source of strength for the U.S. 
economy and thus a potential spur 
to growth that other countries could 
employ.
U.S.-style antitrust did not, how-
ever, always fit well with European 
legal traditions and institutions, and 
in most European countries skepti-
cism toward the U.S. model limited 
progress in protecting competition. 
In Germany, however, a separate set 
of ideas about how to protect com-
petition developed in the 1930s and 
1940s in the underground, and af-
ter the war it became the basis for 
German antitrust law. From here 
it spread to the European level and 
became part of the process of Euro-
pean integration. The basic idea of 
U.S. antitrust law—i.e., protecting 
the competitive process from re-
straints—was part of this model of 
competition law, but the model itself 
was conceptually and institutionally 
quite distinct. European scholars and 
officials in these areas often looked 
to U.S. antitrust for comparisons and 
insights into problems, but there was 
relatively little interaction between 
U.S. and European forms of compe-
tition law until the 1990s.
In the 1990s these relationships 
became far closer and more import-
ant for both the U.S. and Europe-
ans. Moreover, the fall of the Soviet 
Union precipitated widespread in-
terest in market-based approaches 
around the world and revived the 
messianic tenor of the U.S. antitrust 
law community. Many countries 
that had socialist or other com-
mand-based approaches to the or-
ganization of economic activity now 
introduced antitrust laws or signifi-
cantly increased their investment in 
Title page of Control of the Market, by Bruce Wyman, 1911, Library of Congress.
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the enforcement of such laws. Often 
they looked to U.S. antitrust officials, 
lawyers and scholars for help in im-
plementing or evaluating their new 
activities.
B. Policy Issues and Obstacles
 
This has raised a critically im-
portant issue: How will/should 
competition law on global markets 
be implemented? Globalization has 
shown the limitations and distor-
tions of the traditional jurisdictional 
system—e.g., differing rules and 
procedures for different parts of the 
same economic market. Many in 
the U.S. and elsewhere believe that 
the best response to these problems 
is to encourage all countries to fol-
low at least the basic substantive law 
approach of the U.S. antitrust law 
system. This would generate conver-
gence among competition law sys-
tems around the world and reduce 
the harms caused by current jurisdic-
tional arrangements. Many others are, 
however, skeptical that the U.S. model 
should be the focus of convergence. 
They often see some form of coordina-
tion (perhaps at the World Trade Or-
ganization level) as the best response.
How these foreign decision mak-
ers and decision shapers understand 
and evaluate U.S. antitrust law is 
critical to this set of decisions. It is 
important, therefore, that they un-
derstand as clearly as possible how 
U.S. antitrust law works and what 
the guiding ideas are behind the law. 
Only then will they be in a position 
adequately to evaluate it, compare 
it with their own systems and make 
informed choices in relation to it. 
There are many obstacles—linguis-
tic, comparative, political and eco-
nomic—to achieving an adequate 
understanding of the U.S. system 
and of the implications of various 
policy choices for the global system 
and for individual components of it. 
Moreover, it is critical that U.S. law-
yers, officials and scholars acquire a 
better understanding of the compe-
tition law elsewhere and thus of the 
potential bases for convergence and 
coordination on the global level.
IV. Concluding Comments
A former U.S. antitrust official not long ago wrote that U.S. anti-
trust is (or could be) the “light of the 
world.” That might be a bit strong, 
but U.S. antitrust certainly does play 
a key role in the development of the 
global economy and its many com-
ponents. Now the big question is 
whether U.S. legal thinking and the 
creative and pragmatic impulses that 
have been so much a part of U.S. an-
titrust law will continue to provide 
the leadership that can make the 
most of these opportunities.
These changes have important 
implications for U.S. legal education. 
At Chicago-Kent College of Law, 
we are doing our part. Here, and 
at some other leading law schools, 
these issues have generated increas-
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ing attention. Since the 1980s, and 
even more so since the early 1990s, I and 
others have included transnational issues 
in the domestic antitrust course and 
included an antitrust focus in courses 
such as international business trans-
actions. I have also long offered a 
seminar in international and com-
parative antitrust law that tackles 
these issues directly. These efforts 
have two central objectives. One is 
to educate U.S. lawyers to perform 
more effectively in this new global 
context. The other is to educate for-
eign lawyers about U.S. antitrust law 
and provide them with tools for un-
derstanding and evaluating it and its 
global roles.
One fact stands out in 2013 at the 
celebration of Chicago-Kent’s 125 
years of teaching law. The U.S. will 
have to earn its leading role in anti-
trust law on the global level. Effec-
tive legal education in this area will 
be a key element in whether it will be 
successful in achieving that goal. ◆
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For generations, commenta-tors have decried the fact that we live in an era of an impe-
rial presidency. The second Presi-
dent Bush famously (or infamously) 
ignored Congress in subjecting sus-
pected terrorists around the world to 
military commissions at Guantanamo 
Bay and citizens and suspected ter-
rorists alike to warrantless surveil-
lance of their phone calls. President 
Barack Obama, like his predecessor, 
has used executive power to shape 
rules and regulations that Congress 
had delegated to subordinates in 
agencies as opposed to the President 
directly. Both Presidents claimed 
broad power to circumvent the Sen-
ate’s power to consent to treaties and 
appointments. Congress and the 
courts have fought back to limit the 
scope of presidential power, at least 
in discrete contexts.
Somewhat lost in history, a com-
parable battle over executive power 
brewed one hundred and twenty-five 
years ago, culminating in the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1890 decision in In 
re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890). The case 
questioned the President’s inherent 
authority to assign a U.S. Marshal 
to protect the life of Stephen Field, a 
sitting United States Supreme Court 
Justice. Marshal Neagle confronted 
the potential assailant, David Terry, 
and killed him when he thought Jus-
tice Field’s life was in danger. Cali-
fornia authorities were none too 
THE LEGACY OF IN RE NEAGLE
Illustration, from The Life of David S. Terry, by A. E. Wagstaff, 1892, Internet Archive, http://www.archive.org/
details/lifeofdavidsterr00wags, p. 410.
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pleased given that Terry had been so 
prominent in California political life 
and that Terry likely was unarmed. 
Local officials indicted and then im-
prisoned Neagle for killing the Cali-
fornian.  
Events leading up to the Supreme 
Court decision read like a soap opera, 
perhaps revealing more about the 
interplay of society and politics than 
does the decision itself. The history 
of the case starts with David Terry, 
who before the Civil War served 
on California’s Supreme Court with 
Justice Stephen Field. Terry gained 
notoriety by challenging Senator 
Broderick from California, a for-
mer friend who was also a friend of 
Field’s, to a duel, which left Broder-
ick dead. The dispute centered over 
political rivalries, in part due to Ter-
ry’s sympathy with the Confederacy. 
Terry was acquitted and then left 
California to support the South in 
the Civil War. After the War, Terry 
returned to law practice and politics 
in California and, of relevance here, 
within twenty years fell within the 
orbit of an apparently glamorous but 
unstable woman named Sarah Al-
thea Hill.
In the late 1870s, Hill became 
the companion of Senator William 
Sharon of Nevada, who had amassed 
great sums from real estate and 
mining investments. Sharon, who 
was much older than Hill, evidently 
sundered relations when he suspect-
ed Hill’s designs on his money. Hill 
continued to plot how to separate 
Sharon from some of his enormous 
wealth. She made a demand on 
Sharon for alimony, asserting that 
Sharon had married her some three 
years earlier when they had started 
their “companionship.” In so do-
ing, she presented what likely were 
forged documents attesting to the 
marriage relationship. Sharon sued 
in federal court in California (due 
to diversity of citizenship) in 1883 
for a declaration that no marriage 
had ever taken place. Hill then filed 
her own suit in state court in 1884 
to demonstrate that the marriage 
was valid and requested a share of 
Sharon’s property. She hired Terry as 
one of her attorneys.
The state court bizarrely decided 
the case in Hill’s favor even though 
the judge labeled Hill a liar. Sharon 
immediately appealed to the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court but died be-
fore the case was heard. His executor 
pursued the appeal.
In the meantime, the federal suit 
proceeded slowly, prompting more 
aberrant behavior from Hill. She 
sported a pistol at many of the pro-
ceedings, and waved it at witnesses. 
She threatened to have adverse wit-
nesses and their counsel killed. Al-
though Justice Field, by then serving 
on the U.S. Supreme Court, was not 
assigned to preside over the case, 
he was assigned as a Justice riding 
on circuit to hear several motions 
arising out of the case. During one 
proceeding, Justice Field in an effort 
to maintain decorum ordered that 
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Ms. Hill be disarmed, and he found 
her in contempt of court. At the end 
of the proceedings in 1886, the fed-
eral court determined that the mar-
riage was a sham and the documents 
forged.
Terry then married Hill, man-
ifesting an intriguing view of the 
attorney-client relationship. More 
importantly, the marriage placed 
pressure on his successors on the 
California Supreme Court to uphold 
the state court finding that Hill had 
been married to Sharon. A divided 
California Supreme Court acqui-
esced, affirming the trial court’s de-
cision that a valid marriage had in-
deed taken place.
In a complicated procedural 
move, the estate then moved to revive 
the federal court decree and enjoin 
both Hill and Terry from maintain-
ing the validity of the prior marriage, 
despite the state court ruling. At 
this point, the case was assigned to 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen 
Field, sitting by designation. Field 
in 1888 determined that Hill had 
obtained the marriage documents 
through fraud. As he orally delivered 
the decision, Hill caused a commo-
tion in the courtroom protesting the 
ruling and had to be escorted out. 
Terry in a display of chivalry there-
upon attacked the marshal for car-
rying out Field’s order. Field ordered 
both Terry, his former associate on 
the California Supreme Court, and 
Hill imprisoned for contempt of 
court. Hill threatened Field’s life and 
Terry claimed that Field’s decision had 
been bought with Sharon’s money. Ter-
ry then sought a pardon from Presi-
dent Grover Cleveland, asserting in 
part that Field was retaliating against 
him for refusing to throw his support 
to Field in a prior presidential pri-
mary. Cleveland declined, and Terry 
served out his short term.
Upon release, Terry apparently 
became even more consumed by 
revenge, broadcasting widely his 
intent to harm Justice Field. When 
Justice Field traveled back west from 
Washington, newspapers speculated 
on when the confrontation would 
occur. Accordingly, President Benja-
min Harrison through his Attorney 
General assigned Marshal Neagle to 
protect Justice Field.
  The confrontation arose in the summer of 1889 when Field 
traveled by train from San Francis-
co to Los Angeles. Terry and his wife 
boarded the train at a stop along 
the way and entered a dining room 
in which Justice Field was eating 
breakfast. Hill left the room—pre-
sumably to gather her pistol from her 
chamber—but her husband did not 
wait and circled behind Justice Field 
and delivered two blows to his head. 
Neagle, the marshal, announced his 
presence and called on Terry to stop. 
Terry made a move as if to draw a 
knife that he customarily carried, 
and Neagle responded with two 
shots from his pistol, killing the 
assailant.
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A local constable arrested Nea-
gle on the spot. Ms. Terry, upon her 
return to San Francisco, swore out a 
complaint for murder against both 
Field and Neagle. California author-
ities then arrested Field who was 
released under a bond. An eastern 
newspaper reported the following 
imaginary dialogue:
Newsboy: “Man tried to kill a judge 
in California!”
Customer: “What was done about it?”
Newsboy: “Oh! They arrested the 
judge.”
Field immediately filed for a writ 
of habeas corpus, and the federal 
court within a matter of days grant-
ed Justice Field’s writ, ending Justice 
Field’s stay at the other end of the 
courtroom.
Marshal Neagle was not as for-
tunate—he unquestionably fired 
the shots that killed Terry. He filed 
a similar writ of habeas corpus from 
a California prison, asserting that 
he acted within the line of duty in 
protecting Justice Field’s life. He was 
moved to San Francisco, but remained 
behind bars. He argued that, to the ex-
tent his actions were undertaken pur-
suant to federal authority, his conduct 
could only be challenged in federal 
court. The federal court eventually 
scheduled a hearing, and upheld the 
writ, reasoning in part that “upon 
general, immutable principles, the 
power must be necessarily inherent 
in the executive department of any 
government worthy of the name of 
government, to protect itself in all 
matters to which its authority ex-
tends; and this necessarily involves 
Illustration, San Francisco Examiner, 1888, shows Terry attacking a marshal for removing 
Mrs. Terry from the courtroom, U.S. Marshals website, http://www.justice.gov/marshals.
Then & Now: Stories of Law and Progress64
the power to protect all the agency 
and instrumentalities necessary to 
accomplish the objects and purposes 
of government.” The Supreme Court 
accepted the case for review at Cali-
fornia’s request.
On one level, In re Neagle reflects 
the generation-old conflict inherent 
in our system of federalism.  Some 
Californians were resentful that the 
federal courts did not respect the 
state courts’ determination that a 
valid marriage had been entered into 
between Hill and Sharon. Moreover, 
authorities in California were more 
than willing to imprison and indict 
a U.S. Marshal, even when the Mar-
shal was following presidential or-
ders. Others in California believed 
that California courts should be 
trusted to determine whether Nea-
gle’s defense was valid without in-
terference from the federal courts. 
Whatever one thinks of the resur-
gent importance of federalism in our 
generation—including petitions for 
secession filed in the wake of Pres-
ident Obama’s 2012 victory—few 
proponents today would be so bold 
as to approve of California’s im-
prisonment of a U.S. Marshal who 
unquestionably was acting pursu-
ant to the President’s orders, not to 
mention local authorities’ decision 
to arrest Justice Field himself. The 
story reminds us that, no matter 
how intense regional divides may be 
today, they pale before the tensions 
between states and the federal gov-
ernment over a century ago.
But, the facts underlying the case 
reveal more—a sordid tale of love 
gone awry, reminiscent of politi-
cians’ struggles more recently, from 
Senator Gary Hart’s famed ride on 
the aptly named boat “Monkey Busi-
ness” to President Bill Clinton’s fling 
with an intern, and from Wilbur 
Mills’ dalliance with the Argentinian 
stripper Fanne Foxe to Representa-
In re Neagle Supreme Court decision, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), photo by Emily Barney.
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tive Anthony Weiner’s more recent 
debacle of sexting. Politicians’ affairs 
impact not only political races, but 
Supreme Court decisions as well. 
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), 
was not the first Supreme Court case 
on presidential power sparked by 
politicians’ sexual misconduct.
The doctrinal legacy of In re Neagle endures. A divided U.S. 
Supreme Court, with Justice Field 
recusing himself, held that the Pres-
ident enjoys a residuum of authority 
under Article II of the Constitution 
to take steps to protect the nation 
even if those steps are not spelled out 
by Congress. In presaging presiden-
tial power debates of the last decade, 
the Court concluded that the Presi-
dent could rely on powers not direct-
ly rooted in the text of the Consti-
tution in safeguarding the country. 
The Court explained, “In the view 
we take of the Constitution of the 
United States, any obligation fair-
ly and properly inferrible from that 
instrument” is appropriate, includ-
ing the duty to protect a Supreme 
Court Justice, even in the absence of 
explicit congressional authorization. 
The Court continued that “it would 
be a great reproach to the system 
of government of the United States, 
declared to be within its sphere sov-
ereign and supreme, if there is to be 
found within the domain of its pow-
ers no means of protecting the judg-
es, in the conscientious and faithful 
discharge of their duties, from the 
malice and hatred of those upon 
whom their judgments may operate 
unfavorably.”  Presidents can “infer” 
powers from the Constitution—in-
cluding the duty to protect Justices 
from harm.  In the case, those non-
statutory or “inferrible” powers dis-
placed California’s authority to try 
Neagle for murder and provided 
Neagle a complete defense to the 
charge. Although the accumulation 
of powers and responsibilities over 
the last 125 years has radically trans-
formed the presidency, the debate 
over the scope of presidential powers 
under Article II is not new. There is a 
residuum of authority under Article 
II—even if the extent remains in bit-
ter dispute—permitting presidents 
leeway to ensure protection of the 
government and the nation itself. ◆
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When IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law was founded 125 years ago, 
many of our key legal institutions, 
such as the jury, were well estab-
lished. By 1888, the year of our 
school’s founding, the jury was seen 
as an institution that provided jus-
tice in a nation created by a revo-
lution of “we the people.” Although 
it no longer seems remarkable to us 
today, the jury system gave ordinary 
citizens, untutored in the law, the 
power to decide cases and to dis-
pense justice.
Today, reinforced by movies, 
television shows, and constant me-
dia coverage, the American people 
have two deeply-held views about 
the jury. The first is that the jury is 
meant to represent all of us—“we 
the people”—by reflecting our di-
versity as much as is practical. In 
every high-profile jury case, much 
attention is paid to the diversity of 
the jury. In particular, we care about 
race and gender more than almost 
any other characteristics. Although 
the diversity of the venire is en-
shrined in several Supreme Court 
cases, the diversity of the petit jury 
is reinforced by the portrayal of the 
jury in popular culture.
The second widely-held view is 
that the jury has one job, and that is 
to determine the facts. Although a 
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“First woman jury, Los Angeles,” photo by Bain News Service, 1911, Bain Collection, Library of Congress.
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jury trial is presided over by a judge 
and involves decision-making about 
the law, the jury ostensibly plays no 
role in determining which laws ap-
ply or what standards should be met. 
This arrangement seems sensible be-
cause the judge and lawyers bring to 
the trial legal expertise that the ju-
rors do not have.
While these two views are well 
accepted, the students in our first 
law class in 1888 would be shocked 
to learn what our first-year students 
now take for granted. Though our 
modern impulse is to assume that 
a jury should reflect the diversity 
of our community, at one time that 
diversity was limited to white men 
of property. Our broader under-
standing of diversity has been the 
result of a hard-fought struggle to 
extend the rights of jury service to 
African-American men and later 
to women. This expansion of jury 
rights, however, has not been contin-
uous; rather, it has proceeded in fits 
and starts. In fact, African-Ameri-
can men in some states in the South 
were given the right to serve as jurors 
during Reconstruction only to have 
that right stripped away by the end 
of the 1800s before being restored 
decades later. So, too, with women 
in the Western territories; they had 
the right to serve as jurors in the late 
1800s, but it was short-lived.
It will also surprise the modern 
reader to discover that the role of the 
jury was initially to decide both the 
law and the facts. The diminution of 
the role of the jury, so that it decided 
only the facts, happened gradually 
from about 1850 to the 1930s. Some 
researchers believe that as the prac-
tice of law became more profession-
al, the distinction widened between 
judges and lawyers who knew the 
law and ordinary citizens who did 
not, until it made little sense for ju-
rors to decide the law.
I offer a more radical theory in 
which I see a connection between 
the growing diversity of the jury and 
the declining power of the jury. My 
theory is that the white, male legal 
establishment began to curtail the 
power of the jury as African-Amer-
ican men and women had the right 
to serve on juries. Although Afri-
can-American men and women lost 
that right by the late 1800s, they re-
gained it, albeit after much struggle, 
many decades later. For both groups, 
however, even when official barriers 
were eliminated, other practices kept 
them from actually being seated on 
juries. Some of these practices, such 
as the peremptory challenge, are still 
used today in a discriminatory man-
ner, in spite of Supreme Court cases 
to the contrary, in an effort to keep 
African-American men and women 
from being seated on juries.
   
The Exclusion of African-American 
Men from the Jury
Albert Alschuler and Andrew Deiss, in an article entitled A 
Brief History of the Criminal Jury in 
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the United States, identified 1860 as 
the year in which African-American 
men first served on a jury. In that 
year, two African-American men sat 
on a jury in Worcester, Massachu-
setts. In 1864, Congress passed leg-
islation that allowed African-Amer-
ican men to testify in federal courts, 
and this was followed by legislation 
that allowed them to testify in state 
courts. Jury service was soon to fol-
low.
During Reconstruction (1863–
1877), African-American men served 
on juries in some states. For example, 
in South Carolina in 1869, the leg-
islature mandated not only the in-
tegration of grand and petit juries, 
but also that the racial composition 
of the jury should approximate that 
of the community. Similarly, in New 
Orleans between 1872 and 1878, 
one-third of the citizens summoned 
for jury duty were African-Ameri-
cans, and this percentage matched 
their representation in Orleans 
Parish. Between 1870 and 1884 in 
Washington County, Texas, where 
African-Americans were approxi-
mately 50 percent of the population, 
they constituted about 30 percent of 
those who served on juries. During 
the 1870s, in Warren County, Mis-
sissippi, African-Americans were 
about 35 percent of the grand jurors, 
and even though that percentage did 
not approximate their percentage in 
the community (where they were 70 
percent of the community), it was a 
significant improvement over their 
total exclusion in the past.
Newspapers, in their reporting of 
jury trials during this period, noted 
when an African-American man 
(and they were only men) served as 
a juror. On January 15, 1884, in the 
Chicago Daily Tribune, one story 
questioned whether South Carolina 
jurors in a particular case had vot-
ed to convict based on their political 
parties; it included the following ob-
servation: “Three of the jurors, one 
a negro and two white men, refused 
to find a verdict of guilty.” On Feb-
ruary 16, 1885, in the Chicago Daily 
Tribune, a story described a murder 
trial in New Orleans and mentioned 
the sole African-American juror on 
this jury: “The only juror who stood 
out from the very beginning in fa-
vor of conviction was one Edwards, 
a negro, and the only negro on the 
jury, and he maintained his manly 
and honest position to the end, not-
withstanding that [the defendant’s] 
friends went to his house while he 
was serving and threatened his fam-
ily with violence.”
The newspaper accounts also 
noted when the African-American 
juror was the first African-Amer-
ican to serve in that locale. A brief 
story on May 6, 1891, in the New 
York Times announced that a man 
named Nelson Stark, described as 
“colored,” had been selected as the 
eleventh juror in the Garrison mur-
der trial. The story noted that “[it] is 
the first time in the history of that 
county [in West Virginia] that a col-
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ored man has sat on an important 
case in the State court.” Similarly, 
on September 7, 1880, the Chicago 
Daily Tribune noted that “[f]or the 
first time in the history of Kentucky 
the panel of jurymen for the duty 
in a criminal court included in the 
list of the Louisville Circuit Court 
to-day three colored men.” Two of 
those men were selected to serve on 
a grand jury and the third man was 
selected for a petit jury. The article 
noted that there were a number of 
African-Americans at court that day 
and “they evidently took great satis-
faction in seeing representatives of 
their race assume privileges hereto-
fore denied them.”
The inclusion of African-Ameri-
can men on the jury was not limited 
to Southern states. A notice in the 
New York Times on November 19, 
1890, announced that “[a]mong the 
jurors in a case in the Circuit Court 
this morning was Abe Peterson, a 
Grafton blacksmith, who is the first 
colored man to sit on a jury in Rens-
salaer County[, New York].” On July 
9, 1893, a lengthy story in the Chi-
cago Daily Tribune reported that for 
the first time in Madison, Wiscon-
sin, an all-African-American jury 
(six jurors) heard a civil case involv-
ing an assault and battery; the arti-
cle noted that this jury marked “an 
inauguration of a new judicial era.”
Newspaper accounts of jury tri-
als also reported on perceived dif-
ferences between white jurors and 
African-American jurors. Accord-
ing to one story in the Chicago Daily 
Tribune on July 10, 1880, “[t]he first 
negro juror in Atlanta, the other day, 
promptly joined in convicting a ne-
gro who was put on trial.” As a result 
of African-Americans’ seeming pro-
clivity to convict, “[t]he next prison-
er, also a negro, objected to having 
one of his own race on the jury.” 
Another story, published in the New 
York Times on November 3, 1885, 
also observed that African-Amer-
ican jurors had been “decidedly 
in favor of the Commonwealth as 
against colored offenders.” The arti-
cle suggested that African-American 
jurors wanted to show that they were 
committed to law and order—so 
much so that older lawyers who had 
African-American clients would not 
“Negroes as Jurors,” New York Times headline, Nov. 3, 1885.
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select African-American jurors be-
cause “they claim[ed] that colored 
jurors are more severe in meting 
out punishment to offenders of their 
race.”
In spite of constitutional protec-
tions provided by the Fourteenth 
Amendment (1868) and the Fifteenth 
Amendment (1870), statutory protec-
tions provided by the Ku Klux Klan 
Act of 1871, the Federal Civil Rights 
Act of 1875, and the Federal Jury 
Selection Act 





100 U.S. 303 
(1880), which 
held that a state 
statute dis-
qualifying African-American men 
from jury service was unconstitu-
tional, African-American men lost 
their place on juries in the South 
in the 1890s. Booker T. Wash-
ington observed at the end of the 
nineteenth century: “In the whole 
of Georgia & Alabama, and other 
Southern states not a negro juror is 
allowed to sit in the jury box in state 
courts.” According to a 1910 study, 
African-Americans rarely served on 
juries in Florida, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, South Carolina, and 
Virginia, and they never served on 
juries in Alabama and Georgia. In 
sum, according to another commen-
tator, Douglas Colbert, “[a]lthough 
it was common for blacks to have 
served as jurors during Reconstruc-
tion, they virtually disappeared from 
the southern jury box by 1900, even 
in counties where they constituted 
an overwhelming majority of the lo-
cal population.”
Even though statutes could no 
longer prohibit African-American 
men from serving on the jury after 
Strauder, other 
practices kept 
them from the 
jury box. James 
Forman, in Ju-





rected toward African-Americans 
and white Republicans that kept 
African-American men in the South 
from serving as jurors or witnesses, 
or seeking or being afforded the pro-
tection of the legal system. All-white 
Southern juries failed to convict the 
white perpetrators of these crimes.  
Non-violent and more subtle 
practices also kept African-Amer-
icans from actually being seated on 
a jury, even if they had been sum-
moned to serve. These practices 
ranged from color-coding by race 
the names placed in the wheel from 
which jurors were selected to the 
discretion exercised by white jury 
commissioners in selecting only 
“Jury of Whites and Blacks,” illustration by James E. 
Taylor, 1867, Library of Congress.
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white men whom they knew to serve 
as jurors. Mississippi’s 1892 law, 
which allowed three state officials to 
select jurors based on their “good in-
telligence, sound judgment, and fair 
character,” was another way to keep 
African-Americans off the jury; oth-
er Southern states followed suit.
The practice of discriminatory 
peremptory challenges, which con-
tinues to this day, was another way 
to keep African-Americans from 
being selected for petit juries. Each 
party could exercise a certain num-
ber of peremptories and use them 
to remove prospective jurors with-
out giving any reason at all. Parties 
used their peremptory challenges to 
remove African-Americans from the 
jury. Prosecutors, in particular, exer-
cised race-based peremptories to re-
move African-Americans from the 
jury in criminal cases in which the 
defendant was African-American. 
Even after a number of cases, from 
the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, in 
which the Supreme Court developed 
an elaborate framework to attempt 
to counter the exercise of race-based 
peremptory challenges, the practice 
continues today. Lawyers have sim-
ply learned ways to avoid discovery. 
In some courts in the South, defense 
lawyers in capital cases will not even 
challenge the prosecutor’s use of a 
race-based peremptory because they 
know the judge will never find a pe-
remptory to be discriminatory. The 
practice of exercising discriminatory 
peremptory challenges persists, even 
though it is undertaken in more sub-
tle ways than it once was.
The Exclusion of Women from the Jury
Women’s experience in serv-ing as jurors tracked Afri-
can-American men’s experience in 
some ways, but lagged behind by 
many years. Before 1888, women in 
at least two Western territories were 
permitted to serve as jurors, and in 
1898 women in Utah were permitted 
to serve as jurors. Wyoming Territo-
ry gave women the right to vote and 
to sit on juries in 1869, with the first 
woman sitting on a jury in Laramie, 
Wyoming in 1871. However, there is 
some dispute as to when Wyoming 
women lost their right to sit on ju-
ries. Albert Alschuler and Andrew 
Deiss point to 1872 as the year that 
“Wyoming’s experiment in equality 
in the courtroom” came to an end, 
and a New York Times article on No-
vember 19, 1883, claimed that “no 
woman [in Wyoming] is ever seen 
nowadays in the jury box.” Howev-
er, in an article in the Chicago Daily 
Tribune on October 26, 1891, the 
first Governor of the State of Wyo-
ming was interviewed and said that 
there had been “several women ju-
rors in the courts of Cheyenne, the 
Capital of Wyoming.” The Wyoming 
Almanac of Politics included an arti-
cle from the Cheyenne Daily Leader, 
dated September 17, 1891, describ-
ing a trial in which the defendant 
was female as were two of the jurors. 
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In 1884, women in Washington Ter-
ritory had the right to vote and to 
serve on juries. However, in 1887, 
after a change in personnel on the 
Supreme Court of Washington Terri-
tory, women lost their right to sit on 
juries. In 1898, Utah allowed women 
to serve as jurors, and has tradition-
ally been credited as the first state to 
do so, though women rarely served 
as jurors until the 1930s.
Although there were few wom-
en serving as jurors in the 1880s, 
there were occasional ruminations 
about what women jurors would be 
like and what difference they would 
make on juries. In a brief note in 
the Chicago Daily Tribune on April 
21, 1888, entitled Call for Feminine 
Jurors, the writer suggested that it is 
difficult to convict a female defen-
dant on the West Coast, and perhaps 
if women were permitted to serve as 
jurors this situation would change. 
The writer offered the following rec-
ommendation: “It would be a good 
thing if the rights of women could 
be so extended that in cases where 
a woman is accused of crime she 
might be tried by a jury of her own 
sex.” On June 28, 1893, there was a 
brief article in the Chicago Daily 
Tribune entitled Women as Jurors, 
which raised the question wheth-
er Lizzie Borden should have been 
tried by a jury that included women 
because “a woman on trial for her 
life should have the right to demand 
an equal representation of women 
on the jury.” However, the same ar-
ticle also suggested that whenever 
the defendant is a woman, “there 
are few men not predisposed to re-
gard the opposite sex with tender 
consideration.” In 1893, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee held a hearing 
to consider a bill that would allow 
women to serve as jurors if they “are 
wives of men who are duly qualified 
so to act,” according to an article in 
the New York Times on February 1, 
1893. The article reported that Dr. 
Mary Walker spoke in support of the 
bill, but the bill did not go forward.
Women thought the passage 
of the Nineteenth Amendment in 
1920, which gave them the right to 
vote, would also give them the right 
to serve on juries, but this proved 
not to be the case in most states. Ac-
cording to Professor Gretchen Ritter, 
around the time of the Nineteenth 
Amendment, 14 states granted wom-
en the right to serve on the jury. In 
seven of these states, new laws were 
passed that gave women the right to 
serve. In the other seven states, ju-
ry-qualification statutes described 
jurors as “electors,” so once women 
became electors under the Nine-
teenth Amendment, they automat-
ically became eligible to serve as 
jurors. However, other states, like 
Illinois, rejected this idea. The Illi-
nois Supreme Court reasoned that 
at the time when the Illinois General 
Assembly used the term “electors” 
only men could be electors. If wom-
en were to be included as “electors,” 
then it was up to the Illinois General 
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Assembly to say so, which it did, 
though not until 1939.
States decided whether to allow 
women to serve on juries in their 
own courts, and the federal courts 
followed the practice of the state in 
which the federal court was located. 
It was not until the Civil Rights Act 
of 1957 that federal courts allowed 
women to serve as jurors in feder-
al courts regardless of the practice 
of that state’s courts. State courts, 
even when they ostensibly permitted 
women to serve as jurors, followed 
practices that kept many women 
from actually serving. In some states, 
women had automatic exemptions 
from jury duty. In other states, such 
as Florida and Louisiana, women 
could serve as jurors, but only if they 
went down to the courthouse and 
affirmatively registered for service, 
which was an extra step that men 
did not have to take. States that ad-
hered to this practice claimed that it 
respected women’s role in the home 
and that most women would be un-
able to serve because of their duties 
at home. The effect of affirmative 
registration was that very few wom-
en registered for jury service. As late 
as 1961, this practice was upheld in 
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), 
and was not found to be unconstitu-
tional until Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 
U.S. 522, 533 (1975).
Even after the demise of affir-
mative registration, the exercise of 
peremptory challenges was another 
way to keep women from serving 
as jurors. Although women were 
summoned to serve, they could be 
struck from the petit jury by lawyers 
exercising gender-based peremptory 
challenges. Whereas race-based pe-
remptory challenges were addressed 
by the Supreme Court in a series of 
cases spanning from the mid-1960s 
to the mid-1990s, this line of cases 
did not become applicable to gen-
der until J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. 
T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). Although 
there are many reasons that lawyers 
defend the peremptory challenge—
from giving defendants control over 
jury selection to ridding the jury 
of an outlier who could not be dis-
missed for cause—the peremptory 
challenge also should be seen as a 
practice that has been, and contin-
ues to be, used to keep women and 
African-Americans from serving on 
juries.
A Decline in Jury Power
Back in 1888, when Afri-can-American men had for all 
intents and purposes lost their right 
to serve on juries and the few wom-
en in Western territories still had 
their short-lived right to serve on 
juries, the jury had begun to experi-
ence a decline in power. Whereas the 
jury—from colonial times until the 
1850s—had always had the power to 
decide the law and the facts, the jury 
started to lose its power to decide 
the law and was reduced to deciding 
only the facts. This loss came about 
Then & Now: Stories of Law and Progress74
through state court interpretations 
of state statutes and constitutions. 
This loss could be seen in a number 
of states, including Massachusetts 
in 1855 and Louisiana in 1871, and 
soon spread to other states, includ-
ing Georgia in 1879 and Vermont in 
1892. Today, only two states, Indiana 
and Maryland, still instruct jurors 
that they have the right to determine 
the law as well as the facts. Although 
these two states’ constitutions pro-
vide for this right, the judiciary in 
both states has narrowed this right 
through case law.
My own theory is that as Afri-
can-American men and women 
sought to serve on juries, there was 
a move on the part of judges to limit 
the power of juries. Some commen-
tators suggest that this move came 
about because of the growing pro-
fessionalization of judges. As judg-
es received legal training and saw 
themselves as professionals, they 
began to see the functions of judges 
and juries as distinct, and attempt-
ed to limit juries to the fact-finding 
function only. Another possibility is 
that as the law grew more complex, it 
seemed appropriate for professionals 
with training and knowledge to de-
cide it, rather than citizens who had 
only common sense and experience 
to guide them. My own theory is that 
the move to limit the function of the 
jury to fact-finding came about at a 
time when outsiders—women and 
African-Americans—were trying to 
claim a right to serve as jurors. Al-
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though African-American men and 
women had not yet been able to se-
cure their right to serve, the writing 
was on the wall.
Thus, the late 1880s were a time 
of transformation for the jury. Juries 
in many states had lost their power 
to decide the law, and were officially 
limited to finding the facts. It is no 
coincidence that this occurred at a 
time when African-American men 
and women had experienced the 
right to serve as jurors, albeit brief-
ly, and sought to recover that right, 
even though it would take them 
many years to do so. ◆
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After examining the Unit-ed States Reports contain-ing the cases decided by the 
Supreme Court during its 1887–88 
term, one might conclude that the 
United States in the late 1880s was 
a law-abiding country with little 
crime. Of the approximately 270 cas-
es decided by the Court during that 
term, only seven (2.6 percent) raised 
issues of criminal law or procedure. 
In contrast, in its most recently com-
pleted term, 2011–12, the Supreme 
Court decided 76 cases, 22 (29 per-
cent) of which involved issues of 
criminal law or procedure.
What accounts for this dramatic 
rise in the number (and percentage) 
of criminal law or procedure cases 
decided by the Supreme Court? No 
one would deny that crime in the 
United States has increased since 
1888. But the true explanation for 
the increased number of criminal 
law and procedure cases decided by 
the Supreme Court is the “constitu-
tionalization” of criminal procedure. 
When originally adopted in 1791, 
the Bill of Rights (the first eight 
amendments to the U.S. Constitu-
tion) placed limitations only upon 
the Federal Government, not upon 
the individual States. Consequently, 
none of the rights provided in those 
amendments—such as the protec-
tion against unreasonable searches 
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and seizures (Fourth Amendment), 
the guarantee against double jeop-
ardy (Fifth Amendment), the privi-
lege against self-incrimination (Fifth 
Amendment), the right to counsel 
(Sixth Amendment), the right to a 
jury trial (Sixth Amendment), and 
the right to confront hostile witness-
es (Sixth Amendment)—applied in 
criminal prosecutions brought in 
state courts. Hence, an individual 
convicted of a crime in a state court 
could not challenge his or her con-
viction in the U.S. Supreme Court on 
the ground that he or she had been 
denied a right guaranteed in the Bill 
of Rights. Many states did of course 
have their own constitutional pro-
visions guaranteeing various rights 
to those accused of crime in their 
own courts, but each state could in-
terpret its own constitutional provi-
sions, and many of these provisions 
turned out to be less protective of 
individual rights than their federal 
counterparts. Moreover, since these 
were rights guaranteed by state law, 
rather than federal law, their alleged 
violation did not raise a federal issue 
that could be adjudicated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.
Even in 1888, after the adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment—
which, among other things, prohibits 
a State from abridging the “privileg-
es and immunities” of United States 
citizens (“Privileges and Immunities 
Clause”) and from “depriving any 
person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law” (“Due 
Process Clause”)—the Bill of Rights 
still provided no protection to state 
criminal defendants.
Shortly after the turn of the twen-
tieth century, the Supreme Court 
recognized that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protected some individual 
rights from state infringement, in-
cluding, perhaps, some safeguarded 
by the Bill of Rights against National 
action. Nevertheless, the Court ex-
pressly stated that if the Due Process 
Clause protected such latter rights, it 
was not because they were enumer-
ated in the first eight amendments. 
It explained that the Due Process 
Clause protected only those rights 
that are “the very essence of a scheme 
of ordered liberty” and essential to “a 
fair and enlightened system of jus-
tice.” In determining whether a par-
ticular safeguard met this standard, 
the Court asked whether “a civi-
lized system could be imagined that 
would not accord the particular pro-
tection.” Applying this test, the Su-
preme Court held that several of the 
protections contained in the Bill of 
Rights, including the privilege against 
self-incrimination and the right to a 
grand jury indictment, did not apply 
to the States. Even when the Court 
held that a particular right enumerated 
in the Bill of Rights fell within the 
concept of due process, it frequently 
concluded that the protection afford-
ed against state infringement was less 
than that afforded against infringe-
ment by the Federal Government—a 
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“watered-down” version of the right.
To illustrate, although the Fifth 
Amendment guarantee against 
double jeopardy precluded the 
Government in a federal criminal 
prosecution from appealing a jury 
verdict—whether a conviction or 
an acquittal—that protection did 
not apply in state court proceedings. 
Consequently, in the mid-1930s, 
after a Connecticut jury consider-
ing a charge of first-degree murder 
against Frank Palko convicted him 
of second-degree murder (thereby 
implicitly acquitting him of the orig-
inal charge of first-degree murder), 
the State, acting pursuant to a state 
statute, sought review of the con-
viction. The State claimed the trial 
judge had erred in instructing the 
jury on first-degree murder and in 
excluding certain evidence from the 
prosecution’s case. The Connecticut 
Supreme Court agreed; it reversed 
the conviction (and life sentence) 
and, despite Palko’s implicit acquittal 
for that offense, ordered a new trial 
for first-degree murder. At the sec-
ond trial, a jury convicted Palko of 
first-degree murder, and he was sen-
tenced to death—a conviction and 
sentence that the Supreme Court ul-
timately upheld against a claim that 
Palko’s second trial had placed him 
twice in jeopardy for first-degree 
murder.
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the Supreme Court consistently 
rejected the view, persuasively ar-
gued by Justice Hugo L. Black, that 
the Fourteenth Amendment had “in-
corporated” the entire Bill of Rights 
and made its provisions applicable to 
the States to the same extent as they 
applied to the Federal Government. 
Even as late as 1961, despite the 
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that 
an accused in a criminal prosecu-
tion “shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense,” an indigent being tried in 
a state court for a non-capital felony 
had no federal constitutional right to 
have counsel appointed to represent 
him or her. Thus, when Clarence 
Earl Gideon, an indigent drifter be-
ing tried in a Florida state court for 
breaking and entering a poolroom, 
requested the trial court to appoint 
counsel to represent him, the judge 
could respond:
Photo of Clarence Earl Gideon, 1961(?), State Ar-
chives of Florida, Florida Memory, RC12789.
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Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I can-
not appoint Counsel to represent 
you in this case. Under the laws of 
the State of Florida, the only time 
the Court can appoint Counsel to 
represent a Defendant is when that 
person is charged with a capital of-
fense. I am sorry, but I will have 
to deny your request to appoint 
Counsel to defend you in this case.
During the 1960s, however, un-
der the leadership of Chief Justice 
Earl Warren, the Supreme Court 
adopted the position that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment “selectively incorporat-
ed” various provisions of the Bill of 
Rights and made them applicable to 
the States. Using this approach, the 
Court held that the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, the Fifth Amendment guar-
antee against double jeopardy, the 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial, and, in overturning Clarence 
Earl Gideon’s conviction, the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel were 
among the rights safeguarded from 
infringement by the states. In 1968, 
the Court explained that it had re-
formulated its test for determining 
whether a particular provision of 
the Bill of Rights was incorporated 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. It 
stated:
The recent cases . . . have pro-
ceeded upon the valid assump-
tion that state criminal processes 
are not imaginary and theoretical 
schemes but actual systems bearing 
virtually every characteristic of the 
common-law system that has been 
developing virtually contemporane-
ously in England and in this country. 
The question thus is whether given 
this kind of system a particular pro-
cedure is fundamental—whether, 
that is, a procedure is necessary to 
an Anglo-American regime of or-
dered liberty. [Emphasis added.]
Today, virtually all of the provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights safeguard-
ing the rights of a criminal defen-
dant apply to the States (the lone 
exception being the right to an in-
dictment). As a result, the Supreme 
Court each term receives hundreds 
of petitions requesting it to review 
a state-court conviction alleged to 
have been obtained in violation of 
the defendant’s federal constitutional 
rights, and each year the Court de-
cides 20 or so cases involving such 
issues, a large percentage of the 
number of cases it decides each term 
with written opinions. ◆
David S. Rudstein graduated with hon-
ors from the University of Illinois at Chi-
cago. He received his J.D. cum laude from 
Northwestern University and his LL.M. 
from the University of Illinois. After 
teaching at the University of Illinois for 
a year, he served as a law clerk to Justice 
Walter V. Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme 
Court. He joined the faculty of IIT Chi-
cago-Kent in 1973, serving as Associate 
Dean from 1983 to 1987. He has focused 
his scholarship on criminal procedure.
Then & Now: Stories of Law and Progress80
The Supreme Court in 1888 was in crisis. Its structure and responsibilities, created 
a century earlier by the Judiciary Act 
of 1789, were no longer adequate or 
appropriate. The Court was over-
whelmed by its docket, and the jus-
tices’ responsibilities, which included 
circuit riding, were impossible to 
meet. Shaped as it was by a law al-
most as old as the country itself, the 
Supreme Court in 1888—and the 
federal judicial system as a whole—
would be barely recognizable to 
many today.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 estab-
lished not only the Supreme Court, 
but also the entire federal court 
system. The Act divided the coun-
try initially into thirteen districts, 
which were in turn combined into 
three circuits. Unlike today’s circuit 
courts, however, the circuit courts 
created in 1789 had original jurisdic-
tion over certain types of cases and 
provided appellate review of only 
a few cases heard originally in the 
district courts. In addition, the Judi-
ciary Act provided for district court 
judges and Supreme Court justices, 
but no circuit court judges. Instead, 
twice a year, two Supreme Court jus-
tices would visit each district and, 
along with one district court judge, 
would sit as the circuit court. There 
were six Supreme Court justices, so 
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“Our overworked Supreme Court,” Puck cartoon by Joseph Keppler, 1885, Library of Congress.
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that two could be assigned to each 
circuit. Even after 1793, when sub-
sequent laws provided that only 
one Supreme Court justice at a time 
would sit on a circuit courts, mean-
ing that each justice had to make 
the trip only once a year rather than 
twice, an enormous portion of Su-
preme Court justices’ time, was 
spent riding circuit—at a time when 
travel was slow and difficult. And as 
the country grew, more circuits were 
created.
Not only did Supreme Court jus-
tices ride circuit, but the Supreme 
Court itself had no discretion over 
its docket. Cases were appealed to 
the Supreme Court as of right, unlike 
today. This lack of control turned out 
to be extremely problematic. During 
the first century of its existence, not 
only did the United States become 
geographically larger and more pop-
ulous, but industry grew, the coun-
try’s economy became increasingly 
sophisticated, and new laws and 
sources of litigation abounded, espe-
cially after the Civil War. As a result, 
the Supreme Court’s docket grew 
dramatically. At the beginning of the 
1888 Term, there were 1,563 cases on 
the docket. The Court simply could 
not keep up. As Felix Frankfurt-
er and James M. Landis described 
the situation: “The Supreme Court 
docket became a record of arrears.” 
Less poetically, it took three years for 
a case to be heard. The situation was 
untenable.
Faced with overwhelming case-
loads, by 1888 the Supreme Court 
had already attempted to adjust its 
standard of review in order to dis-
suade lawyers and litigants from 
appealing fact-intensive cases with 
few implications beyond the partic-
ular parties. In Newell v. Norton and 
Ship, an 1865 admiralty case involv-
ing a steamboat collision, for exam-
ple, the Court summarily affirmed 
the verdict for the plaintiff, holding 
that there was “ample testimony to 
support the decision.” The Court ex-
plained that it would not engage in 
a searching review of the lengthy re-
cord, which included more than 100 
depositions:
 
Parties ought not to expect this court 
to revise their decrees merely on a 
doubt raised in our minds as to the 
correctness of their judgment, on 
the credibility of witnesses, or the 
weight of conflicting testimony.
The Court’s reluctance to engage 
in error correction, even at a time when 
it had no formal control of its docket, 
continues to this day. Today, Supreme 
Court Rule 10, Considerations Gov-
erning Review on Writ of Certioari, 
explains that a “petition for a writ of 
certiorari is rarely granted when the 
asserted error consists of erroneous 
factual findings or the misapplica-
tion of a properly stated rule of law.”
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Despite the Court’s effort to define a very narrow scope of review, it 
was unable to halt the flood of cases 
coming to it. Facing both its own 
swelling docket and the geographic 
expansion of the country, the jus-
tices found circuit riding to be in-
creasingly difficult and they often 
simply did not do it. As Frankfurter 
and Landis explain, “[B]y 1890 the 
statutory duty of the Justices to at-
tend circuit was practically a dead 
letter.”
And it was not the Supreme 
Court alone that was unable to func-
tion properly. Despite some earlier 
attempts to expand and reform the 
lower courts, there were still not 
nearly enough judges. Circuit courts, 
which were supposed to sit with two 
judges, often had to function with 
only one. Even more problematic, 
that single judge was often a district 
court judge who was hearing appeals 
of his own decisions. In 1889, a pa-
per presented at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Bar Association put 
it this way:
Such an appeal is not from Philip 
drunk to Philip sober, but from 
Philip sober to Philip intoxicated 
with the vanity of a matured opin-
ion and doubtless also a published 
decision.
This arrangement could not possibly 
inspire confidence in an impartial 
and fair justice system.
Congress finally acted in 1891, 
after many years of considering and 
rejecting proposals for major reform, 
and the federal judicial system we 
know today began to emerge. Most 
significantly, Congress established 
intermediate appellate courts for the 
first time. If litigants were required 
to appeal first to those intermediate 
courts, the hope was, many fewer of 
them would subsequently take their 
cases to the Supreme Court. The law 
indeed appeared to lessen the tide of 
cases, at least at first. During 1890, 
before passage, 623 new cases were 
docketed at the Supreme Court. In 
1892, the number dropped by more 
than half, to 275.
The 1891 law, known as the Evarts 
Act, also contained the seeds of to-
day’s Court’s largely discretionary 
jurisdiction. For the first time, Con-
gress created a category of cases that 
the Supreme Court would review 
only upon certification, or certiorari, 
although most cases continued to 
flow to the Court as a matter of right.
The Supreme Court embraced 
the opportunity to limit the number 
of cases coming before it. During 
the first two years after passage of 
the 1891 act, it granted certiorari 
in only two cases. While careful to 
maintain its power to grant certiora-
ri in any case pending in the courts 
of appeals, the Court was, quite 
deliberately, “chary of action in re-
spect to certiorari,” as it explained 
in Forsyth v. City of Hammond, de-
cided in 1897. In Forsyth, the Court 
announced narrow criteria for when 
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certiorari would be appropriate:
[The certiorari] power will be 
sparingly exercised, and only when 
the circumstances of the case sat-
isfy us that the importance of the 
question involved, the necessity of 
avoiding conflict between two or 
more courts of appeal, or between 
courts of appeal and the courts of a 
state, or some matter affecting the 
interests of this nation in its inter-
nal or external relations, demands 
such exercise.
These criteria remain, largely un-
changed, the stated criteria for cer-
tiorari today as set forth in Supreme 
Court Rule 10.
The Evarts Act, however, was 
not successful in its goal of cutting 
the Court’s workload to a manage-
able size. It did not eliminate most 
of the Court’s mandatory appellate 
jurisdiction. The hope that the cre-
ation of the intermediate appellate 
courts would satisfy litigants’ need 
for appellate review, thereby making 
an appeal to the Supreme Court less 
attractive, proved largely illusory. 
(Lawyers and litigants often appar-
ently used the right of an appeal to 
the Supreme Court simply as a de-
laying tactic, a possibility that seems 
entirely obvious to a modern legal 
audience.) In the years following the 
enactment of the Evarts Act, the Su-
preme Court’s caseloads increased 
again to unmanageable proportions, 
as the nation, its economy, and its 
judicial business continued to grow. 
Moreover, even after 1891 and de-
spite the concern for the Supreme 
Court’s caseload that inspired the 
Evarts Act, Congress continued to 
create even more categories of man-
“The Supreme Court/Men Who Know the Law,” October Term, 1895. Designed by the American Lithographic Co., 
1896, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States.
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datory appeals to the Court. In 1903, 
for example, it passed the Expediting 
Act, which created the three-judge 
district court to hear certain anti-
trust cases. Appeals from this type 
of district court went directly to the 
Supreme Court as of right. And over 
the following 10 to 15 years, Con-
gress provided that more and more 
types of cases follow this procedure. 
(A handful of cases, such as consti-
tutional challenges to congressional 
districts, are subject to this proce-
dure even today.)
Although it expanded the Court’s 
mandatory jurisdiction in some ar-
eas, Congress did cut back on it in 
others. In 1916, for example, Con-
gress eliminated mandatory juris-
diction over Federal Employers’ Li-
ability Act cases, as well as certain 
cases arising out of state courts, cas-
es from the Philippines, and cases 
arising under certain other federal 
statutes. The most significant over-
haul of the Supreme Court’s jurisdic-
tion, however, was the 1925 Judges’ 
Bill—so called because it was drafted 
by members of the Supreme Court 
itself. The Act dramatically expand-
ed the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction, 
leaving only a few, relatively small 
categories of cases for mandatory 
appeals.
The goal of the Judges’ Bill, like 
the Evarts Act, was to free the Court 
from having to decide cases that were 
not important to anyone beyond 
the immediate parties involved and 
to allow it to focus on more nation-
ally significant matters. The House 
Committee report on the Judges’ Bill 
explained:
The problem is whether the time 
and attention and energy of the 
court shall be devoted to matters 
of large public concern, or whether 
they shall be consumed by matters 
of less concern, without especial 
general interest, and only because 
the litigant wants to have the court 
of last resort pass upon his right.
In a 1925 Yale Law Review article, 
Chief Justice William Howard Taft 
provided more detail about what 
sorts of cases he believed the Court 
should take on certiorari after pas-
sage of the Judges’ Bill, reiterating 
the criteria the Court first articulat-
ed in the 1890s—and that today are 
embodied in Rule 10:
The function of the Supreme 
Court is conceived to be . . . the 
consideration of cases whose deci-
sion involves principles, the appli-
cation of which are of wide pub-
lic or governmental interest, and 
which should be authoritatively 
declared by the final court. Such 
cases should include issues of the 
Federal constitutional validity of 
statutes, Federal and State, genuine 
issues of constitutional rights of 
individuals, the interpretation of 
Federal statutes when it will affect 
large classes of people, questions 
of Federal jurisdiction, and some-
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times doubtful questions of gen-
eral law of such wide application 
that the Supreme Court may help 
remove the doubt. Where there 
is a conflict of opinion between 
intermediate appellate courts in 
the different Circuits or between 
the Federal intermediate appellate 
courts and the Supreme Courts of 
the States, the public interest cer-
tainly requires that the Supreme 
Court hear the cases, if its decision 
will remove the conflict.
The Judges’ Bill did not com-
pletely eliminate caseload pressures, 
of course. Petitions for certiorari alone 
topped 5,000 a year by the early 1980s. 
In October Term 2011, the Court con-
sidered more than 7,500 petitions, 
although this number represents a 
modest decrease from prior years. 
Despite these massive numbers, 
however, the Court has not fallen 
behind in dealing with these filings. 
Instead, it has adopted a variety 
of ways of dealing with them effi-
ciently—from eliminating the need 
to discuss a petition in the justices’ 
conference unless at least one justice 
wants to consider it, to relying on 
law clerks to read the petitions and 
summarize them in brief memos. 
This latter mechanism relies heavi-
ly on the “cert pool”—a cooperative 
agreement among most of the jus-
tices (currently, all but Justice Alito) 
in which the petitions are divided 
among the chambers and each petition 
is assigned to a single law clerk. The 
cert pool was introduced in the 1970s.
For cases decided on the merits, 
however, the Court continued to 
feel greatly burdened by its work-
load in the mid- to late twentieth 
century, even as the number of merits 
cases shrank. In the 1980s, the Court 
heard argument and issued written 
opinions in approximately 150 cases 
a year. Many observers, and some of 
the justices themselves, believed that 
150 cases were simply too many for 
the Court to handle well. Moreover, 
these people argued, the Court was 
unable to give truly important cases 
the time and attention they needed 
in part because of the need to man-
age the mandatory appeals, which 
were often not of interest beyond the 
parties themselves. There was much 
discussion of some kind of national 
court of appeals or other panel to 
assist the Supreme Court with the 
more mundane cases. Then-Justice 
William H. Rehnquist explained at 
his 1986 confirmation hearings to be 
Chief Justice:
I think if Congress could be per-
suaded, not ultimately but very 
presently, there ought to be a 
new national court, frankly 
recognized as such, with judges 
appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate, who 
would act as something of a junior 
chamber of the Supreme Court, 
to hear primarily statutory cases 
about which there are presently 
conflicts in the circuit[s].
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As we all know, no such dramatic change occurred. During the 
1970s, Congress eliminated man-
datory jurisdiction in a number 
of types of cases and in 1988, once 
again at the justices’ urging, it elim-
inated almost all of the remaining 
direct appeals to the Supreme Court. 
The Court, freed from mandatory 
appeals and aggressively applying its 
certiorari criteria, has been hearing 
argument in fewer and fewer cases 
a year. In October Term 2011, for 
example, the number of cases decid-
ed after briefing and oral argument 
reached the historic low of 65 cases.
Not only do these numbers place 
the Supreme Court caseload at his-
toric lows, but, as Judge Richard A. 
Posner has pointed out, when mea-
sured as a proportion of all cases in 
the federal judicial system, the case-
load is vanishingly small. He “com-
pare[s] the percentage just of fed-
eral court cases in which the Court 
granted certiorari in 2004—0.11% 
(64 divided by 56,396)—with the 
corresponding percentage in 1960—
1.6% (60 divided by 3753)” to find 
that “the Court reviewed, in relative 
terms, almost 15 times as many fed-
eral court cases in 1960 as in 2004.”
Put another way, what Frankfurter 
and Landis said in 1928 remains just 
as true today:
Perhaps the decisive factor in the 
history of the Supreme Court 
is its progressive contraction of 
jurisdiction. . . . In contrast with 
the vast expansion of the bounds 
of the inferior federal courts, the 
scope of review by the Supreme 
Court has been steadily narrowed.
Photo of Supreme Court Room (in the Capitol), c. 1894, Wittemann Collection, Library of Congress.
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This “progressive contraction,” 
both of mandatory jurisdiction and 
of the Court’s exercise of its own dis-
cretion to hear cases, has reached a 
point where the concerns expressed 
today about the Supreme Court’s 
workload are unprecedented. Com-
mentators and observers today com-
plain that the Court is not taking 
enough cases and that the justices 
do not work hard enough. In stark 
contrast to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
statements at his confirmation hear-
ings, then-Judge John G. Roberts in-
dicated at his hearings in 2005 that 
he thought there was “room for the 
Court to take more cases.” None-
theless, since his confirmation, the 
Court has not in fact done so. As al-
ready noted, the Court decided only 
65 cases after briefing and argument 
in October Term 2011. Whether 
and how Congress—or the Court it-
self—will ultimately respond to such 
complaints and observations, and 
what the next 125 years will bring, 
remains to be seen. ◆
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James Kent wrote those words in 1826, decrying the fact that more than 600 volumes of English and 
American case reports and treatises 
had been published, but not many 
of them were helpful to the student 
seeking an understanding of the 
common law. “Steady perseverance,” 
to Chancellor Kent, meant setting 
aside more books than were consulted, 
to take control of the “indigestible 
heap of . . . legal authorities.”
The early classes at Chicago-Kent 
College of Law were taught in judges’ 
chambers or in law offices, where 
the library usually belonged to the 
instructor. Students were often free 
to use the books, and sometimes 
could borrow them for short periods 
of time. The trouble was, everyone 
needed the same books. The prob-
lem was underscored when Dean 
Langdell’s case method became the 
dominant means of instruction. 
Many volumes of case reports had to 
To attain a competent knowledge of the common law . . . 
requires steady perseverance, in consequence of the number of 
books which beset and encumber the path of the student.
     —James Kent
125 YEARS OF LAW BOOKS, 1888–2013
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be replaced year after year, because 
the pages where the assigned cases 
appeared were simply thumbed to 
death by students: the casebook was 
born of necessity as much as conve-
nience.
The nineteenth century law 
schools that merged to become Chi-
cago-Kent College of Law had very 
small collections of books, but stu-
dents had access to both the city’s 
public library (founded in 1872) and 
the Newberry Library, a human-
ities research collection open to the 
public that was established in 1887. 
The only Chicago law library of any 
size was the Chicago Law Institute 
Library, which was incorporated by 
a small group of lawyers in 1857 to 
serve the needs of the city’s grow-
ing legal community. The collection 
consisted of approximately 7,000 
volumes and was housed in the 
Cook County Courthouse, where 
judges, government employees, and 
law students were permitted to use 
the collection at no charge, while lo-
cal practitioners paid an annual fee 
of $100. The Law Institute collection 
eventually served as the basis for the 
Cook County Law Library, which is 
now estimated to have more than 
300,000 volumes.
Law book publishing in the nine-
teenth century was initially based 
in Albany, New York City, Philadel-
phia, and Boston, but Chicago also 
had a share of the industry, includ-
ing E.B. Myers & Co., a book store/
office for Lawyers Co-operative 
Publishing Company of New York, 
and the Illinois Book Exchange, 
which provided student textbooks. 
The most famous law book store of 
all was “Callaghan’s Three Miles of 
Law Books” at 68 West Washing-
ton Street, which eventually became 
“Miles and Miles of Law Books” in 
later advertisements when its stock 
was replaced after the Great Chicago 
Fire of 1871. Law books were often 
distributed through the publishers’ 
own book stores, but Callaghan sold 
books from many publishers.
It was in the 1880s that American 
law publishers began to create order 
out of the “indigestible heap” of law 
books that was growing very fast 
as the nation and commerce devel-
oped. By then, case reports had been 
published in the United States for 
approximately 100 years, but not in a 
systematic way until West’s National 
Reporter System began in 1879 with 
the Northwestern Reporter. West 
was the company that established a 
real system for publishing cases, and 
then followed that innovation with 
the American Digest System. Soon 
after the Northwestern Reporter be-
gan, West took over and improved 
the U.S. Digest, which was previously 
published by Little, Brown. West’s 
digests and Key Number System 
enabled lawyers to find what they 
needed in the rapidly-growing sets 
of West reporters. The company then 
answered the needs of lawyers who 
could not afford (and did not want) 
the entire national system when it 
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began publishing state digests and 
reporters.
As West was inventing a sys-
tem to grapple with the burgeon-
ing case law, Frank Shepard was 
inventing the case citator. Shepard’s 
Citations began in 1873 as a service 
in which adhesive labels were sent 
to subscribers who affixed them to 
the pages of published case reports 
so that the lawyer reading the case 
could determine whether the court’s 
decision in the case was still “good 
law” or had been overturned on ap-
peal. Eventually Shepard developed 
a complicated system of abbrevia-
tions to indicate the importance and 
validity of the case so that a reader 
knew if the case could be cited as au-
thority for the statement he wanted 
to make. The awkward method of 
updating (the gummed labels often 
dried up and fell off the pages) didn’t 
work very well, so Shepard began 
publishing his updating system in 
bound volumes keyed to the various 
reporters and updated by paperback 
supplements. The lawyer who needed 
to determine the history or current 
status of a case he was reading could 
simply check by citation. Finally, in 
the 1980s, the Shepard’s Citations 
system became the extremely cur-
rent online citator that lawyers use 
today.
One response to the proliferation 
of cases was the birth of selective 
case reporters with so-called anno-
tations, i.e., an explanation that put 
the case(s) in context and provided a 
narrative to explain the development 
of a particular area of law. It was sim-
ply impossible for most lawyers to 
keep up with the massive number of 
court opinions being published, so 
the idea of highlighting and explain-
ing only the leading cases had real 
merit. The earliest of the annotated 
cases, in the 1880s, were accompa-
nied by short notes; later on, editors 
wrote hundreds of pages to explain 
the development and current state 
of an area of law in multiple juris-
dictions.
Another innovation that came 
from the law book publishers soon 
after the turn of the century was the 
specialized loose-leaf service. The 
first successful one was published by 
Commerce Clearing House in 1913 
after ratification of the Sixteenth 
Amendment created the income 
tax. Soon there were other services 
covering such subjects as trade reg-
ulation and banking, then additional 
areas of law as more publishers en-
tered the field. The most useful of the 
loose-leaf services brought together in 
one publication all of the things that a 
practitioner needed: court opinions, 
rulings, statutes and regulations, as 
well as secondary commentary. Many 
of the services were updated weekly, 
so the lawyer had less reason to worry 
that the information he had was out of 
date. In the 1980s, many lawyers who 
specialized in a particular area of law 
welcomed the new CD-ROM format, 
which made it easy for them to carry 
around their entire law library.
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Judges were not the only busy 
writers; legislatures, both state and 
federal, began to pass more laws to 
deal with the demands of an increas-
ingly complex industrial society. Ses-
sion laws were often published only 
at the end of a session of the legisla-
ture; these, along with the occasional 
statutory digest and the various in-
dexes, were not sufficient to make 
the material available in a timely 
manner. It was increasingly difficult 
to piece together the original statute 
with all of the amendments of later 
years. The Revised Statutes of 1873 
was a temporary solution to the 
problem, but it was 1926 before the 
first publication of the United States 
Code. The Code finally gave lawyers 
access to federal law in a topical ar-
rangement that was updated. The 
official Code is republished every 
six years; the most recent edition 
consists of more than 200,000 pages. 
West began publishing an unofficial 
version of the Code right away, in 
1927, called the United States Code 
Annotated. As everyone knows who 
has done research in federal statutes, 
West did a faster, better job than the 
government of publishing the sup-
plementation necessary to keep the 
Code up to date. Many states also 
began to compile their statutes into 
a topical arrangement with an ex-
tensive index. Some of these com-
pilations provided citations to cases 
or short annotations of the court 
decisions that had construed each 
section of the statute.
No law library could afford to 
collect all of the official statutes and 
court opinions of Federal and state 
governments, let alone the commer-
cial versions of primary material. The 
huge wave of secondary legal publi-
cations that appeared in response 
to the New Deal and the eventual 
specialization of the legal profession 
made it impossible to build a truly 
comprehensive collection. The 600 
volumes of case reports that once 
annoyed Chancellor Kent contin-
ued to multiply until it eventually 
became the behemoth that also in-
cluded thousands of law reviews and 
legal newspapers. Luckily, the tech-
nology we needed and the uniform 
system of legal citation made it pos-
sible to control this enormous mass 
of material, and to simplify the many 
elaborate systems that had been cre-
ated to help the practitioner find the 
law by subject.
The 1970s and 1980s were de-
cades of real achievement in mak-
ing the whole body of law and the 
many secondary sources more read-
ily available in convenient form. 
The Lexis database was followed 
eventually by Westlaw, and the two 
systems have dominated the market 
for online legal research ever since, 
despite weak challenges from small-
er publishers and from the open ac-
cess movement. The recent entry of 
Bloomberg Law/BNA into the online 
market is the first real challenge to 
the supremacy of Lexis and Westlaw.
A collection of historical books 
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named The Making of Modern Law 
(MOML) was an important con-
tribution to law collections several 
years ago that helped to level the field 
for new academic law libraries that 
had few of the older books. MOML 
is a digital collection of more than 
twenty thousand nineteenth and 
early twentieth century treatises and 
other legal documents that are acces-
sible through Chicago-Kent Library’s 
online catalog. As one flips through 
the pages of this electronic book col-
lection, it is somewhat surprising to 
realize that quite often one is looking 
at images of a print work that was 
once prized by our nineteenth centu-
ry faculty and students. An example 
is Thayer’s A Preliminary Treatise on 
Evidence at the Common Law, pub-
lished at the turn of the last century 
and later added to our library’s print 
collection as the 10,510th volume, a 
work that is still available on a shelf 
in the library, but also accessible as 
a full-text e-book that can be read 
24/7 by clicking a hyperlink.
Now that our huge collections of print volumes are disappearing 
from shelves, what will happen next 
to the academic law book collections 
that took more than a century to 
acquire? One can probably predict 
more offsite storage, more e-books, 
and more use of print-on-demand 
options. What was once known as 
“collection development” in the li-
brary has undergone radical change. 
Acquisition is often temporary, and 
research materials are not automat-
ically added to the library’s perma-
nent collection.
Class poem from The Transcript, 1920, Chicago-Kent’s student yearbook, photo by Emily Barney.
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Many law libraries are returning 
to their roots to make the historical 
materials of their law schools avail-
able. For instance, Chicago-Kent 
Library is starting a project to pre-
serve the law school’s unique his-
torical collections by placing them 
in a digital repository. The images 
will reside in the cloud, rather than 
moldering away, page by page, in a 
dark room. The institutional reposi-
tory will be the permanent home for 
(among other things) the early pub-
lications and videos of and about the 
law school. We will be able to tell the 
descendant of a 1915 graduate where 
to find the online class photograph 
that includes his great-grandfather. 
The nephew of a woman who was 
the class poet many years ago can 
now read her work online, because 
we saved on old student yearbook 
before it disintegrated.
Today’s law student may finish 
her legal education and then go into 
the practice of law without ever using 
a print volume, given the twenty-first 
century reality that online databases 
usually contain everything she needs 
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the Library at Chicago-Kent. She received 
her law degree from Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center and her M.S. in Library 
Science from Catholic University. Keith 
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for research, and client files are often 
in an electronic knowledge manage-
ment system rather than in a print 
file. But if she returns for a law school 
class reunion in a few years, hoping 
to re-live her triumph at a law stu-
dent talent show, we hope we’ll have 
a link to the video. ◆
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I. The First 100 Years
A. The Early Years
At the end of the nineteenth century, the major meth-od by which one became 
a lawyer was through self-study 
under the supervision of a prac-
ticing lawyer—an apprenticeship. 
Few law schools or even university 
law departments existed. In 1774, 
Judge Tapping Reeve of Connecti-
cut established the first law school, 
Litchfield. Over the next 58 years, 
Reeve and his partner James Gould 
lectured on all areas of the law to 
over one thousand student-appren-
tices. Graduates included two Vice 
Presidents of the United States, 101 
members of the United States House 
of Representatives, 28 United States 
senators, three justices of the United 
States Supreme Court, 14 state gov-
ernors and 13 state Supreme Court 
chief justices. In 1779, Thomas Jef-
ferson established a “chair in law” at 
William and Mary. George Wythe 
was appointed to the position, and 
gave lectures on various law subjects 
as part of the university’s multifari-
ous curriculum. Harvard, Pennsyl-
vania, Maryland and other schools 
later added actual law departments; 
Ralph L. Brill
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Photo of Grand Pacific Hotel, LaSalle St. and Jackson Blvd., site of the Illinois Supreme Court chambers of 
Justice Joseph M. Bailey, where Chicago College of Law classes met, 1887–1889.
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their graduates were awarded bach-
elor degrees. Most schools offered 
a curriculum similar to Litchfield’s: 
lectures on Domestic Relations, Ex-
ecutors and Administrators, Sheriffs 
and Gaolers, Contracts and Actions, 
Torts, Evidence, Pleading and Prac-
tice, The Law Merchant, Equity, 
Criminal Law, and Real Property. 
Apprenticeship remained the major 
means to becoming a lawyer.
As interest in law training in-
creased, lawyer/mentors tended to 
overwork their apprentices with 
work growing out of their practices, 
leaving little time for the would-be 
lawyers to study on their own. Also, 
the significant increase in immi-
grants furnished a large audience 
eager to enter a profession in their 
new country. Thus, a number of eve-
ning law programs began, enabling 
those interested in keeping their jobs 
while preparing for careers in law. In 
Chicago, the first of these was Union 
College of Law, begun in 1859. It was 
founded and maintained through a 
loose association of Northwestern 
University and Chicago University. 
The Chicago University was not The 
University of Chicago, which was 
founded years later in 1890. Chicago 
University went defunct about 1871, 
at which time Northwestern com-
pletely took over the Union College 
of Law.
In 1887, four young clerks at 
the law firm of Burke, Hollett and 
Tinsman—Kickham Scanlon, Louis 
Henry, Rudolph Frankenstein, and 
Joseph Grannick—asked Mr. Burke 
for advice on how they could obtain 
mentoring after work as they stud-
ied for possible admission to the bar. 
Mr. Burke recommended they talk 
with Justice Thomas A. Moran of the 
Illinois Appellate Court. Moran was 
intrigued with the idea but at that 
time believed he was too busy. He in 
turn recommended they speak with 
Justice Joseph Meade Bailey, then 
of the Appellate Court and soon to 
be elevated to the Illinois Supreme 
Court. Justice Bailey agreed to meet 
with the group from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m. 
three nights a week in what they infor-
mally called “The Evening Law Class.” 
The group met in Justice Bailey’s 
chambers at the Court, located in the 
Grand Pacific Hotel, at LaSalle and 
Jackson. As word of the class spread, 
other apprentices throughout the 
city requested to be allowed to sit in 
on the class. In 1888, the class was 
formalized and Justice Bailey incor-
porated it as Chicago College of Law, 
with himself as dean and president. 
Bailey induced Justice Moran and 
Appellate Court Judge Shepard to join 
him as teachers, enabling them to split 
the evenings and have classes Monday 
through Saturday.  
Classes were spread over two 
years, and labeled the Junior and 
Senior Classes. The Junior classes 
were held on Monday, Wednesday 
and Friday, from 7 p.m. to 10 p.m., 
and the Senior classes were held on 
Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday. Tu-
ition was set at $5 per month, pay-
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able three months in advance. The 
judges’ lectures were supplement-
ed for the Junior Class by readings 
from law books, including Black-
stone’s Commentaries, Kent’s Com-
mentaries, Bishop on Contracts, 
Walker’s American Law, and Morey’s 
Elements of Roman Law. The Senior 
Class was assigned readings from 
more advanced legal texts includ-
ing, Bishpam’s Principles of Equity, 
Gould on Pleading, Taylor on Cor-
porations, and Langdell on Equity 
Pleadings. Completion of the two-
year program enabled graduates to 
be eligible for admission to the bar, 
upon proper motion by an existing 
member of the bar.
Students could be admitted with-
out having attended college or fin-
ishing high school. Students who 
lacked a high school diploma could 
be admitted by showing that they 
had a “good common school edu-
cation” and could pass a test on the 
branches of learning commonly 
taught in high school. Many other 
schools in the country did not admit 
women or persons of color. In con-
trast, the Chicago College of Law cat-
alogue emphasized that “no distinc-
tion will be made in the admission of 
students on account of sex or color.” 
Thus, among the students in the early 
classes were several women and stu-
dents of color. Ms. Emma Bauman 
was in the very first class and was 
admitted to practice in 1890. Ms. 
Ida Platt, Class of 1894, was the first 
African-American woman admitted 
to practice in Illinois. Twenty of the 
first one hundred women admitted 
to practice in Illinois were graduates 
of the school.  
Things moved quite quickly in 
the first few years. The rapid increase 
in enrollment led Justice Bailey to 
move the classes to the Appellate 
Court rooms at the Chicago Op-
era House Building, on Clark near 
Washington. In 1889, the Chicago 
College of Law merged with Lake 
Forest University, which was seeking 
to become a full-fledged university 
with affiliated medical, dental and 
seminary schools. In addition, be-
cause so many lawyers had already 
been admitted to practice, based 
only on their home-study, the Chi-
cago College of Law established a 
post-graduate program to help them 
measure up to the demands of the 
profession. The graduate program 
consisted of one year of practice-ori-
ented courses, two nights per week 
for eight months, with tuition of $40 
per year. Further help was offered 
through a summer school, with 
classes on drafting pleadings and 
contracts, for a fee of $12. Comple-
tion of the full three-year program 
earned graduates a Bachelor of Laws 
degree and automatic admission to 
the bar.
The success of the College is 
shown by the fact that over the first 
six years of its existence, 766 students 
graduated from the two-year under-
graduate program, and 290 lawyers 
from the graduate program. In 1892, 
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the ever increasing size of the class-
es caused the College to move once 
again, this time to the Atheneaum 
Building, located on Van Buren near 
Michigan.
Justice Bailey passed away in 
1896. Judge Moran took over as dean 
and president. Judged by modern 
standards, the law school was liter-
ally an undergraduate college, with 
very young students. It was thus nat-
ural that the typical college organi-
zations formed, including fraterni-
ties and sororities, clubs of all kinds, 
a school newspaper, and a combina-
tion catalog/yearbook/law review, 
The Athenaeum Journal.
Meanwhile, in 1891, Northwest-
ern took full control of the Union 
College of Law, and renamed it 
Northwestern Law School. Marshall 
Ewell, one of Union College’s lead-
ing professors, was unhappy with 
the shift in teaching philosophy and 
pedagogy that was put into effect at 
Northwestern. He believed that by 
eliminating many practical courses 
from its curriculum, Northwestern 
had lost sight of the fact that the law 
school was supposed to be training 
students for the practice of law. In 
1892, he and several other faculty 
members resigned and formed a new 
school, Kent School of Law. Within a 
year the name changed to Kent Col-
lege of Law. Forty-two Northwestern 
students followed Ewell to Kent. The 
initial classes were held at the Briggs 
and Stratton Business School Build-
ing. Kent’s first catalog opined that it 
would be the first law school in the 
country emphasizing the “practical 
method,” requiring each student, af-
ter learning the basics of the law, to 
“engage in the practical work such 
as usually engages the attention of a 
regular practitioner.” Such training 
would enable graduates “at once to 
fill important and responsible positions 
. . . which, under the old method, they 
could not . . . fill without from six 
months to a year’s further training in 
an office.” The curriculum featured 
an upper class School of Practice, in 
which each student would have to 
draft all of the typical documents for 
cases that would arise in every area 
of practice.
Kent College was very success-
ful, enrolling well over 500 students 
during the first three years of its ex-
istence. Within a year, the law school 
Painting of Justice Joseph Meade Bailey, Dean, Chi-
cago College of Law, 1888–1896.
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moved to the sixth floor of the Ash-
land Block Building at Clark and 
Randolph. Two years later, it moved 
again, this time to the Association 
Building, next to the Chicago Bar 
Association’s quarters on LaSalle 
Street.
In 1902, Ewell’s advancing age 
apparently led him to negotiate a 
merger with Chicago College of Law 
of Lake Forest University. The law 
school name was changed to Chica-
go-Kent College of Law. Ewell and 
some Kent faculty made the move as 
well. Two years later, Lake Forest de-
cided to leave the professional school 
business, rescinded the merger, and 
Chicago-Kent became a freestand-
ing independent law school, which 
it remained for 65 years. In subse-
quent years, Chicago-Kent absorbed 
other law schools that had tried to 
establish themselves in the Chicago 
law school market, including colleges 
named YMCA, Webster, Western and 
Chicago Business Law. The Chica-
go-Kent curriculum was expanded to 
three years, and a bachelor of laws 
awarded to graduates, which made 
them eligible for admission to the 
bar. The law faculty adopted the Case 
Method of teaching, pioneered by 
Langdell of Harvard, but also retained 
the senior School of Practice inherited 
from Ewell and Kent College.
In 1904, Judge Thomas Moran 
passed away. He was succeeded by 
Justice Edmund W. Burke, also of 
the Appellate Court. The law school 
now employed, part-time, about 20 
lawyers and judges to teach the solid 
array of courses in its three-year cur-
riculum. They were paid $5 per class 
hour for their teaching. Courses were 
divided by the number of weeks they 
would meet. Thus, during their first 
Photo of 116 North Michigan Ave., site of Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1912–1924.
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year, students took Contracts for five 
hours a week for 14 weeks, Torts for 
two and one-half hours per week for 
18 weeks, Personal Property for two 
and one-half hours for 11 weeks, etc. 
The law school moved again in 
1913. It occupied three floors in the 
new 116 N. Michigan Avenue Build-
ing, which also housed the Chicago 
Municipal Courts. This arrange-
ment made it easier to draw on the 
judges and lawyers who served as 
faculty, and reach out to the employ-
ers of many of the students. Among 
the faculty was one distinguished 
alumnus of the school, Hon. Henry 
Horner, Judge of the Probate Court.
Horner continued to teach until 
1924, during which time he wrote 
the leading treatise on Illinois Pro-
bate Law. In 1933, he was elected 
Governor of Illinois, serving till his 
death in 1940.
The make-up of the student body 
was incredibly diverse. A survey of 
one class showed that the students 
held jobs as disparate as accountants, 
court reporters, dentists, engineers, 
law clerks, letter carriers, merchants, 
secretaries, teachers, etc. They were 
primarily young people on the rise. 
Thus, the school had a debating so-
ciety, which placed teams in compe-
titions against teams from other col-
leges. These debates were carried on 
radio, and the listeners sent in their 
ballots to choose the winners. The 
school also had a swimming team, a 
wrestling team, and a highly success-
ful basketball team, all competing 
against teams sponsored by other local 
colleges, churches, or clubs. One of the 
six fraternities, Phi Alpha Delta, was 
established at Chicago-Kent, and in 
fact had its own fraternity house on 
south Michigan Avenue. The first legal 
sorority, Kappa Beta Pi, likewise began 
at Chicago-Kent and soon had chap-
ters throughout the country. A band, 
the Kent Syncopators, was hired out 
for weddings and bar mitzvahs. When 
World War I broke out, many students 
enlisted or were drafted. Some, unfor-
tunately, did not return from the war.
B. World Wars I and II
In 1918, upon the death of Dean Edmund W. Burke, his son, Web-
ster Burke, became dean and pres-
ident of the Board of Trustees. He 
continued to run the school for over 
30 years, at a salary of $400 per year. 
He waived all salary during and after 
World War II. Tuition in 1918, which 
had been $60 per year in 1888, had 
slowly risen to $90 per year. The ear-
ly period of Webster Burke’s tenure 
as dean saw the law school grow to 
one of the largest in the country. 
Thus, from 1909 to 1912, Chica-
go-Kent had the sixth largest student 
population; from 1913 to 1916, it 
had climbed to second largest.
Webster Burke was a frugal ad-
ministrator and somehow raised 
enough money so that by 1923 the 
law school was able to finally buy 
its own building, a small four-story 
structure at 10 N. Franklin Street.
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That year coincided with the inau-
guration of the Chicago-Kent Law 
Review.
Over the next 15 years, the law 
school increased its requirements for 
admission. The first change was to 
require applicants to have complet-
ed at least 30 hours of college credit. 
Within a few years, the requirement 
grew to 60 hours. The school also 
gradually moved towards adding a 
day division. A major step was taken 
in 1937 when the law school received 
ABA accreditation, enabling gradu-
ates to be eligible to seek admission 
to practice in any other state. In ad-
dition, part-time teachers were no 
longer the entire law school faculty. 
By 1940, six full-time teachers made 
up the nucleus of the faculty: Don-
ald Campbell, James Hemmingway, 
Charles Pickett, Roger Severns, Ernest 
Tupes and William F. Zacharias. Tui-
tion now was charged by the credit 
hour—$7 per hour, with 75 hours 
required to graduate.
World War II had a serious im-
pact on the law school. Unlike many 
other law schools, it remained open, 
though with very small classes. The 
student-body was roughly a third of 
its normal size. Warren Heindl, born 
with cerebral palsy and thus ineli-
gible for the draft, took one class in 
which he was the only student. The 
professor held every class and re-
quired Warren to “recite” on every 
assigned case.
In 1949, Dean Burke resigned so 
that the school could apply for AALS 
accreditation. The rules required a 
full-time dean and he still was work-
ing and drawing a salary at his old 
law firm. Donald Campbell was pro-
moted from the full-time faculty to 
take on the job. AALS accreditation 
was received in 1951, making Chica-
go-Kent one of only three non-uni-
versity affiliated schools to be ac-
credited by the AALS. The year 1951 
also saw over 500 alumni attend the 
65th annual homecoming luncheon 
in the Grand Ballroom of the Sherman 
Hotel. At that event, a Chicago-Kent 
student team was honored for reach-
ing the finals of the National Moot 
Court Competition, a first for the 
law school.
In 1956, Dean Campbell retired 
and William F. Zacharias was cho-
sen to succeed him. Zacharias at first 
declined the offer because of what he 
asserted was the deplorable physical 
condition of the law school. The 10 
N. Franklin building had no library. 
Students had to use the library of the 
Cook County Bar Association at the 
Civic Center. It had only three class-
rooms and not enough offices for the 
full-time faculty. In fact, Zacharias’ 
first faculty “office” was located in 
the boiler room!
Zacharias agreed to accept the job 
after President Douglas Schwantes 
of the Board of Trustees announced 
a fund-raising campaign, seeking to 
acquire for the law school the adjoin-
ing wine warehouse at 12 N. Frank-
lin, and to blend the two buildings 
into one. A $500,000 campaign was 
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successfully launched, the building 
was acquired, and classes continued 
to be held at 10 N. Franklin while the 
blending construction took place at 
12 N. Franklin. When it was com-
plete, the law school now contained 
space for a library reading room, a 
reserve library stack area for 25,000 
books, a 200-seat auditorium, six 
classrooms, a student lounge, a small 
faculty library, seven faculty offices, 
a separate faculty washroom, a large 
entry area, offices for the dean, reg-
istrar, and two assistants, as well as 
space for a switchboard operator.
Dean Zacharias prided himself 
on “running a tight ship.” However, 
he often ran it too tightly. He was 
dean, policeman, security guard, 
registrar, admissions officer, and 
secretary all-in-one. He made all 
admissions decisions, some of them 
controversial. He cut off the locks 
from student lockers at the end of 
the year. He physically removed 
students from classes if they were 
behind in paying tuition. He also 
personally threw out the occasional 
Skid Row bum who wandered into 
the building. At the time of registra-
tion for a new semester, he wrote out 
the class schedule for each student, 
including selecting their “electives” 
for them. When grades were turned 
in, he computed each student’s grade 
point average by pencil, and then 
personally typed the warning letters 
to those who were to be put on pro-
bation and the dismissal letters to 
those who would be dismissed.
Photo of 10-12 North Franklin St., site of Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1924–1976.
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Faculty who taught for most of 
the Zacharias years included the 
brilliant Fred Herzog, a judge in 
Austria who fled the Nazi invasion 
to come to America, James K. Mar-
shall, Theodore Bayer, John Drac, 
Marty Hauselman, Warren Heindl, 
Shelvin Singer, Jerry Bepko, Dean 
Sodaro, and a very young Ralph 
Brill. Faculty salaries were very low, 
and teaching loads were very high.  
In 1968, both Dean Zacharias 
and President Doug Schwantes an-
nounced that they would be retiring 
within a year. While the school was 
maintaining steady enrollment and 
income, it had a very small endow-
ment to fall back on should leaner 
times appear. The Trustees contin-
ued to insist on quality education 
at an affordable tuition—$18 per 
credit hour with 75 hours required 
for graduation. Some felt that the 
reputation and the future of the 
law school were jeopardized by the 
fact that it was not connected with 
a university. Thus an agreement was 
reached to merge the school with 
the Illinois Institute of Technology, 
effective in 1969. A controversial 
provision in the agreement indicated 
that the law school would be moved 
to the IIT campus in the future, away 
from the downtown law firms and 
not convenient for evening students. 
The agreement also specified that 
the Chicago-Kent name would not 
be changed.
For the first time in its history, 
the law school performed a nation-
wide search for Zacharias’ successor; 
however in the end, the faculty and 
administration chose Fred Herzog 
to be its new leader. Simultaneous-
ly with his taking office in Septem-
ber 1970, an unexpected rise in ap-
plications for admission occurred. 
The number of women taking the 
LSAT rose dramatically. Within the 
three years of his deanship, the total 
enrollment of the school rose from 
450 to 750, with most of the increase 
being traceable to the high percent-
age of women entering law school. 
The boom necessitated a dramatic 
increase in full-time faculty, and 
pushed the limits of the existing 
physical plant to a nearly unman-
ageable level.
Dean Herzog made history by 
the faculty he recruited and hired. 
Among the many new faculty hired 
during Dean Herzog’s short term 
were Mary Lee Leahy, the first 
woman professor at Chicago-Kent, 
and Emerson Blue, the first Afri-
can-American professor. Dr. Walter 
Jaeger, a nationally famous profes-
sor at Georgetown and the author 
of the revised edition of the famous 
treatise, Williston on Contracts, was 
induced to join the Chicago-Kent 
faculty. He also hired Lew Collens, 
who later would become dean of 
the law school and then president 
of the university. Two wonderful 
colleagues, Howard Chapman and 
Phil Hablutzel, were also hired at 
that time and are still active and pro-
ductive professors at the law school. 
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When Professor Leahy left for a gov-
ernment appointment, Dean Herzog 
hired another well-known female 
lawyer, Jill McNulty, who later would 
be elected as Justice of the Appellate 
Court.
In December 1973, Dean Herzog 
was recruited by the Illinois Attor-
ney General to become First Assis-
tant Attorney General of Illinois. 
Professor Ralph Brill, then the asso-
ciate dean, was elevated to interim 
dean, and served for two years.
Much was accomplished in those 
two years. The law school space was 
doubled by annexing space at 33 W. 
Madison. Five new professors were 
hired, including David Rudstein and 
Richard Conviser. A new clinical 
program was started in which third 
year law students earned credit by 
working on Cook County Legal As-
sistance Foundation cases, under the 
supervision of three clinical profes-
sors hired by the law school. War-
ren Wolfson, a well-known Chicago 
lawyer and judge, was hired to start 
the Trial Practice program.
C. The Lew Collens Era
In 1974, the IIT administration selected Professor Lew Collens to 
become the dean of the law school. 
Lew went on to serve as dean for 17 
years, at which time he was selected 
to be the president of the university. 
During Lew’s long reign as dean, the 
law school made tremendous prog-
ress as an innovative and exciting 
law school.
One of the first steps taken by 
Dean Collens and IIT’s new presi-
dent, Tom Martin, was to resolve the 
physical plant issues that had mush-
roomed as the school had grown. 
The 10–12 N. Franklin building was 
much too small for the many stu-
Photo of Lewis Collens, c. 1975, Dean of IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1974–1990.
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dents and faculty now at the school, 
and the 33 W. Madison annex was 
only a temporary solution. While 
the merger agreement with IIT had 
specified that the law school would 
relocate to a building on campus at 
31st and Federal, the law school fac-
ulty, Chicago-Kent Board of Over-
seers, and the alumni agreed that 
this would be a significant mistake. 
President Martin agreed, and instead 
raised funds to acquire a six-sto-
ry building at 77 S. Wacker Drive. 
The more than 120,000 square feet 
was at least five times the total space 
of the old building and annex. The 
space was refurbished with modern 
furniture and fixtures, several floors 
of classrooms, two floors of open li-
brary stacks and reading rooms, over 
50 faculty, administrative and stu-
dent organization offices, a cafeteria, 
one separate floor for the clinic, and 
a multi-use auditorium. The library 
grew to house 450,000 volumes. The 
school moved into the new space in 
mid-1976.   
Dean Collens was a very prag-
matic dean, willing to take chanc-
es with new ideas and back them 
fully. Thus, in 1977, he approved 
the creation and implementation 
of the first three-year Legal Writ-
ing program in the country, headed 
by Professor Brill. As it developed, 
students were required to take 11 
credit hours of the total of 90 now 
required for graduation, in five sepa-
rate courses, spread over three years 
of law school. The program received 
superlative reviews and the posi-
tive publicity was used successfully 
as a recruiting tool by the admis-
sions office. Full-time Legal Writing 
teachers taught the first-year classes 
and expert practitioners taught spe-
Photo of 77 South Wacker Dr., site of IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1976–1992.
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cialized advanced courses. In later 
years, a Visiting Assistant Professor 
component was added to help cover 
the first-year component. The VAP 
program, basically an apprentice-
ship for new teachers, still receives 
wide acclaim today. Over 50 former 
VAPs have gone on to careers as law 
professors at law schools throughout 
the country.
The successful Legal Writing pro-
gram also led to another remarkable 
program. At the behest of students 
Ron Petri and Tom Krebs, the facul-
ty approved the creation of the Moot 
Court Society. Students who had 
excelled in the first-year second-se-
mester Legal Writing oral advocacy 
competition were invited into the 
Society, and received credit for par-
ticipation in an advanced intra-mu-
ral competition. From this compe-
tition, students were chosen to staff 
Chicago-Kent teams in an increas-
ing number of inter-mural national 
moot court competitions. Almost 
immediately, student teams began 
winning local rounds of national 
competitions and then advancing to 
the final rounds of competitions such 
as the very prestigious National Moot 
Court Competition and the ABA 
National Advocacy Competition.
Professor Ron Staudt was respon-
sible for the next innovation the law 
school could justly claim—the es-
tablishment in 1983 of the Center 
for Law and Computers. Professor 
Staudt received a grant from IBM 
to install desktop computers into a 
student computer laboratory, and 
to teach students how to create their 
study materials, do legal research 
and experiment with the creation 
and drafting of legal documents us-
ing this then novel tool. Doctrinal 
faculty, who at first were against the 
use of the new gadgets, were taught 
word processing and research, and 
soon became supportive advocates 
for the program.
The Legal Clinic, begun as a sup-
plier of legal services for the poor, 
was turned into a full fee-generating 
law firm under the direction of Pro-
fessor Gary Laser. The Chicago-Kent 
Law Offices was and is still the only 
law school clinic of its kind in Amer-
ican law schools. Clinic lawyers and 
students worked on famous cases, 
such as representing John Wayne 
Gacy. One clinician, assisted by stu-
dents, won acquittal on attempted 
murder charges for Vietnam veter-
an Jerald Wood based on a Vietnam 
stress syndrome defense. The Law 
Offices also initiated an externship 
program, placing students as law 
clerks for credit with judges. 
In the 1980s, the Trial Advocacy 
program began sending teams to a 
number of national competitions. 
In 1988, a Chicago-Kent team, con-
sisting of Lauretta Higgins, Peter 
Roskam and Joel Daly, and coached 
by Professor Warren Wolfson, won 
the 13th Annual National Trial Ad-
vocacy competition, the start of a 
marvelous string of victories in na-
tional competitions.
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Dean Collens also devoted much 
attention to hiring and financially 
supporting the best possible schol-
ars to teach at Chicago-Kent. Thus, 
within a few years of his decanal 
appointment the following nation-
ally recognized scholars joined the 
faculty: Dan Tarlock, Mike Spak, 
Sheldon Nahmod, Stuart Deutsch, 
Howard Eglit, David Gerber, Marty 
Malin, Jeffrey Sherman, Joan Stein-
man, Margaret Stewart, Richard 
Wright, Steve Heyman, and Jacob 
Corre. The law school also benefited 
from semester or year-long visits by 
distinguished professors from elite 
law schools, including John Hart 
Ely of Harvard, and Gerald Gunther 
of Stanford. Special lectures were 
delivered by celebrated dignitaries 
including Justice Arthur Goldberg, 
Judge Abner Mikva, Governor Adlai 
Stevenson III, Mayor Harold Wash-
ington, and Mayor Richard J. Daley. 
Financial support for Chicago-Kent 
faculty scholarship was augmented 
by a grant from Paul Freehling in 
honor of his father, a Chicago-Kent 
alumnus.
Wise decisions also were made in 
judging young talent. Teachers who 
were given their start at Chicago- 
Kent, developed into leading experts 
in their fields, and then moved on to 
other schools included: Fred Abbott, 
Randy Barnett, Dale Nance, Anita 
Bernstein, Linda Hirshman, J. Gor-
don Hylton, and Carol Silver.
Another major change for the law 
school was the establishment of a 
number of specialized J.D. programs 
and several graduate programs. 
The graduate programs during this 
period were in Tax Law, currently 
run by Professor Gerry Brown, Fi-
nancial Services, currently run by 
Hank Perritt, and an LL.M. for for-
eign students, currently run as part 
of our international programs under 
the direction of Ed Harris. J.D. spe-
cialization certificate programs were 
available to students in Environmen-
tal Law and Labor Law, later joined 
by Litigation and Dispute Resolution 
and Intellectual Property.
The successes of the school’s in-
novative skills programs led Chief 
Justice Burger in 1986 to single out 
Chicago-Kent for special praise. The 
high quality of scholarship produced 
by the faculty played a key role in 
having Chicago-Kent inducted into 
the prestigious Order of the Coif, the 
70th school to receive that honor. 
And, in 1990, U.S. News and World 
Report listed Chicago-Kent as the 
top “Up and Coming Law School in 
the Country.”
In 1987, the law school celebrated 
its 100th anniversary. The all-day 
celebratory program featured vis-
its by alumni and guests to the law 
school, a convocation at McCor-
mick Place, the bestowal of honor-
ary Doctor of Laws degrees on Hon. 
Harry Blackmun of the U.S. Supreme 
Court and Professor Gerald Gunther 
of Stanford. Speeches were given by 
representatives of the students, fac-
ulty, alumni, legal education organi-
Ralph L. Brill 107
zations, and IIT. Dean Collens listed 
the agenda the school faced for the 
next 100 years. The list included: 
establishing faculty chairs to attract 
and retain great faculty; establishing 
interdisciplinary research centers 
in such subjects as environmental 
law, energy, computers and the law, 
legal theory, and problems of the el-
derly; creating exchange programs 
abroad to enhance the teaching of 
international and comparative law; 
expanding scholarship programs to 
attract great students and ease their 
financial burdens; and to expand the 
physical plant to accommodate ex-
pected growth in students and fac-
ulty. All of these and more would be 
accomplished in the next 25 years.
D. The Last 25 Years
The year 1990–91 was one of the most important in the school’s 
history. First, when IIT’s President 
Meyer Feldberg suddenly resigned, 
Lew Collens was elected by the IIT 
Board of Trustees to fill that position. 
He served as President until 2007. 
Professor Joan Steinman served 
as interim dean for one year. Rick 
Matasar, the associate dean at Iowa, 
was then selected to become Chica-
go-Kent’s next dean, the first Chica-
go-Kent dean to be chosen from out-
side the ranks of the existing faculty.
Second, the IIT Board of Trustees 
seized an opportunity to sell the exist-
ing law school building at 77 S. Wacker 
Drive and to raise additional funds 
with which to construct a new, state-
of-the art building at 565 W. Adams 
St., near Union Station. Among the 
many innovations in the new build-
ing were the Abraham Lincoln Ma-
rovitz Courtroom, a 500-seat audi-
torium, full computer technology 
in all offices and classrooms, a large 
fresh food cafeteria, and multiple 
student function areas. The building 
was finished and occupied in 1992.
During the 1990–96 era the law 
school faculty and dean focused on 
trying to improve the school’s rep-
utation among peer groups—i.e., 
scholarly faculty at other law schools. 
Dean Matasar therefore created a 
number of Distinguished Professor-
ships, rewarding some of the faculty’s 
most productive scholars. Many fine 
scholars were added to the faculty, 
including: Cheryl Harris, Lori An-
drews, Katherine Baker, Fred Bossel-
man, Evelyn Brody, Bartram Brown, 
James Lindgren, Richard McAdams, 
Richard Warner, Harold Krent, Steve 
Sowle, Richard Hasen, Rafael Gely 
and Sarah Harding. The annual law 
school catalog listed 12 pages of law 
review articles and books for this 
period.
Dean Matasar resigned in 1996 
to become dean at the University of 
Florida School of Law, and Professor 
Stuart Deutsch filled in as interim 
dean for a year. Professor Steve Sowle 
took over as assistant dean from 
long-time Associate Dean Howard 
Chapman, who continues to teach 
major courses in the curriculum.
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Professor Henry Perritt of Vil-
lanova was selected as dean of the 
law school in 1997 and served until 
2002. Perritt was a pioneer in the 
use of computers in legal education, 
wrote a multi-volume treatise on 
labor law, and consulted on issues 
related to the war and recovery in 
Kosovo. As dean he established the 
extensive multi-disciplinary Global 
Law and Policy Initiative through 
which faculty, students, and alumni 
worked together on issues related to 
international criminal law, assisting 
the media to deal with political cen-
sorship in Bosnia, computerizing in-
frastructures for courts and business 
in Poland, and providing advice to 
refugees from the war in Kosovo.
Among the faculty hired during 
Dean Perritt’s term were: Graeme 
Dinwoodie, Steven Harris, Mark 
Rosen, Claire Hill, Tim Holbrook, 
Christopher Leslie, Nancy Marder, 
and Peggie Smith.
By the end of Dean Perritt’s term 
in 2002, Chicago-Kent was ranked 
in the top third of all law schools 
by U.S. News and World Report. It 
was one of only a few schools with 
an evening division to be ranked 
that high. It ranked behind Chicago, 
Northwestern and Illinois among 
law schools in the state.
In 2003, Hal Krent was selected 
to succeed Perritt as Chicago-Kent’s 
dean. He still holds that position. It 
is fair to say that since his appoint-
ment the law school has succeeded 
in every major respect, from faculty 
recruiting, to scholarly production, 
to superior skills training, to hav-
ing a major role in legislative and 
societal planning. The quality of the 
students has increased dramatically. 
Members of the faculty are leaders in 
their fields, invited to appear on na-
tionwide programs as well as deliver 
talks to individual law school audi-
ences. They are regularly recruited 
by more elite schools, but luckily most 
have remained at Chicago-Kent. The 
Moot Court and the Trial Advocacy 
programs are consistently ranked 
among the top 10 in the country. 
The three-year Legal Writing pro-
gram remains unique and emu-
lated. The physical plant has been 
continuously upgraded and is still 
a state-of-the-art facility. The school 
has added many international and 
LL.M. programs, attracting over 100 
students annually from all corners of 
the globe.
The beginning years of the 
twenty-first century continued the 
wonderful successes of the Moot 
Court program. Under the direc-
tion of Professor Sanford Greenberg 
and, for the last nine years, Professor 
Kent Streseman, the Chicago-Kent 
Moot Court program has achieved 
remarkable successes in national 
competitions. Our teams have won 
36 national and regional moot court 
competitions, along with over 80 in-
dividual awards for brief-writing and 
oral advocacy. It has the distinction 
of being the only school nation-wide 
to win back-to-back national titles in 
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the National Moot Court Competi-
tion, the oldest and most prestigious 
tournament in the country.
Similar successes have come in 
the Trial Advocacy program. Under 
the direction of former Judge Dave 
Erickson, and with coaching assis-
tance of many Chicago trial lawyers 
and judges, the Chicago-Kent trial 
teams and members have excelled in 
national and regional competitions. 
Since 2000, Chicago-Kent teams 
have been National Champions four 
times. In various regional compe-
titions Judge Erickson’s teams have 
been declared Champions nine times.
Under the direction of Mary Rose 
Strubbe and Susan Adams, Chica-
go-Kent’s three-year Legal Writing 
program continues to be a model 
emulated by many other schools 
and consistently ranks among the 
top writing programs in the country. 
The program has a group of very 
experienced and dedicated teach-
ers: Elizabeth De Armond, Suzanne 
Ehrenberg, Doug Godfrey, Sanford 
Greenberg, and Kari Johnson. Cher-
ish Keller was hired recently to work 
with teaching foreign students in the 
LL.M. programs. Outstanding Vis-
iting Assistant Professors fill out 
the program before going on to 
tenure-track teaching jobs at other 
Photo by Hedrich Blessing Photography of 565 West Adams St., site of IIT Chicago-
Kent College of Law, 1992–present.
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law schools.
The Law Offices of Chicago-Kent 
greatly expanded during the last 25 
years. It now offers a wide range of 
long-standing programs in live-cli-
ent clinical legal education that ac-
commodate more than 150 students 
in the fall and spring semesters and 
more than 50 students in the sum-
mer semester. The programs are 
diverse, covering the practice of 
criminal defense law, health and 
disability law, immigration law, em-
ployment discrimination law, tax law, 
family law, business law, and medi-
ation and alternative dispute reso-
lution. Current full-time teacher/
practitioners in the clinic are Gary 
Laser, Richard Kling, Daniel Coyne, 
Richard Gonzalez, Laurie Leader, 
Heather Harper, Rhonda de Freitas, 
Edward Kraus, Ana Mencini, Jona-
than Decatorsmith, and Pam Ken-
tra. Natalie Potts runs a program in 
Open Government. Vivien Gross su-
pervises the Judicial Externship and 
Legal Externship programs in which 
students are placed as law clerks for 
credit with a judge or legal practice. 
The last 10 years have seen the 
greatest growth in the breadth and 
credentials of the faculty. Dean 
Krent raised one and a half million 
dollars from 450 alumni to create 
Chicago-Kent’s first endowed chair, 
The Ralph L. Brill Chair in Law. Pro-
fessor Adrian Walters, a world-re-
nowned expert on bankruptcy law 
from the United Kingdom, was ap-
pointed as the first chair-holder. The 
school’s excellent reputation aided 
the dean and faculty in recruiting 
outstanding teachers including, 
Sungjoon Cho, Carolyn Shapiro, Mi-
chael Scodro, Daniel Hamilton, Felice 
Batlan, Bernadette Atuahene, William 
Birdthistle, Kimberly Bailey, César 
Rosado Marzán, Christopher Bucca-
fusco, Edward Lee, David Schwartz, 
Stephanie Stern and Christopher 
Schmidt.
Chicago-Kent’s reputation for 
constant innovation has continued 
in the early twenty-first century. The 
energy of the new faculty and of the 
dean has led Chicago-Kent to be-
come home to several institutes and 
centers, with missions that range 
from conducting scholarly and 
practical research on legal and so-
cial issues to providing topical pro-
gramming for the legal community 
to developing public interest initia-
tives. Students who become involved 
in these activities, many of which 
involve cross-disciplinary projects, 
learn to appreciate and adapt to 
major social and global influences 
changing the nature of legal practice. 
II. The Future
I hope that one reading this histo-ry is impressed with the tremen-
dous growth of this great law school, 
from the Evening Law Class meeting 
in the chambers of Justice Bailey in 
1887 to a vibrant, innovative, state-
of-the-art educational institution. 
Among the thousands of its gradu-
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Ralph L. Brill has been a member of the 
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law faculty 
since 1961. He served as Associate Dean 
from 1970 to 1973, and Acting Dean 
from 1973 to 1974. For 14 years, Profes-
sor Brill was director of Chicago-Kent’s 
unique three-year legal research and writ-
ing program, for which he is widely known. 
He has been the recipient of numerous 
awards for his contributions to the field 
of Legal Writing, including the Burton 
Foundation Legends Award, The AALS 
Section on Legal Writing, the Reasoning 
and Research Annual Award, the Legal 
Writing Institute Lifetime Achievement 
Award, the ALWD Leadership Award, 
and the special LWI/ALWD Ralph L. 
Brill Award for Long-Time service. Chi-
cago-Kent’s first endowed chair is named 
after him, and is held by Ralph L. Brill 
Professor Adrian Walters. Professor Brill 
is co-author (with S. Brody, C. Kunz, R. 
Newmann and M. Walter) of the Amer-
ican Bar Association publication, A 
Sourcebook on Legal Writing Programs, 
has written numerous practical articles 
on Tort law, and has prepared appellate 
briefs in many important Tort cases.
ates are governors, senators, judges, 
outstanding lawyers, corporate exec-
utives, teachers, and societal leaders. 
The present situation is challeng-
ing. The economy has weakened the 
demand for lawyers. The costs of 
legal education have escalated dra-
matically. The innovations of the 
past, while great, may not be enough 
for the new issues law schools will 
face in coming years. But through-
out its history, this law school has 
met every new challenge, including 
the Great Depression and two World 
Wars, by finding ways to innovate 
and advance. The Spirits of the 
founders, Justices Bailey and Moran, 
and Marshall Ewell, and of their suc-
cessors, hold great promise that this 
law school will continue to thrive 
and prepare great lawyers and public 
leaders far into the future. ◆
